Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? a Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination By MARIANNE BERTRAND AND SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN* We study race in the labor market by sending fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers. To manipulate perceived race, resumes are randomly assigned African-American- or White-sounding names. White receive 50 percent more callbacks for interviews. Callbacks are also more re sive to resume quality for Whi es than for African-American ones. The gap is uniform across occupation, industry, and employer size. We also find little evidence that employers are inferring social class from the names. Differential treatment by race still appears to still be prominent in the U.S. labor market. JEL J71,J64) Every measure of economic success reveals dates, employers might favor the African- significant racial inequality in the U.S. labor American one. Data limitations make it market. Compared to Whites, African-Ameri- difficult to empirically test these views. Since cans are twice as likely to be unemployed and researchers possess far less data than employers earn nearly 25 percent less when they are em- do, White and African-American workers that ployed( Council of Economic Advisers, 1998) ear similar to researchers may look very This inequality has sparked a debate ferent to employers. So any racial difference whether employers treat members of different in labor market outcomes could just as easily be races differentially. When faced with observ- attributed to differences that are observable to ably similar African-American and White ap- employers but unobservable to researchers plicants, do they favor the White one? Some To circumvent this difficulty, we conduct a argue yes, citing either employer prejudice or field experiment that builds on the correspon- employer perception that race signals lower pro- dence testing methodology that has been pri ductivity. Others argue that differential treat- marily used in the past to study minority ment by race is a relic of the past, eliminated by outcomes in the United Kingdom. We send some combination of employer enlil chemel resumes in response to help-wanted ads in Chi affirmative action programs and the profit cago and Boston newspapers and measure call maximization motive. In fact, many in this latter back for interview for each sent resume. We amp even feel that stringent enforcement of affirmative action programs has produced an environment of reverse discrimination. They Th ften explains the or performance of would argue that faced with identical candi- African-Americans in terms of supply factors. If African Americans lack many basic skills entering the labor market, then they will perform worse, even with parity or favoritism Chicago, 1101 E. 58th Street, RO 229D, Chicago, IL 6063 Roger Jowell and Patricia Prescott-Clarke(1970). NBER, and CEPR (e-mail: marianne bertrand@ gsb. Jim Hubbuck and Simon Carter(1980), Colin Bi hicago.edu): Mullainathan: Department of Econo Pat Gay(1985), and Peter A Riach and Judith Rich massachusetts Institute of Technology, 50 Memorial Driv One caveat is that some of these studies fail to fully match MA 02142, and NBER (e skills between mi arkowitz, Hong Chung, Almudena Fernandez, Mary Anne racial origin. Doris Weichselbaumer (2003, 2004)studies cha Maheswari, Beverley the artis, Alison Tisza, grant Whitehorn, and Christine Yee ard E nisbett Cohen(1996) provided excellent research assistance. We are also grateful experiment to study how employers to numerous colleagues and seminar participants for very past varies between the North and the p response to criminal helpful commentsAre Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination We study race in the labor market by sending fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers. To manipulate perceived race, resumes are randomly assigned African-American- or White-sounding names. White names receive 50 percent more callbacks for interviews. Callbacks are also more respon￾sive to resume quality for White names than for African-American ones. The racial gap is uniform across occupation, industry, and employer size. We also find little evidence that employers are inferring social class from the names. Differential treatment by race still appears to still be prominent in the U.S. labor market. (JEL 571, J64). Every measure of economic success reveals significant racial inequality in the U.S. labor market. Compared to Whites, African-Ameri￾cans are twice as likely to be unemployed and earn nearly 25 percent less when they are em￾ployed (Council of Economic Advisers, 1998). This inequality has sparked a debate as to whether employers treat members of different races differentially. When faced with observ￾ably similar African-American and White ap￾plicants, do they favor the White one? Some argue yes, citing either employer prejudice or employer perception that race signals lower pro￾ductivity. Others argue that differential treat￾ment by race is a relic of the past, eliminated by some combination of employer enlightenment, affirmative action programs and the profit￾maximization motive. In fact, many in this latter camp even feel that stringent enforcement of affirmative action programs has produced an environment of reverse discrimination. They would argue that faced with identical candi- * Bertrand: Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 1101 E. 58th Street, RO 229D, Chicago, IL 60637, NBER, and CEPR (e-mail: marianne. bertrand @gsb. uchicago.edu); Mullainathan: Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 50 Memorial Drive, E52-380a, Cambridge, MA 02142, and NBER (e-mail: mullain@mit.edu). David Abrams, Victoria Bede, Simone Berkowitz, Hong Chung, Almudena Femandez, Mary Anne Guediguian, Christine Jaw, Richa Maheswari, Beverley Martis, Alison Tisza, Grant Whitehorn, and Christine Yee provided excellent research assistance. We are also grateful to numerous colleagues and seminar participants for very helpful comments. dates, employers might favor the African￾American one.' Data limitations make it difficult to empirically test these views. Since researchers possess far less data than employers do, White and African-American workers that appear similar to researchers may look very different to employers. So any racial difference in labor market outcomes could just as easily be attributed to differences that are observable to employers but unobservable to researchers. To circumvent this difficulty, we conduct a field experiment that builds on the correspon￾dence testing methodology that has been pri￾marily used in the past to stud minority outcomes in the United Kingdom! We send resumes in response to help-wanted ads in Chi￾cago and Boston newspapers and measure call￾back for interview for each sent resume. We ' This camp often explains the poor performance of African-Americans in terms of supply factors. If African￾Americans lack many basic skills entering the labor market, then they will perform worse, even with parity or favoritism in hiring. See Roger Jowell and Patricia Prescott-Clarke (1970), Jim Hubbuck and Simon Carter (1980), Colin Brown and Pat Gay (1985), and Peter A. Riach and Judith Rich (1991). One caveat is that some of these studies fail to fully match skills between minority and nonminority resumes. For ex￾ample some impose differential education background by racial origin. Doris Weichselbaumer (2003, 2004) studies the impact of sex-stereotypes and sexual orientation. Rich￾ard E. Nisbett and Dov Cohen (1996) perform a related field experiment to study how employers' response to a criminal past varies between the North and the South in the United States