ElectronicjournalofcomparativeLa,vol.9.1(jAnuary2005),<http://www.ejclorg/> following the interactional pattern of the spontaneity paradox out of a therapeutic concern with the very real pathological effects the paradox can generate; it is at the basis of the generation of schizophrenic symptoms. Further research leads them to the hypothesis of double bind,, a pathological cond ition in which a person finds herself punished for correct perceptions. A double-bind interaction consists in three ingred ients Between two or more interacting parties there is an intense relationship, such as exhibited by family life and loyalty to a creed or ideology, but also including contexts influenced by social norms or In such a context, a message is given which is structured in a way that(a)it asserts something, (b)it asserts something about its own assertion and(c) these two assertions are mutually exclusive; thus, if the message is an injunction it must be disobeyed to be obeyed The recipient of the message is prevented from stepping outside the frame set by the message, either by metacommunicating(commenting)about it or by withdrawing, this makes the logically meaningless message into a pragmatic rea lity. 13 When we apply these psychological insights to the self-regulation paradox and take into account the less intense relationships between official actors on the side of the government and actors in social fields, we can diminish the concern that a double bind generating something akin to organizational schizophrenia will be a frequent phenomenon, but still the comparison will show a number of factors that may indeed lead to pathologies at the level of organizational interaction, and thus to a faulty social logic of processes of regulation. Fe instance. think of situations where the stakes between interacting agents are high, as a result of mutual dependencies in reaching their differently defined objectives, a legislative strategy implicitly metacommunicates a discrepant attitude, thus creatingconfusion (this legislative message is an injunction that must be disobeyed to be obeyed ); the legislative strategy is unidirectional, not a response to an offer for a regulation strategy coming from the regulated field the legal command is backed by force the legal command cannot be escaped, negotiated or evaded (thus becom ing a pragmatic reality) Especially when these factors are cumulatively present, a legislative strategy of legally conditioned self-regulation may easily backfire, lead ing to pro forma responses, and not achieve the desired effect of bounded regulative autonomy. But there is a more important lesson to be learned from the pragmatics of human communication. It concerns the conditions for success rather than the factors responsible for pathological interactional patterns. For the message of legally conditioned self-regulation to be taken seriously as an njunction to rule making and to evade the traps of its parad oxical structure, it is necessary to create an institutional structure in which metacommunication can occur. so that receivers can communicate back to senders. Consequently, both sides to the interaction can adapt their mutual expectations in the light of the legitimate point of view of the other. It will also be helpful if the official announcement of legally conditioned self-regulation is not issued as a command but as the outcome of previous negotiations(as a quasi-contract perhaps), so that it is no longer a unid irectional but a multid irectional strategy. It concerns matters for which the use of force is not resorted to, instead relying on the organizing power of established social Ibid. p. 212Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 9.1 (January 2005), <http://www.ejcl.org/> 7 following the interactional pattern of the spontaneity paradox out of a therapeutic concern with the very real pathological effects the paradox can generate; it is at the basis of the generation of schizophrenic symptoms. Further research leads them to the hypothesis of ‘double bind’, a pathological condition in which a person finds herself punished for correct perceptions. A double-bind interaction consists in three ingredients: - Between two or more interacting parties there is an intense relationship, such as exhibited by family life and loyalty to a creed or ideology, but also including ‘contexts influenced by social norms or tradition’. - In such a context, a message is given which is structured in a way ‘that (a) it asserts something, (b) it asserts something about its own assertion and (c) these two assertions are mutually exclusive; thus, if the message is an injunction it must be disobeyed to be obeyed’. - ‘The recipient of the message is prevented from stepping outside the frame set by the message, either by metacommunicating (commenting) about it or by withdrawing; this makes the logically meaningless message into a pragmatic reality.’13 When we apply these psychological insights to the self-regulation paradox and take into account the less intense relationships between official actors on the side of the government and actors in social fields, we can diminish the concern that a double bind generating something akin to organizational schizophrenia will be a frequent phenomenon, but still the comparison will show a number of factors that may indeed lead to pathologies at the level of organizational interaction, and thus to a faulty social logic of processes of regulation. For instance, think of situations where: - the stakes between interacting agents are high, as a result of mutual dependencies in reaching their differently defined objectives; - a legislative strategy implicitly metacommunicates a discrepant attitude, thus creating confusion (‘this legislative message is an injunction that must be disobeyed to be obeyed’); - the legislative strategy is unidirectional, not a response to an offer for a regulation strategy coming from the regulated field; - the legal command is backed by force; - the legal command cannot be escaped, negotiated or evaded (thus becoming a pragmatic reality). Especially when these factors are cumulatively present, a legislative strategy of legally conditioned self-regulation may easily backfire, leading to pro forma responses, and not achieve the desired effect of bounded regulative autonomy. But there is a more important lesson to be learned from the ‘pragmatics of human communication’. It concerns the conditions for success rather than the factors responsible for pathological interactional patterns. For the message of legally conditioned self-regulation to be taken seriously as an injunction to rule making and to evade the traps of its paradoxical structure, it is necessary to create an institutional structure in which metacommunication can occur, so that receivers can communicate back to senders. Consequently, both sides to the interaction can adapt their mutual expectations in the light of the legitimate point of view of the other. It will also be helpful if the official announcement of legally conditioned self-regulation is not issued as a command but as the outcome of previous negotiations (as a quasi-contract perhaps), so that it is no longer a unidirectional but a multidirectional strategy. It concerns matters for which the use of force is not resorted to, instead relying on the organizing power of established social 13 Ibid., p. 212