JAPANESE LINEAGE OF KOREA'S"DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 1277 never carried it out:the bureaucratic capacity was corresponding sums of deposits being 120,000 yen in absent,as was the power to confront land controlling 1909 and 981.000 yen in 1913)(Government-General groups who wanted to hide the extent of their taxable of Chosen,1914,p.19).Later during the colonial rule, lands.By contrast.the colonial state made an exhaus- the Government-General required Koreans to buy tive land survey a priority.Over a period of eight years government bonds that helped finance the industrial- the Japanese invested some 30 million yen in the pro- ization drive of the 1930s.While capital inflows from ject (compared,say,to the total revenue intake of the Japan remained the dominant source,local capital Government-General in 1911 of 24 million yen).The accumulation also increased considerably.The colo- survey "mapped all plots of land.classified it accord- nial state in Korea.even more than the Japanese Meiji ing to type,graded its productivity and established state on which it was modeled,became heavily and ownership."While Japanese civil servants super- directly involved in economic tasks.and judged vised the entire project.Korean landowners cooper- strictly by economic criteria,performed these tasks ated and eventually benefited;local land investigation rather effectively. committees,for example,who were responsible for More significant than the state's direct economic investigating the "ownership,location,boundaries role was the indirect role that led up to the involve- and class of land"were composed of "land-owners ment of wealthy groups in productive activities.The themselves"(Government-General of Chosen,1912, mechanics of how these state-private sector alliances p.13).As a result of the survey,the colonial state were created are important because similar arrange secured a revenue base and,less obviously,enhanced ments were later central to South Korea's phenomenal its control over the Korean agrarian sector by involv- economic success.The dynamics of change in both ing the landowning classes as ruling partners.What the agrarian and industrial sectors thus deserve our the Korean landlords lost in terms of autonomy from, attention. and influence over,the traditional Yi state,they made up by.first,securing new,Western-style,legal private property rights and later (as discussed below),by (b)The state and the agrarian sector enhanced profits from land(Robinson in Eckert et al., 1990,pp.266-267). The colonial state restructured its relationship with Over time.the colonial state in Korea undertook the Korean landed classes.The highest Yangban elite numerous other projects of economic value.This is no who held offices in the Yi state were pensioned off place for a comprehensive discussion;I simply wish (Government-General of Chosen,1911,pp.18-19). to flag some of the main areas.34 First,the Govern- As career bureaucrats took over official functions,the ment-General invested heavily in infrastructure,so direct control of landed classes on the state weakened. much so that Korea's roads and railways were among The successful land survey further confirmed the the finest that a developing country inherited from supremacy of the new state because,as a result of it. their colonial past.Second,as mentioned above,the the capacity of the landed classes to evade the reach of Japanese made significant investments in Korea in the state had shrunk.In return,however,the state primary education.Given the long gestation period, offered the landowners plenty,so as to not only not however,the returns on this investment were probably alienate them,but to make them active partners in exe- reaped,less by colonial Korea,but more by the two cuting the state's goals.For example,the Japanese sovereign Koreas who inherited a relatively literate introduced a new legal code-based on the Meiji labor force.Third,the colonial government ran a num- legal code-that created Western-style legal private ber of economic enterprises directly:e.g.,railways. property,thus securing the control of Korean landed communications.opium,salt and tobacco.Judged by groups over land in perpetuity.While the Japanese in the regular financial contribution that these public the process ended up owning significant amount of undertakings made to public revenues,they were run agricultural land in Korea,most Koreans who con- relatively efficiently.Finally,the Government- trolled land prior to the arrival of the Japanese main- General played an important role in the overall tained,nay,even expanded their land ownership.35 process of capital accumulation.While I will return to Moreover,as mentioned above,many among the this issue again below,and the direct role of the new landed elite were incorporated into local governance, colonial state in extracting taxes has already been cooperating with and helping local agents of the state noted,a few other points also deserve attention.The maintain control over villages.While students of colo- currency and banking reforms that the new colonial nialism often distinguish direct and indirect colonial state undertook rather early led to a significant jump in rule,the Japanese political arrangement in Korea uti- private,institutional savings:e.g.,deposits in the lized both forms:direct bureaucratic penetration was Bank of Chosen (Korea)doubled from some 18 mil- buttressed by the authority of local influentials.This lion yen in 1911 to 37 million yen in 1913 and the arrangement also suggests that,contrary to some number of depositors in the postal savings bank went recent arguments,the presence of a landowning class up from about 20,000 in 1909 to 420.000 in 1913 (the does not necessarily inhibit the formation of a power-JAPANESE LINEAGE OF KOREA’S “DEVELOPMENTAL STATE” 1277 never carried it out; the bureaucratic capacity was absent, as was the power to confront land controlling groups who wanted to hide the extent of their taxable lands. By contrast. the colonial state made an exhaus￾tive land survey a priority. Over a period of eight years the Japanese invested some 30 million yen in the pro￾ject (compared, say, to the total revenue intake of the Government-General in 1911 of 24 million yen). The survey “mapped all plots of land, classified it accord￾ing to type, graded its productivity and established ownership.