(1) By following evidentialism, we are completely shut off from certain kinds of truth (2)A rule which completely shuts us off from certain kinds of truth is wrong ()So evidentialism is wrong.(1, 2) How compelling is this argument? Is(2), our"possible pragmatist principle", plausible? Problem: We should accept rules that shut us off from some kinds of truths--e. g, we should accept rules that shut us off from beliefs about exactly how possible; So(2)seems like it too strong. Yet, we wouldn, t want a rule that blocked us from all belief about the past, or K many dinosaurs there were. We want to limit belief in cases where evidence is not forthcoming or where only guesswork about distant places, or about other people, etc. So(2)may be on the right track, but it needs to be refined to get at what James is looking for.(Exercise: can you refine it?) II. Worries about pragmatism i Spirit of James's argument: When there is something of significance(love, immortality. at stake, we are allowed to take, perhaps are even justified in taking, epistemic risks i Yet Pragmatism is compatible with entrenched dogmatism: where there is a genuine choice and insufficient evidence, one may opt for the status quo i Evidentialists in general and Clifford in particular are concerned that Pragmatism doesn 't provide enough safeguard against prejudice, wishful thinking, and self-serving belief. Examples of James's"special class"of proposition Theism: God exists Love: So and so] cares about me.( God loves me. Morality: It is morally right/good to give generously to the poor What about: ( do they sometimes, for some people, present genuine choices where evidence does not decide the matter? Should we conclude that believing them in such cases is"rationally permissible"?) Intrinsic racism: People of racial group X are inherently morally inferior Extrinsic racism: People of racial group X tend to have the property P, and P is a morally objectionable property(e.g dishonesty, laziness), or warrants subordinating treatment(e. g, stupidity, irrationality) Intrinsic/extrinsic sexism: (same as above, substituting sexes for races) (Meritocratic) Classism: People earn what they deserve: those who make more money work harder/contribute more than others Ethnocentrism: The [American way of life] is preferable to all others Questions to consider 1. In the cases at hand, why is there, or why does there seem to be, no compelling evidence to decide between the proposition or its negation? Has compelling evidence been earnestly sought? Has the evidence been properly evaluated? 2. Why do we find ourselves considering whether to believe p(or not)? Have there been influences over what count as live or dead options for us that have prevented us from considering other viable hypotheses? 3. What is required to exercise rational autonomy over our beliefs? To say that it is"rationally permissible"for us to believe p, the suggestion seems to be that we may exercise our autonomy in choosing to believe p. But can we be truly autonomous in matters for which there is no(compelling)evidence? Aren,' t we just driven by custom(ideology? )(1) By following evidentialism, we are completely shut off from certain kinds of truth. (2) A rule which completely shuts us off from certain kinds of truth is wrong. (3) So evidentialism is wrong. (1,2) How compelling is this argument? Is (2), our "possible pragmatist principle", plausible? Problem: We should accept rules that shut us off from some kinds of truths--e.g., we should accept rules that shut us off from beliefs about exactly how many dinosaurs there were. We want to limit belief in cases where evidence is not forthcoming or where only guesswork is possible; So (2) seems like it too strong. Yet, we wouldn't want a rule that blocked us from all belief about the past, or about distant places, or about other people, etc. So (2) may be on the right track, but it needs to be refined to get at what James is looking for. (Exercise: can you refine it?) III. Worries about Pragmatism ï Spirit of James's argument: When there is something of significance (love, immortality...) at stake, we are allowed to take, perhaps are even justified in taking, epistemic risks. ï Yet Pragmatism is compatible with entrenched dogmatism: where there is a genuine choice and insufficient evidence, one may opt for the status quo. ï Evidentialists in general and Clifford in particular are concerned that Pragmatism doesn't provide enough safeguard against prejudice, wishful thinking, and self-serving belief. Examples of James's "special class" of propositions? Theism: God exists. Love: [So and so] cares about me. (God loves me.) Morality: It is morally right/good to give generously to the poor. What about: (do they sometimes, for some people, present genuine choices where evidence does not decide the matter? Should we conclude that believing them in such cases is "rationally permissible"?) Intrinsic racism: People of racial group X are inherently morally inferior. Extrinsic racism: People of racial group X tend to have the property P, and P is a morally objectionable property (e.g., dishonesty, laziness), or warrants subordinating treatment (e.g., stupidity, irrationality). Intrinsic/extrinsic sexism: (same as above, substituting sexes for races) (Meritocratic) Classism: People earn what they deserve: those who make more money work harder/contribute more than others. Ethnocentrism: The [American way of life] is preferable to all others. Questions to consider: 1. In the cases at hand, why is there, or why does there seem to be, no compelling evidence to decide between the proposition or its negation? Has compelling evidence been earnestly sought? Has the evidence been properly evaluated? 2. Why do we find ourselves considering whether to believe p (or not)? Have there been influences over what count as live or dead options for us that have prevented us from considering other viable hypotheses? 3. What is required to exercise rational autonomy over our beliefs? To say that it is "rationally permissible" for us to believe p, the suggestion seems to be that we may exercise our autonomy in choosing to believe p. But can we be truly autonomous in matters for which there is no (compelling) evidence? Aren't we just driven by custom (ideology?)