The Customary International Law Supergame February 23, 2004 Penance contrast, is subgame perfect and is" weakly renegotiation proof. Under penance, the response to defection is counter-defection that is continued until the original defector accepts a period of punishment after which all players return to cooperation. That is, in the event of defection, the victim retaliates by defecting until the initial defector accepts a period of punishment, by cooperating while the victim defects a form of penance seems to be endorsed by the International Law Commission of the United Nations for application in international law generally. Articles 49 to 54 of the Articles on State Responsibility provide that countermeasures may be used only to induce a state to cease a wrongful act and to make reparations; they must be commensurate with the injury V. Equilibrium Selection and Coordination One of the problems in an n-player prisoners dilemma is identifying the strateg hat other players are playing and coordinating on a single strategy. Fudenberg and Tirole conclude: " Thus, repeated play with patient players not only makes cooperation'-meaning efficient payoffs--possible, it also leads to a large set of other equilibrium outcomes. Several methods have been proposed to reduce this multiplicity of equilibria; however, none of them has yet been widely accepted, and the problem remains a topic of research. Under circumstances of multiple equilibria, anything that tends to focus the players'attention on one particular equilibrium, in a way that is commonly recognized, tends to make this the equilibrium that the players will expect and thus actually implement. While there is no formal solution to this problem, states may coordinate through diplomacy, through other communication, or through their actions advancing particular customary rules. The selection among multiple equilibria may be understood as a separate, coordination game. Here, CIL, for example as reflected in the Rules of State Responsibility, may also play a role 3. Assumptions Within the N-Player Prisoner's Dilemma See Fudenberg Tirole, supra note 36, at 179-182."Penance"is sometimes referred to as"getting even. See RoGEr B MYERSON, GAME THEORY: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT 326-27(1991 Fudenberg Tirole, supra note 36, at 180, citing Farrell Maskin, supra note 45,at 327; Eric van Damme, Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, 47J. EcoN THEORY 206(1989) See The Chorzow Factory Case, 1928P C I.J., Ser A, Nos 7,9, 17, 19(obligation to make reparations) See david J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AM J INT'L L 817 54 Myerson, supra note 49, at 371The Customary International Law Supergame February 23, 2004 17 “Penance” 49 , by contrast, is subgame perfect and is “weakly renegotiation￾proof.” 50 Under penance, the response to defection is counter-defection that is continued until the original defector accepts a period of punishment after which all players return to cooperation. That is, in the event of defection, the victim retaliates by defecting until the initial defector accepts a period of punishment, by cooperating while the victim defects. A form of penance seems to be endorsed by the International Law Commission of the United Nations for application in international law generally. Articles 49 to 54 of the Articles on State Responsibility provide that countermeasures may be used only to induce a state to cease a wrongful act and to make reparations; 51 they must be commensurate with the injury. 52 v. Equilibrium Selection and Coordination One of the problems in an n-player prisoner’s dilemma is identifying the strategy that other players are playing and coordinating on a single strategy. Fudenberg and Tirole conclude: “Thus, repeated play with patient players not only makes ‘cooperation’—meaning efficient payoffs—possible, it also leads to a large set of other equilibrium outcomes. Several methods have been proposed to reduce this multiplicity of equilibria; however, none of them has yet been widely accepted, and the problem remains a topic of research.” 53 Under circumstances of multiple equilibria, “anything that tends to focus the players’ attention on one particular equilibrium, in a way that is commonly recognized, tends to make this the equilibrium that the players will expect and thus actually implement.” 54 While there is no formal solution to this problem, states may coordinate through diplomacy, through other communication, or through their actions advancing particular customary rules. The selection among multiple equilibria may be understood as a separate, coordination game. Here, CIL, for example as reflected in the Rules of State Responsibility, may also play a role. 3. Assumptions Within the N-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma 49 See Fudenberg & Tirole, supra note 36, at 179-182. “Penance” is sometimes referred to as “getting even.” See ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT 326-27 (1991). 50 Fudenberg & Tirole, supra note 36, at 180, citing Farrell & Maskin, supra note 45, at 327; Eric van Damme, Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, 47 J. ECON. THEORY 206 (1989). 51 See The Chorzow Factory Case, 1928 P.C.I.J., Ser. A, Nos. 7, 9, 17, 19 (obligation to make reparations). 52 See David J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 817 (2002). 53 Id. at 112. 54 Myerson, supra note 49, at 371