“?? While Japanese civil servants super￾vised the entire project, Korean landowners cooper￾ated and eventually benefited; local land investigation committees, for example, who were responsible for investigating the “ownership, location, boundaries and class of land” were composed of “land-owners themselves” (Government-General of Chosen, 1912, p. 13). As a result of the survey, the colonial state secured a revenue base and, less obviously, enhanced its control over the Korean agrarian sector by involv￾ing the landowning classes as ruling partners. What the Korean landlords lost in terms of autonomy from, and influence over, the traditional Yi state, they made up by, first, securing new, Western-style, legal private property rights and later (as discussed below), by enhanced profits from land (Robinson in Eckert er al., 1990, pp. 266-267). Over time, the colonial state in Korea undertook numerous other projects of economic value. This is no place for a comprehensive discussion; I simply wish to flag some of the main areas.34 First, the Govem￾ment-General invested heavily in infrastructure, so much so that Korea’s roads and railways were among the finest that a developing country inherited from their colonial past. Second, as mentioned above, the Japanese made significant investments in Korea in primary education. Given the long gestation period, however, the returns on this investment were probably reaped, less by colonial Korea, but more by the two sovereign Koreas who inherited a relatively literate labor force. Third, the colonial government ran a num￾ber of economic enterprises directly: e.g., railways, communications, opium, salt and tobacco. Judged by the regular financial contribution that these public undertakings made to public revenues, they were run relatively efficiently. Finally, the Government￾General played an important role in the overall process of capital accumulation. While I will return to this issue again below, and the direct role of the new colonial state in extracting taxes has already been noted, a few other points also deserve attention. The currency and banking reforms that the new colonial state undertook rather early led to a significant jump in private, institutional savings: e.g., deposits in the Bank of Chosen (Korea) doubled from some 18 mil￾lion yen in 1911 to 37 million yen in 1913 and the number of depositors in the postal savings bank went up from about 20,000 in 1909 to 420,000 in 19 13 (the corresponding sums of deposits being 120,000 yen in 1909 and 98 1,000 yen in 19 13) (Government-General of Chosen, 19 14, p. 19). Later during the colonial rule, the Government-General required Koreans to buy government bonds that helped finance the industrial￾ization drive of the 1930s. While capital inflows from Japan remained the dominant source, local capital accumulation also increased considerably. The colo￾nial state in Korea, even more than the Japanese Meiji state on which it was modeled, became heavily and directly involved in economic tasks, and judged strictly by economic criteria, performed these tasks rather effectively. More significant than the state’s direct economic role was the indirect role that led up to the involve￾ment of wealthy groups in productive activities. The mechanics of how these state-private sector alliances were created are important because similar arrange￾ments were later central to South Korea’s phenomenal economic success. The dynamics of change in both the agrarian and industrial sectors thus deserve our attention. (b) The state and the agrarian sector The colonial state restructured its relationship with the Korean landed classes. The highest Yangban elite who held offices in the Yi state were pensioned off (Government-General of Chosen, 1911, pp. 18-19). As career bureaucrats took over official functions, the direct control of landed classes on the state weakened. The successful land survey further confirmed the supremacy of the new state because, as a result of it, the capacity of the landed classes to evade the reach of the state had shrunk. In return, however, the state offered the landowners plenty, so as to not only not alienate them, but to make them active partners in exe￾cuting the state’s goals. For example, the Japanese introduced a new legal code - based on the Meiji legal code - that created Western-style legal private property, thus securing the control of Korean landed groups over land in perpetuity. While the Japanese in the process ended up owning significant amount of agricultural land in Korea, most Koreans who con￾trolled land prior to the arrival of the Japanese main￾tained, nay, even expanded their land ownership.35 Moreover, as mentioned above, many among the landed elite were incorporated into local governance, cooperating with and helping local agents of the state maintain control over villages. While students of colo￾nialism often distinguish direct and indirect colonial rule, the Japanese political arrangement in Korea uti￾lized both forms: direct bureaucratic penetration was buttressed by the authority of local influentials. This arrangement also suggests that, contrary to some recent arguments, the presence of a landowning class does not necessarily inhibit the formation of a power-