o MY Sections 11-1.5 1.2Ze The minmax theorem and lp 2. Normal-Form Analysis 2.1 Beliefs and Best Responses Dual characterizations of Best Responses Iterating the"best response operator: rationalizability, itera ted weak dominance MY Sections 1. 8 and 3.1: BERNHEIM, D.(1984): Rationaliza ble Strategic Behavior, Econometrica 2.2 Fixed points of the best response operator: Nash equilibrium Existence and mixed strategies. Interpretation OR Sections 2.2-2.4 and 3. 1-3.2 3. Games with Incomplete Information The Harsanyiapproach Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Interpretation 3.2 A closer look: higher-order beliefs Common Priors 4. Interactive Beliefs and the Foundations of Solution Concepts The basic idea: Harsanyi's model revisited Correlated Equilibrium OR Section 3.3 4.2 Rationality and the Belief operator Common Certainty of Rationality Equilibrium in Beliefs L O DEKEL, E and GUL, F(1990): Rationality and Knowledge in Game Theory in Advances in Economics and Econometrics, D Kreps and K Wallis, edsO MY Sections 1.1-1.5 1.2 Zerosum games Minmax theory The Minmax theorem and LP R OR Section 2.5 L 2. Normal—Form Analysis 2.1 Beliefs and Best Responses Dual characterizations of Best Responses Iterating the “best response operator:” rationalizability, iterated weak dominance. R OR Section 2.1 and Chapter 4 O MY Sections 1.8 and 3.1; BERNHEIM, D. (1984): “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior,” Econometrica, 52, 1007-1028. 2.2 Fixed points of the best response operator: Nash equilibrium. Existence and mixed strategies. Interpretation. R OR Sections 2.2-2.4 and 3.1-3.2 3. Games with Incomplete Information 3.1 The basic model The Harsanyi approach Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Interpretation. R OR Section 2.6 3.2 A closer look: higher-order beliefs Common Priors L 4. Interactive Beliefs and the Foundations of Solution Concepts 4.1 The basic idea: Harsanyi’s model revisited Correlated Equilibrium R OR Section 3.3 L 4.2 Rationality and the Belief operator Common Certainty of Rationality. Equilibrium in Beliefs. L O DEKEL, E. and GUL, F. (1990): “Rationality and Knowledge in Game Theory,” in Advances in Economics and Econometrics, D. Kreps and K. Wallis, eds