74 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MAY 200 integration explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies:the higher T-T SMA.SCAL ope individual-level eco omic and demographic variables do not explain behavior either within Mach enga 26 01 or across group Fifth,behavior in the exper Tanzania 040 mi I.The Evidence Bolivi 037 027 Because the ultin ne (UG)has be populations and has generated robust violations we econducted this game & n an PNG 043 PNG and asked to propose an offer to a second per 041 son.the respondent may then Tanzanis 042 ed amounts o it.in which case the two receive nothing.If both Zimbabwe 045 canonical model and i that th Is easy to see thatt 042 ept any positive offer and so will offer the O-n 044 smallest possible amount,which will be Ache Paraguay 051 ac plaved anon 63) sly no ing the ident of the person or persons with whom they were s a prop paired.The stakes of most games were denom nat in money(仙hough s tobacco ho mak a pr with the actual nu participants for their numb hension of the experiment and eliminated any ter-generated low offers and 50 ent.Finally.the inferred from Table 1.which lists all group Ache and the Lamelara had mean offers greater where UG's were conducted.Contrary to the than 50 percent predictio ith the standa ven the e group differences are strikingly large rcent of stake size u trating our second result(the large variation in sity students (Roth et al..1991).While mean including rsin industrial societies are typically cos nd 40 till oth percent,the mear including the Achuar and the Sangu,offered while modal ofers are consistently50 percen Ths conent dow-52-59 UTC74 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MAY 2001 integration explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation, the greater the level of cooperation in experimental games. Fourth, individual-level economic and demographic variables do not explain behavior either within or across groups. Fifth, behavior in the experi- ments is generally consistent with economic patterns of everyday life in these societies. I. The Evidence Because the ultimatum game (UG) has been conducted throughout the world with student populations and has generated robust violations of the canonical model, we conducted this game in all of our 17 societies. The "proposer" in this game is provisionally assigned an amount equivalent to a day or two' s wages in the society and asked to propose an offer to a second per- son, the "respondent." The respondent may then either accept the offer, in which case the two players receive the proposed amounts, or reject it, in which case the two receive nothing. If both players conform to the canonical model and if this is common knowledge, it is easy to see that the proposer will know that the respondent will accept any positive offer and so will offer the smallest possible amount, which will be accepted. In most of our field experiments subjects played anonymously, not knowing the identity of the person or persons with whom they were paired. The stakes of most games were denom- inated in money (though in some cases tobacco or other goods were used). In all cases, we tested prospective participants for their compre- hension of the experiment and eliminated any who appeared not to grasp the game. The systematic deviations from the canonical model in our sample of simple societies can be inferred from Table 1, which lists all groups where UG's were conducted. Contrary to the prediction of the standard model, even the groups with the smallest offers have mean of- fers greater than 25 percent of stake size. Illus- trating our second result (the large variation in mean offers across societies), others, including the Torguud and the Mapuche, offered between 30 percent and 40 percent, while still others, including the Achuar and the Sangu, offered TABLE 1-THE ULTIMATUM GAME IN SMALL-SCALE SOCIETIES Low- offer Mean Rejection rejection Group Country offera Modesb ratec rated Machiguenga Peru 0.26 0.15/0.25 0.048 0.10 (72) (1/21) (1/10) Hadza Tanzania 0.40 0.50 0.19 0.80 (big camp) (28) (5/26) (4/5) Hadza Tanzania 0.27 0.20 0.28 0.31 (small (38) (8/29) (5/16) camp) Tsiman6 Bolivia 0.37 0.5/0.3/0.25 0.00 0.00 (65) (0/70) (0/5) Quichua Ecuador 0.27 0.25 0.15 0.50 (47) (2/13) (1/2) Torguud Mongolia 0.35 0.25 0.05 0.00 (30) (1/20) (0/1) Khazax Mongolia 0.36 0.25 Mapuche Chile 0.34 0.50/0.33 0.067 0.2 (46) (2/30) (2/10) Au PNG 0.43 0.3 0.27 1.00 (33) (8/30) (1/1) Gnau PNG 0.38 0.4 0.4 0.50 (32) (10/25) (3/6) Sangu Tanzania 0.41 0.50 0.25 1.00 farmers (35) (5/20) (1/1) Sangu Tanzania 0.42 0.50 0.05 1.00 herders (40) (1/20) (1/1) Unresettled Zimbabwe 0.41 0.50 0.1 0.33 villagers (56) (3/31) (2/5) Resettled Zimbabwe 0.45 0.50 0.07 0.57 villagers (70) (12/86) (4/7) Achuar Ecuador 0.42 0.50 0.00 0.00 (36) (0/16) (0/1) Orma Kenya 0.44 0.50 0.04 0.00 (54) (2/56) (0/0) Ach6 Paraguay 0.51 0.50/0.40 0.00 0.00 (75) (0/5 1) (0/8) Lamelarae Indonesia 0.58 0.50 0.00 0.00 (63) (3/8) (4/20) Note: PNG = Papua New Guinea. a This column shows the mean offer (as a proportion) in the ultimatum game for each society. b This column shows the modal offer(s), with the percentage of subjects who make modal offers (in parentheses). c The rejection rate (as a proportion), with the actual numbers given in parentheses. d The rejection rate for offers of 20 percent or less, with the actual numbers given in parentheses. e Includes experimenter-generated low offers. between 40 percent and 50 percent. Finally, the Ache and the Lamelara had mean offers greater than 50 percent. These group differences are strikingly large compared to previous cross-cultural work com- paring ultimatum-game behavior among univer- sity students (Roth et al., 1991). While mean offers in industrial societies are typically close to 44 percent, the mean offers in our sample range from 26 percent to 58 percent. Similarly, while modal offers are consistently 50 percent This content downloaded from 218.106.182.240 on Tue, 01 Mar 2016 11:52:59 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions