1. 2. Asymmetric Information Akerlof(1970): market failure due to asymmetric information Spence(1973): signaling Rothchild-Stiglitz(1976): screening Myerson(1979): revelation principle and mechanism design 1.3. Agency problems Mirrlees(1974), Holmstrom(1978): unverifiable investment, IC conditions Standard contract theory: revenue-sharing contract e Multi-agent contract Optimal linear contract dynamic contract 1.4. Incomplete contract al proach p e Hart. Moors. Grossman allocation of control rights is an alternative mechanism Coase. Williamson: transaction costs Option contract: ex-post option Page 2 of 5Page 2 of 5 1.2. Asymmetric Information • Akerlof (1970): market failure due to asymmetric information. • Spence (1973): signaling • Rothchild-Stiglitz (1976): screening • Myerson (1979): revelation principle and mechanism design 1.3. Agency Problems • Mirrlees (1974), Holmstrom (1978): unverifiable investment, IC conditions • Standard contract theory: revenue-sharing contract. • Multi-agent contract • Optimal linear contract • Dynamic contract 1.4. Incomplete Contract Approach • Hart, Moors, Grossman: allocation of control rights is an alternative mechanism • Coase, Williamson: transaction costs • Option contract: ex-post option