Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK; TAN, T.C.C. and WERLANG,SRC.(1988): The Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games, Journalof Economic Theory, 45, 370-391 AUMANN, R and BRANDENBURGER, A(1995): Epistem ic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium, Econometrica, 63, 1 161-1180 5. Putting it All Together: Some Auction Theory 1 First- and Second-price auctions Dominance and Equilibrium analysis with private values The Revenue equivalence Theorem MY Section 3.1 1 5.2 Rationalizability with Incomplete Information Non-equilibrium analysis of auctions Computation! 6. Extensive Games: Basics 6.1 Extensive games with perfect information DR Sections 6.1.6.3.6.4 6.2 Backward Induction and Subgame-Perfect equilibrium Extensive games with perfect but incomplete information 7.1 Repeated Games: ba 7.2 General setup and payoff aggregation criteria sh Folk theorems for infinitely repeate R 7.2 Perfect folk theorems for infinitely repeated games R Sections 8.8-8.10 8. Extensive Games details 8.1 General Extensive games: imperfect informationCambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK; TAN, T.C.C. and WERLANG, S.R.C. (1988): “The Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games,” Journal of Economic Theory, 45, 370-391. AUMANN, R. and BRANDENBURGER, A. (1995): “Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium,” Econometrica, 63, 1161-1180. 5. Putting it All Together: Some Auction Theory 5.1 First- and Second-price auctions Dominance and Equilibrium analysis with private values The Revenue Equivalence Theorem L O MY Section 3.11 5.2 Rationalizability with Incomplete Information Non-equilibrium analysis of auctions Computation! L 6. Extensive Games: Basics 6.1 Extensive games with perfect information Notation(s) and terminology Nash equilibrium R OR Sections 6.1, 6.3, 6.4 6.2 Backward Induction and Subgame-Perfect equilibrium The One-Deviation Property Extensive games with perfect but incomplete information Perfect Bayesian equilibrium R OR Section 6.2, 12.3 up to p. 233 7.1 Repeated Games: basics 7.2 General setup and payoff aggregation criteria Automata Nash Folk theorems for infinitely repeated games. R OR Sections 8.1-8.5 7.2 Perfect folk theorems for infinitely repeated games Perfect folk theorems for finitely repeated games R OR Sections 8.8-8.10 8. Extensive Games: details 8.1 General Extensive games: imperfect information. Relationship between normal and extensive form