SPEAKING FROM IGNORANCE 219 Mesoudi..5).Nearly every theory in Accordng to ales-pragmaics thory. There are man ns to do so.Two of the relationship are con be th with others,and (b)people t to be accepted and ple,the field of safe driving is not a p of the driv C.g. 1979 rs tailor-made for conformity Hov and other objects.Thus,values stitute real on and a uld often cho e not to agre with the c of mo vary i ng so not ding to and rea g pa nd thers in a y,and trust.The experiments d a hypothesis explicitly ny oth r psychological activity,is neve out a single that has proved valuable for explaining Asch's (195 on in which he used a task would be ome intoler and thus inefficic d小wnan nt for ing (Hodges&B n.192).These multiple valu are hete ght be g when the hical.a term first used by Warre by all the valt vary in their ordering for the s of the In drivine for e may take pric Values-Pragmatics Theory place ut then re night lead to i Values tical approach to og ha ents to he and ability to identify bility to recognize and the goods (ie of clanf a lication to Asch' s the desi (19)e ation we use in this.According to the the ory.values are the n e that ion) sider.for e mple.the act of The Dilemma of speaking from knowledge field of safe travel (Gibson Crooks,1938),is a very rea vell;the participants questions fron a position other participants gave the same wrong answer.Although the others values defipe the field of action and are obligatory:Unles sch(1952. 12)himself offered safery,travel (i.e.,freedom of movement),and oth h in comm 86)ecological psychology Mesoudi, 2009; Richerson & Boyd, 2005). Nearly every theory in social psychology, especially those about social influence, would agree. There are many compelling reasons to do so. Two of the most powerful are believed to be the following: (a) People want to be correct, and the most likely way to be correct in this situation is to agree with others, and (b) people want to be accepted and liked by others, and one of the most reliable ways to do this is to agree with other people’s views (e.g., J. D. Campbell & Fairey, 1989; Claidière & Whiten, 2012; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). The speaking-from-ignorance (SFI) situation, described earlier, appears tailor-made for conformity. However, we argue that it is considerably more complicated than it first appears. More specif￾ically, we predicted that individuals asked to speak from ignorance would often choose not to agree with the correct answers of more knowledgeable others. Their reasons for doing so would not be stupidity, stubbornness, or independence. Rather, their failures to agree would be generated by pragmatic considerations for speak￾ing to others in a cooperative and pragmatically warranted way and by their seeking to acknowledge values, particularly truth, social solidarity, and trust. The experiments tested a hypothesis explicitly posed by values-pragmatics theory (Hodges & Geyer, 2006), an account that has proved valuable for explaining Asch’s (1951, 1956) well-known studies, in which he used a task that seems tailor-made for dissent. The overarching argument we offer is that a single set of complex dynamics can account for people some￾times agreeing when they might be expected to disagree (i.e., Asch situation) and sometimes disagreeing when they might be expected to agree (i.e., the SFI situation). We begin by introducing selected aspects of values-pragmatics theory, illustrating it, first, using driving as an example, then applying it to Asch’s (1956) speaking-from-knowledge situation. Then we turn to a more careful analysis of the SFI situation. Values-Pragmatics Theory Values-realizing theory is a general theoretical approach to perception, action, and cognition, which has been applied to perception-action tasks (e.g. Hodges, 2007b; Hodges & Lindhiem, 2006), social and developmental issues (e.g., Hodges & Baron, 1992; Hodges & Geyer, 2006), and language and cognition (e.g., Hodges, 2007a, 2009). Applied to social communicative contexts, values-realizing theory has sometimes been referred to as values￾pragmatics theory (Hodges & Geyer, 2006), and that is the desig￾nation we use in this article. According to the theory, values are the real goods that define fields of action within ecosystems; that is, they constrain what is possible to do that makes an activity worth doing. Consider, for example, the ecosystem of driving. The act of driving brings into existence a field (in the sense used in physics) that guides the driver’s actions. This field, which has been called the field of safe travel (Gibson & Crooks, 1938), is a very real physical field that opens up before the vehicle, is bounded by obstacles (e.g., buildings, trees, other vehicles), and is continu￾ously changing its size and shape. It is also a social field, since it depends crucially, often moment to moment, on the actions of others. Values define the field of action and are obligatory: Unless safety, travel (i.e., freedom of movement), and other values such as accuracy and tolerance (e.g., distance between vehicles) are real￾ized sufficiently, the field will literally cease to exist (Hodges, 2007b). According to values-pragmatics theory, values are not located in persons or in objects but are better thought of as real demands placed on relationships, so that action and perception are con￾strained by values, regardless of whether or not there is any explicit awareness or acknowledgment of those demands. For example, the field of safe driving is not a projection of the driver (e.g., it exists even if the driver is not looking), nor does it exist in cars, roads, or other objects. Rather, it exists as a dynamic field of possibilities “for good or ill” (i.e., affordances; Gibson, 1979/ 1986, p. 127) that obligate the driver’s ongoing actions relative to cars, roads, and other objects. Thus, values constitute real onto￾logical, epistemic, and ethical demands on possible actions, and as such, they cannot be equated with social norms, personal prefer￾ences, or biological needs. Individuals or groups may vary in how skilled they are in attending to and realizing particular values, but individuals and groups do not “possess” values. Rather, values define the goods that make their existence and action possible.1 According to values-pragmatics theory (Hodges, 2007b), any psychological activity is constrained by multiple goods. Driving, or any other psychological activity, is never about a single value, such as safety, or accuracy, or efficiency. If one cared only for safety, one would never drive; if one cared only for accuracy, driving would become intolerant and thus inefficient and unsafe. As a values-realizing activity, driving cannot be reduced to goal seeking (Hodges & Baron, 1992). These multiple values are heter￾archically organized. Heterarchical, a term first used by Warren McCulloch (1945), means that actions are mutually constrained by all the values, so that there is no fixed, hierarchical ordering of values; rather, across time and task, values vary in their ordering for the sake of the joint realization of all the values (i.e., the ecosystem as a whole). (Hodges, 2009, p. 632) In driving, for example, speed and accuracy may take priority over safety at one place or time but then reverse at another. These are not simple tradeoffs: Sometimes safety might lead to increased speed and increased accuracy (tighter tolerances). Good driving is a continuous balancing act, making ongoing adjustments to realize all the values. It is possible, of course, to engage in bad driving, but there are very real limits, and our very ability to identify such misbehavior depends on our implicit ability to recognize and enact the goods (i.e., values) of driving. To illustrate and clarify the worth of this way of characterizing values, we review its application to Asch’s (1951) social dilemma, in which he had people answer questions that others had answered incorrectly (see Hodges & Geyer, 2006, for an extended discus￾sion). The Dilemma of Speaking From Knowledge In Asch’s (1956) experimental paradigm, everyone could see the visual information about which they were being asked equally well; the participants answered questions from a position of knowledge. The only difficulty, of course, was when all of the other participants gave the same wrong answer. Although the 1 Asch (1952, chapter 12) himself offered an account of values that has much in common with values-pragmatics theory (Hodges, 2007b), al￾though he was influenced by the Gestalt tradition (e.g., Asch, 1968; Köhler, 1937/1966), while Hodges and Baron (1992) developed their account in relation to Gibson’s (1979/1986) ecological psychology. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. SPEAKING FROM IGNORANCE 219