Smith 317 negatively biased gossip.and form impressions of the spe cific targets that are more negative than their impressions of (a) No Disregard the other targets. Results hown here are mean over 10neped of the mode neachof 16 conditions.E ers and each of the 20 targets (hence 40.000 trials).The 16 conditions are(Evil targets/Malicious observers)(Directed/ Interesting gossip)x(Decision/No decision)(Disregard resplotting results show the last 22 1.0 Evil Targets observers can form impressions that successfully different (b) That g the o ervers to av them.To examine this question,Figure la shows the average .5 nd als panels of the graph show four different versions of the model. in the toprow (No decision),observers interact uncondition ally wit n targets on e while in the bottom tria hased on the valer of their cu ously described.In the left(No disregard)observers n the nght col egard). gossip that is Within each panel are shown the results for four diferent obse ossip different amounts.One observer ne gossips volve an opportunity to int Figure I.(a)Mean impression of normal(clear)and evil on 95%6 of trials tive to Figure 1b shows the average number of extremely nega- tsuffered by observers in different ve acts that the ob ervers T the oh ins all 100 trials are inter ction based on the different observers'differing numbers of trials with the target.and we would expect five of those to involve involving interaction with the targets. extreme negative ors (be of the ause the evil targets emi si Figure I sho with th Directed gossip ve ch behaviors cted 20 of the 100 80 trials involve direct interaction:the expected number of evil targets even with gossin as a result as figure lb shows extreme negative behaviors is5%of 80,or 4 rather than 5 observers in this No decision condition are fully exposed to erver wou wher Smith 317 negatively biased gossip, and form impressions of the spe￾cific targets that are more negative than their impressions of the other targets. Results All results shown here are means over 100 independent runs of the model in each of 16 conditions. Each run involves 100 opportunities for interaction between each of the 20 observ￾ers and each of the 20 targets (hence 40,000 trials). The 16 conditions are (Evil targets/Malicious observers) × (Directed/ Interesting gossip) × (Decision/No decision) × (Disregard/ No disregard). Figures plotting results show the last 2 × 2 as 4 panels of the figure. Evil Targets When the model is run with four targets who produce rare, extremely negative behavior, the key question is whether the observers can form impressions that successfully differenti￾ate those “evil” targets from the other, normal ones. That would be adaptive, allowing the observers to avoid attempt￾ing to cooperate with the evil ones (and opening themselves up to exploitation), or forming long-term relationships with them. To examine this question, Figure 1a shows the average impression observers form of the normal (clear bars) and evil (shaded bars) targets. The averages are across all 20 observ￾ers, and also across the 16 normal and 4 evil targets. The four panels of the graph show four different versions of the model. In the top row (No decision), observers interact uncondition￾ally with targets on each trial, while in the bottom row (Decision), observers decide whether to interact on each trial based on the valence of their current impression, as previ￾ously described. In the left column (No disregard) observers incorporate all gossip into their impressions. In the right col￾umn (Disregard), observers ignore gossip that is too discrep￾ant from their current impression. Within each panel are shown the results for four different observers, who gossip different amounts. One observer never gossips (all trials involve an opportunity to interact with a target) whereas the second observer gossips on 20% of trials, the third observer on 45% of trials, and the fourth observer on 95% of trials. Figure 1b shows the average number of extremely nega￾tive acts that the observers experience in the same set of con￾ditions, as a proportion of the expected number. That is, for the observer who never gossips, all 100 trials are interactions with the target, and we would expect five of those to involve extreme negative behaviors (because the evil targets emit such behaviors 5% of the time). In contrast, the second observer gossips on an expected 20 of the 100 trials, so only 80 trials involve direct interaction; the expected number of extreme negative behaviors is 5% of 80, or 4 rather than 5. Thus, the graph shows the number of bad acts as a proportion of the number the observer would be expected to encounter, based on the different observers’ differing numbers of trials involving interaction with the targets. Figure 1 shows the results with the Directed gossip ver￾sion of the model. Note first that in the top row (uncondi￾tional interaction with targets) there is no ability to detect the evil targets, even with gossip. As a result, as Figure 1b shows, observers in this No decision condition are fully exposed to these targets’ bad actions. For observers who do not gossip, the Decision version of the model (refusing interaction when No Disregard Disregard 0.0 0.2 0.4 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 No Decision Decision 0% 20% 45% 95% 0% 20% 45% 95% Proportion of gossip meanimpr Evil 0 1 No Disregard Disregard 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 No Decision Decision 0% 20% 45% 95% 0% 20% 45% 95% Proportion of gossip meanbadacts Evil 0 1 (a) (b) Figure 1. (a) Mean impression of normal (clear) and evil (shaded) targets under different conditions, with directed gossip. (b) Mean proportion of especially bad acts relative to the expected number (see the text) suffered by observers in different conditions, with directed gossip. Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015