STATE POWER AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 323 in competition,potentially ruinous for the weaker state,in third- country markets.The size and economic robustness of the hegemonic state also enable it to provide the confidence necessary for a stable international monetary system,and its currency can offer the liquidity needed for an increasingly open system. In sum,openness is most likely to occur during periods when a hegemonic state is in its ascendency.Such a state has the interest and the resources to create a structure characterized by lower tariffs,rising trade proportions,and less regionalism.There are other distributions of potential power where openness is likely,such as a system composed of many small,highly developed states.But even here,that potential might not be realized because of the problems of creating confidence in a monetary system where adequate liquidity would have to be pro- vided by a negotiated international reserve asset or a group of national currencies.Finally,it is unlikely that very large states,particularly at unequal levels of development,would accept open trading relations. These arguments,and the implications of other ideal typical con- figurations of potential economic power for the openness of trading structures,are summarized in the following chart. Size of States RELATIVELY EQUAL VERY UNEQUAL SMALL LARGE Level of EQUAL Moderate- Low- High Moderate High Development of States UNEQUAL Moderate Low Moderote- High CHART I.PROBABILITY OF AN OPEN TRADING STRUCTURE WITH DIFFERENT DISTRIBUTIONS OF POTENTIAL ECONOMIC POWER THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE:DESCRIBING THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM The structure of international trade has both behavioral and institu- tional attributes.The degree of openness can be described both by the fow of goods and by the policies that are followed by states with respect to trade barriers and international payments.The two are not unre- lated,but they do not coincide perfectly. In common usage,the focus of attention has been upon institutions. Openness is associated with those historical periods in which tariffsSTATE POWER AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 323 in competition, potentially ruinous for the weaker state, in third￾country markets. The size and economic robustness of the hegemonic state also enable it to provide the confidence necessary for a stable international monetary system, and its currency can offer the liquidity needed for an increasingly open system. In sum, openness is most likely to occur during periods when a hegemonic state is in its ascendency. Such a state has the interest and the resources to create a structure characterized by lower tariffs, rising trade proportions, and less regionalism. There are other distributions of potential power where openness is likely, such as a system composed of many small, hghly developed states. But even here, that potential might not be realized because of the problems of creating confidence in a monetary system where adequate liquidity would have to be pro￾vided by a negotiated international reserve asset or a group of national currencies. Finally, it is unlikely that very large states, particularly at unequal levels of development, would accept open trading relations. These arguments, and the implications of other ideal typical con￾figurations of potential economic power for the openness of trading structures, are summarized in the following chart. Size of States RELATIVELY EQUAL VERY UNEQUAL SMALL LARGE EQUAL Moderote- Low- Level of High High Moderote Development of States UNEQUAL Moderote Low Moderate - High The structure of international trade has both behavioral and institu￾tional attributes. The degree of openness can be described both by the pow of goods and by the policies that are followed by states with respect to trade barriers and international payments. The two are not unre￾lated, but they do not coincide perfectly. In common usage, the focus of attention has been upon institutions. Openness is associated with those historical periods in which tariffs