24.00: Problems of Philosophy Prof. Sally Haslanger September 26, 2001 Evidentialism v. Pragmatism 1. The"Wager"and the Practical Rationality Principle Practical Rationality Principle: The practically rational thing to do is the thing with the highest expected value(or utility ") Version A: Do the thing with higher expected value than all its competitors --In the case of a tie, neither action/belief is permitted Version B: Find the actions with highest expected value and perform whichever of them you like --In the case of a tie, Theism is practically rational. Just like choosing pie over cake 2. Evidentialism(Clifford). It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence"(p. 124) First objection: Problem is not with evidence, but with falsity of beliefs Cliffords response: There is an all-important difference between the beliefs we are entitled to hold and those we arent The beliefs we are entitled to hold are the ones supported by the evidence, i.e., the supported beliefs. Nothing else is relevant Second objection: Cliffords examples all involve beliefs that matter, i.e., ones that have consequences for the welfare of others. This suggests that maybe what's wrong is holding unsupported beliefs that can reasonably be expected to cause harm. What about harmless beliefs? Note distinction between actions that are intrinsically wrong and ones that are instrumentally wrong. Instrumental wrongs are not wrong in themselves, but only insofar as they cause harm. If unsupported belief is intrinsically wrong, then it would be clear that it is always wrong. But if only instrumentally wrong, then it would seem that there are all sorts of cases which no bad consequences could reasonably be expected. In fact, there seem to be cases in which unsupported beliefs are instrumentally good, i. e, they have good or positive consequences You'd expect Clifford, given his uncompromising position, would not be happy simply with the idea that the wrong o unsupported belief is merely instrumental. And he does sometimes suggest otherwise. But he has no argument for the intrinsic wrongness of unsupported belief. Instead he puts together a questionable argument that unsupported belief always has bad consequences, and so is ahvays instrumentally wrong But forasmuch as no belief held by one man, however seemingly trivial the belief, and however obscure the believer, is ever actually insignificant or without its effects on the fate of mankind, we have no choice but to extend our judgement to all cases of belief whatever (123)24.00: Problems of Philosophy Prof. Sally Haslanger September 26, 2001 Evidentialism v. Pragmatism 1. The "Wager" and the Practical Rationality Principle Practical Rationality Principle: The practically rational thing to do is the thing with the highest expected value (or "utility"). Version A: Do the thing with higher expected value than all its competitors. --In the case of a tie, neither action/belief is permitted. Version B: Find the actions with highest expected value and perform whichever of them you like. --In the case of a tie, Theism is practically rational. (Just like choosing pie over cake.) 2. Evidentialism (Clifford) "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence" (p. 124) First objection: Problem is not with evidence, but with falsity of beliefs. Clifford's response: There is an all-important difference between the beliefs we are entitled to hold and those we arenít. The beliefs we are entitled to hold are the ones supported by the evidence, i.e., the supported beliefs. Nothing else is relevant.. Second objection: Clifford's examples all involve beliefs that matter, i.e., ones that have consequences for the welfare of others. This suggests that maybe what's wrong is holding unsupported beliefs that can reasonably be expected to cause harm. What about harmless beliefs? Note distinction between actions that are intrinsically wrong, and ones that are instrumentally wrong. Instrumental wrongs are not wrong in themselves, but only insofar as they cause harm. If unsupported belief is intrinsically wrong, then it would be clear that it is always wrong. But if only instrumentally wrong, then it would seem that there are all sorts of cases in which no bad consequences could reasonably be expected. In fact, there seem to be cases in which unsupported beliefs are instrumentally good, i.e., they have good or positive consequences. You'd expect Clifford, given his uncompromising position, would not be happy simply with the idea that the wrong of unsupported belief is merely instrumental. And he does sometimes suggest otherwise. But he has no argument for the intrinsic wrongness of unsupported belief. Instead he puts together a questionable argument that unsupported belief always has bad consequences, and so is always instrumentally wrong. But forasmuch as no belief held by one man, however seemingly trivial the belief, and however obscure the believer, is ever actually insignificant or without its effects on the fate of mankind, we have no choice but to extend our judgement to all cases of belief whatever. (123)