Rational Choice Theory and International Law: Insights and limitation Robert o. Keohane James b. duke professor of political science Duke University Author's note: The article appears in The Journal of Legal Studies, Volume XXXI(1), Pt. 2, January 2002 S307-S319. This volume is an attempt to explore the value of rational-choice analysis for the study of international law. As the editors suggest, the field of international law has been quite resistant to rational-choice analysis. It is important to recognize, however, that the enterprise of which this volume is an example is not new. Political scientists have used rational-choice analysis for two decades to understand international institutions, beginning notably with a special issue of international Organization in 1982. Some international legal scholars understood fairly quickly that"international institutions, "in the language of political science, were largely equivalent to "international law"as they understood it. Indeed, Anne-Marie Slaughter characterized institutionalist work on international regimes as"reinventing international law in rational-choice language Kenneth abbott was the pioneer among international legal scholars in introducing political scientists' arguments about institutions into the legal literature. More recently, another special issue of International Organization -this time an interdisciplinary venture involving international legal scholars -has been devoted to the subject of realization I These comments are highly indebted to the discussion at the conference on Rational Choice and International Law, University of Chicago Law School, April 27-29, 2001. I especially want to thank Lenneth Abbott, George Downs, John Ferejohn, Jack Goldsmith, Nannerl O Keohane, Eric Posner, Imke Risopp-Nickelson, and Duncan Snidal for comments on earlier drafts. 2 International Organization, volume 36, no. 2(Spring 1982), reprinted in Stephen DKrasner,ed International Regimes(Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1983). The papers in this volume that used rational-choice frameworks were Arthur A Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World"(pp 115-140 in the Krasner volume)and Robert O Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes"(pp. 141-171). The latter paper is the theoretical kernel of my 1984 book, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the world Political Economy(Princeton: Princeton University Press) Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, "International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, " 87 American Journal of International Law 205(1993), p. 220. Kenneth w. Abbott, "Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for Intermational Lawyer 14 Yale ournal of international Law 335 (1989) International Organization, volume 54, no. 3(summer 2000), reprinted as Judith L. Goldstein, Miles, Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, eds, Legalization and World Politics(Cambridge MIT Press, 2001). Kenneth w. Abbott and duncan Nidal rely heavily on rational-choice analysis in their ontribution to this volume; and the influence of the rationalist way of thinking pervades it. See Abbott and Snidal, "Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, "in Legalization, pp. 37-71 Rational Choice Theory and International Law: Insights and Limitations1 Robert O. Keohane James B. Duke Professor of Political Science Duke University Author’s note: The article appears in The Journal of Legal Studies, Volume XXXI (1), Pt. 2, January 2002: S307-S319. This volume is an attempt to explore the value of rational-choice analysis for the study of international law. As the editors suggest, the field of international law has been quite resistant to rational-choice analysis. It is important to recognize, however, that the enterprise of which this volume is an example is not new. Political scientists have used rational-choice analysis for two decades to understand international institutions, beginning notably with a special issue of International Organization in 1982.2 Some international legal scholars understood fairly quickly that “international institutions,” in the language of political science, were largely equivalent to “international law” as they understood it. Indeed, Anne-Marie Slaughter characterized institutionalist work on international regimes as “reinventing international law in rational-choice language.”3 Kenneth Abbott was the pioneer among international legal scholars in introducing political scientists’ arguments about institutions into the legal literature.4 More recently, another special issue of International Organization – this time an interdisciplinary venture involving international legal scholars -- has been devoted to the subject of legalization.5 1 These comments are highly indebted to the discussion at the conference on Rational Choice and International Law, University of Chicago Law School, April 27-29, 2001. I especially want to thank Kenneth Abbott, George Downs, John Ferejohn, Jack Goldsmith, Nannerl O. Keohane, Eric Posner, Imke Risopp-Nickelson, and Duncan Snidal for comments on earlier drafts. 2 International Organization, volume 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982), reprinted in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1983). The papers in this volume that used rational-choice frameworks were Arthur A. Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World” (pp. 115-140 in the Krasner volume) and Robert O. Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes” (pp. 141-171). The latter paper is the theoretical kernel of my 1984 book, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 3 Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, “International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda,” 87 American Journal of International Law 205 (1993), p. 220. 4 Kenneth W. Abbott, “Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers,” 14 Yale Journal of International Law 335 (1989). 5 International Organization, volume 54, no. 3 (summer 2000), reprinted as Judith L. Goldstein, Miles, Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, eds., Legalization and World Politics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001). Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal rely heavily on rational-choice analysis in their contribution to this volume; and the influence of the rationalist way of thinking pervades it. See Abbott and Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,” in Legalization, pp. 37-72