98:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY radio communications between the CCP and Moscow a strategic priority and succeeded in the summer of 1936.Thereafter,Mao reported to Moscow every week on every important policy issue,and Moscow's directives were always closely heeded by Mao as well during the entire period of the Sino- Japanese war.10 Consequently,Stalin played an essential role in the CCP's policymaking process,and behind every major turn and twist in CCP policy a message from Moscow could be found.Mao's internationalistic outlook was evident when he stated at a party meeting in 1935 that "We are not an independent communist party,we are a branch of the Comintern,while our Chinese revolution is a part of the world revolution."1 "Ideology"alone.however,cannot explain why Mao's loyalty to Moscow sustained for decades before 1949,since one's "idea"would change in the real course of life journey.The Chinese Communists needed to feel worth- while to identify themselves as a part of the Moscow-led world revolution on a continuous basis.Nonetheless,the CCP's sense of being gratified cannot be measured by the quantity of Soviet material aid,just like chil- dren's affection for their parents cannot be determined by how many toys they get.Moscow's aid to the CCP came in three categories:psychological support,political guidance,and military assistance. Once the Chinese Communists committed themselves to their revolu- tion,they were against the whole world surrounding them.To sustain their hard-won struggle,they needed to know that they belonged to an interna- tional common cause and Moscow was on their side and ready to help them. Mao was fully aware of the crucial value of Moscow's psychological support to the CCP's morale.For instance,Mao made a speech at a rally on 30 November 1935,after the remaining CCP troops won a small battle in Shaanbei against the GMD local force.Mao claimed that the CCP's recent victory at home assisted "brothers"in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Mongolia (PRM).12 More than merely words of comfort,Mao's rhetoric actually conveyed his excitement over the receipt of Stalin's recent message.After the Jiangxi defeat,the CCP leadership was divided over where to locate their new base. Zhang Guotao wanted to go to western Sichuan,while Mao insisted on going to the Soviet-influenced northwest,close to either Xingjiang or Mon- golia.He reasoned that only with Soviet assistance could the CCP have a 10.For a more detailed discussion see Sheng."Mao.Stalin,"150-58;and idem,"Maoist Dualism and Chinese Communist Foreign Relations,1935-1949"(Ph.D.diss..York Univer- sity1991),21-196. 11.Huang Qijun,"The Process of Restoring Electronic Communication between the Party and the Comintern in 1935-36,"Dangshi Yanjiu 2 (1987):23.See also Sheng."Mao. Stalin,"159. 12.Mao Zedong wenji [The collection of Mao's writings](Beijing.1993).1:363-71.While the Chinese government of the time was resentful of Soviet influence in Outer Mongolia and refused to accept its independence.Mao had good reasons,as we will see,to feel blessed that Soviet control over Outer Mongolia was strengthened in the 1930s.98 : D I P L O M A T I C H I S T O R Y radio communications between the CCP and Moscow a strategic priority and succeeded in the summer of 1936. Thereafter, Mao reported to Moscow every week on every important policy issue, and Moscow’s directives were always closely heeded by Mao as well during the entire period of the Sino￾Japanese war.10 Consequently, Stalin played an essential role in the CCP’s policymaking process, and behind every major turn and twist in CCP policy a message from Moscow could be found. Mao’s internationalistic outlook was evident when he stated at a party meeting in 1935 that “We are not an independent communist party, we are a branch of the Comintern, while our Chinese revolution is a part of the world revolution.”11 “Ideology” alone, however, cannot explain why Mao’s loyalty to Moscow sustained for decades before 1949, since one’s “idea” would change in the real course of life journey. The Chinese Communists needed to feel worth￾while to identify themselves as a part of the Moscow-led world revolution on a continuous basis. Nonetheless, the CCP’s sense of being gratified cannot be measured by the quantity of Soviet material aid, just like chil￾dren’s affection for their parents cannot be determined by how many toys they get. Moscow’s aid to the CCP came in three categories: psychological support, political guidance, and military assistance. Once the Chinese Communists committed themselves to their revolu￾tion, they were against the whole world surrounding them. To sustain their hard-won struggle, they needed to know that they belonged to an interna￾tional common cause and Moscow was on their side and ready to help them. Mao was fully aware of the crucial value of Moscow’s psychological support to the CCP’s morale. For instance, Mao made a speech at a rally on 30 November 1935, after the remaining CCP troops won a small battle in Shaanbei against the GMD local force. Mao claimed that the CCP’s recent victory at home assisted “brothers” in the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of Mongolia (PRM).12 More than merely words of comfort, Mao’s rhetoric actually conveyed his excitement over the receipt of Stalin’s recent message. After the Jiangxi defeat, the CCP leadership was divided over where to locate their new base. Zhang Guotao wanted to go to western Sichuan, while Mao insisted on going to the Soviet-influenced northwest, close to either Xingjiang or Mon￾golia. He reasoned that only with Soviet assistance could the CCP have a 10. For a more detailed discussion see Sheng, “Mao, Stalin,” 150–58; and idem, “Maoist Dualism and Chinese Communist Foreign Relations, 1935–1949” (Ph.D. diss., York Univer￾sity, 1991), 21–196. 11. Huang Qijun, “The Process of Restoring Electronic Communication between the Party and the Comintern in 1935–36,” Dangshi Yanjiu 2 (1987): 23. See also Sheng, “Mao, Stalin,” 159. 12. Mao Zedong wenji [The collection of Mao’s writings] (Beijing, 1993), 1:363–71. While the Chinese government of the time was resentful of Soviet influence in Outer Mongolia and refused to accept its independence, Mao had good reasons, as we will see, to feel blessed that Soviet control over Outer Mongolia was strengthened in the 1930s