4 International Organization TABLE 1.World leaders and challengers as identified by long-cycle theorists Years Leader Challenger 1609-1713 Netherlands France 1714-1815 Great Britain France 1816-1945 Great Britain Germany 1946-(1990) United States Soviet Union Sources:Thompson 1983a;Modelski 1983. tition.Systematic evidence to this effect can be found in recent studies of war outcomes.Lake reports that democracies tend to prevail in wars against authori- tarian states.6 Reiter and Stam confirm this finding using more sophisticated mod- els.?Siverson,and Reiter and Stam show that democracies are more likely to win wars that they initiate and to suffer lower costs in the process.8 A similar pattern emerges when we expand the empirical domain from individ- ual wars to prolonged hegemonic struggles,such as those identified by "long cy- cle"theorists.Table 1 shows one classification of world leaders and challengers identified in this literature.It is striking that all of the leading states in this table had,if not democratic governments,at least limited or liberal governments.Al- though the franchise in seventeenth-century Holland and eighteenth-century Great Britain was too restricted for these states to qualify as democracies by current standards,both had representative institutions and a sense of appropriate limits on state action-the basic characteristics of a liberal polity.In every prolonged con- flict in modern history,such states have prevailed over their illiberal rivals. The effort to explain such observations is ongoing.Lake argues that democratic institutions constrain rent seeking by the state,therefore leading to a more effi- cient allocation of resources and enhanced economic growth.10 Reiter and Stam suggest that democracies enjoy greater legitimacy and thus have an easier time mobilizing popular support for war and motivating soldiers to fight efficiently. Bueno de Mesquita et al.argue that democratic leaders have stronger incentives to spend their resources on delivering successful public policies-such as victory in war-while nondemocratic leaders devote their resources toward paying off a small 6.Lake1992. 7.Reiter and Stam 2002:see also Stam 1996. 8.Siverson 1995;see also Reiter and Stam 2002. 9.Thompson 1983a;see also Thompson 1983b;and Modelski 1983. 10.Lake1992 11.Reiter and Stam 2002;see also Stam 1996.4 International Organization TABLE 1. World leaders and challengers as identijied by long-cycle theorists Years Leader Challenger 1609-1713 Netherlands France 1714-1815 Great Britain France 1816-1945 Great Britain Germany 1946-(1990) United States Soviet Union Sources: Thompson 1983a; Modelski 1983. tition. Systematic evidence to this effect can be found in recent studies of war outcomes. Lake reports that democracies tend to prevail in wars against authori￾tarian state^.^ Reiter and Stam confirm this finding using more sophisticated mod￾els.' Siverson, and Reiter and Stam show that democracies are more likely to win wars that they initiate and to suffer lower costs in the proce~s.~ A similar pattern emerges when we expand the empirical domain from individ￾ual wars to prolonged hegemonic struggles, such as those identified by "long cy￾cle" theorist^.^ Table 1 shows one classification of world leaders and challengers identified in this literature. It is striking that all of the leading states in this table had, if not democratic governments, at least limited or liberal governments. Al￾though the franchise in seventeenth-century Holland and eighteenth-century Great Britain was too restricted for these states to qualify as democracies by current standards, both had representative institutions and a sense of appropriate limits on state action-the basic characteristics of a liberal polity. In every prolonged con￾flict in modern history, such states have prevailed over their illiberal rivals. The effort to explain such observations is ongoing. Lake argues that democratic institutions constrain rent seeking by the state, therefore leading to a more effi￾cient allocation of resources and enhanced economic growth.'' Reiter and Stam suggest that democracies enjoy greater legitimacy and thus have an easier time mobilizing popular support for war and motivating soldiers to fight efficiently." Bueno de Mesquita et al. argue that democratic leaders have stronger incentives to spend their resources on delivering successful public policies-such as victory in war-while nondemocratic leaders devote their resources toward paying off a small 6. Lake 1992. 7. Reiter and Stam 2002; see also Stam 1996. 8. Siverson 1995; see also Reiter and Stam 2002. 9. Thompson 1983a; see also Thompson 1983b; and Modelski 1983. 10. Lake 1992. 11. Reiter and Stam 2002; see also Stain 1996