Union Let me substantiate the above as follows: in the initial stages of the Principles project, there was not much concern for its possibly unifying effect. The Principles, it was thought, were not intended to create uniform law. But these days, perhaps because of the influence of the European Parliament's two Resolutions, the outlook is quite different. It is not just scholarly writers who are concerned about the Principles''soft' status,they are also a hot political item. At a recent conference entitled Towards a European Civil Code, which was held when the Netherlands was holding the Presidency of the European Council, almost the entire morning session was devoted to finding a possible legal base in Community Law for the authority to impose mandatory rules of private law, was a separate treaty needed, was article K3 of the third pillar the legal base, or could a legal base be found in Articles 100 and 100a EU Treaty? In short the question was how to make mandatory law from soft law. The emphasis, therefore, was not on substantive private law aspects, but on the question of competence: the Principles could be incorporated, if necessary in an amended form, into a European codification providing a legal base was found in Community Law for imposing the Thirdly, the more traditional unification method-through binding treaties-is also characterized by the imposition by the state of law on organs which have to implement it. I discuss this method in the last place, because virtually no uniform abstantive property, contract or tort law has been created by this method. The reason for this is quite interesting: since, in order to be binding treaties, unanimity of the Treaty drafters and ratification by the national States are needed, they cannot play a major part in unifying private law. Where, in a context other than a European, binding treaties have been entered into, this has resulted in either conforming to a single legal system (the Hague Conventions on the International Sale of Goods), or a flight into vague formulations by way of compromise(UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods CISGD. It is quite remarkable that, whereas evidently where treaties were concerned the view prevailed that the differences between the systems were too great for achieving a successful unification through a binding instrument, now a quest has begun for a legal base in Community Law in order to coerce the ECC The current attempts to achieve a European private law can be characterized therefore as virtually totally authoritarian The ecc is much more a political rather than a legal challenge. This is striking since, in the national systems, legal positivism has been given up for the most part. Even in The Netherlands, where with the introduction of the new Dutch Civil Code in 1992 a greater fixation on state-imposed rules could be expected, judges are afforded such a degree of discretionary freedom that it is in fact Cf. Daniela Caruso: The Missing View of the Cathedral: The Private Law Paradigm of European Legal Integration, 3 European Law Journal(1997), 12, who states that the ongoing project of European integration is now transforming the rediscovery of the ius commune from a mere intellectual curiosity to fashionable political discourse 16 or Instance, Muller-Graff, op cit, at 27 The Hague 28 February 1997. See on this Nederlands Juristenblad(1997), 637 ff. and Zeitschrift fir Europaisches Privatrecht 5(1997), 595 ff. Cf. Gerhard Kegel, Internationales Privatrecht, 7th ed, (Munchen, 1991), 60 ff. Error! bookmark not definedError! Bookmark not defined. Union.14 Let me substantiate the above as follows: in the initial stages of the Principles project, there was not much concern for its possibly unifying effect. The Principles, it was thought, were not intended to create uniform law. But these days, perhaps because of the influence of the European Parliament's two Resolutions, the outlook is quite different. It is not just scholarly writers who are concerned about the Principles' `soft' status, 15 they are also a hot political item. At a recent conference entitled `Towards a European Civil Code',16 which was held when the Netherlands was holding the Presidency of the European Council, almost the entire morning session was devoted to finding a possible legal base in Community Law for the authority to impose mandatory rules of private law; was a separate treaty needed, was article K3 of the `third pillar' the legal base, or could a legal base be found in Articles 100 and 100a EU Treaty? In short: the question was how to make mandatory law from soft law. The emphasis, therefore, was not on substantive private law aspects, but on the question of competence: the Principles could be incorporated, if necessary in an amended form, into a European codification providing a legal base was found in Community Law for imposing the Principles. Thirdly, the more traditional unification method - through binding treaties - is also characterized by the imposition by the state of law on organs which have to implement it. I discuss this method in the last place, because virtually no uniform substantive property, contract or tort law has been created by this method. The reason for this is quite interesting: since, in order to be binding treaties, unanimity of the Treaty drafters and ratification by the national States are needed, they cannot play a major part in unifying private law.17 Where, in a context other than a European, binding treaties have been entered into, this has resulted in either conforming to a single legal system (the Hague Conventions on the International Sale of Goods), or a flight into vague formulations by way of compromise (UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods [CISG]). It is quite remarkable that, whereas evidently where treaties were concerned the view prevailed that the differences between the systems were too great for achieving a successful unification through a binding instrument, now a quest has begun for a legal base in Community Law in order to coerce the ECC. The current attempts to achieve a European private law can be characterized therefore as virtually totally authoritarian. The ECC is much more a political rather than a legal challenge. This is striking since, in the national systems, legal positivism has been given up for the most part. Even in The Netherlands, where with the introduction of the new Dutch Civil Code in 1992 a greater fixation on state-imposed rules could be expected, judges are afforded such a degree of discretionary freedom that it is in fact 14 Cf. Daniela Caruso: The Missing View of the Cathedral: The Private Law Paradigm of European Legal Integration, 3 European Law Journal (1997), 12, who states that the ongoing project of European integration is now transforming the rediscovery of the ius commune from a mere intellectual curiosity to fashionable political discourse. 15 For instance, Müller-Graff, op. cit., at 27. 16 The Hague 28 February 1997. See on this Nederlands Juristenblad (1997), 637 ff. and Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 5 (1997), 595 ff. 17 Cf. Gerhard Kegel, Internationales Privatrecht, 7th ed., (München, 1991), 60 ff