72 ERIK GARTZKE War costs are also endogenous;if fighting is prohibitive, developed economies,especially where developed coun- countries will make themselves a "nice little war."30 In- tries are geographically clustered(Gleditsch 2003).Since creasing the cost of fighting,or alternately increasing the most territorial disputes are between contiguous states benefits of peace-even when possible-shape what each (Vasquez 1993),I hypothesize that developed,contigu- actor will accept in lieu of fighting,but do not tell us which ous dyads are more powerful than either developing or bargains are forged before warfare,and which after.Even noncontiguous dyads.34 the prospect ofnuclear annihilation did not deter disputes during the cold war(Schelling 1960). HI:Development leads contiguous dyads to If,on the other hand,the value of resources in dis- be less likely to experience conflict. pute is small or varies with ownership,then states can be disinclined to fight.Nations have historically used force While development decreases incentives for territo- to acquire land and resources,and subdue foreign pop- ulations.War or treaties that shifted control of territory rial aggrandizement,it greatly enhances the technological changed the balance of resources,and power.Sovereigns, ability of states to project power.Nations with ships and aircraft can engage in distant disputes inconceivable for and to a lesser extent citizens,prospered as the state ex- tended its domain.Development can alter these incen- poor countries.Development may also lead to increased willingness to pursue policy conflicts.If development is tives if modern production processes de-emphasize land, minerals,and rooted labor in favor of intellectual and clustered and neighbors no longer covet territory,capabil- financial capital(Brooks 1999,2005;Rosecrance 1996). ities can be devoted to pursuing the nation's secondary or If the rents from conquest decline,even as occupation tertiary interests.Distributed production networks and costs increase,then states can prefer to buy goods rather greater economic,social,or political integration natu- than steal them.31 As the U.S.invasion of Iraq illustrates, rally also create incentives to seek to influence the for- occupying a reluctant foreign power is extremely labor eign policies ofother countries,sometimes through force. intensive.If soldiers are expensive,then nations can be In contrast to the blanket assertion of classical politi- better off "outsourcing occupation"to local leaders and cal economists,I expect that development actually leads obtaining needed goods through trade.32 countries to be more likely to engage in conflicts far from At the same time that development leads states to home.35 Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwaitin August 1990, prefer trade to theft,developed countries also retain pop- intent on securing its"nineteenth province"and wresting Kuwaiti oil wealth from local leaders.The United States ulations with common identities,cultural affinities,and and its Coalition allies also invaded Kuwait,not to conquer political,social,and economic ties.These states may be reluctant to conquer their neighbors,but they are equally and keep,but to return the Emirate to its previous lead- opposed to arbitrary contractions of their borders.Resi- ers.While Coalition objectives were couched in moralistic rhetoric,the United States was clearly concerned about dents of Gibraltar,for example,prefer British rule,even while Spain,which has fought over this lump of rock for who governed Kuwait,while preferring not to govern the centuries,is today unwilling to provoke a war.33 The com- country itself.Similarly,European colonial powers have bination of a lack of motive for territorial expansion and repeatedly intervened in Africa,Asia,and elsewhere to continued interest in serving and protecting a given pop- prop up or dethrone regimes,impose settlements,or oth- ulation ensures a decline in conflict among states with erwise meddle in the affairs of developing countries. H2:Developmentleads noncontiguous dyads 30In Gunga Din(1939),Sgt.Archibald Cutter(Cary Grant)asks, to be more likely to experience conflict. "How can we get a nice little war going?" 3Boix(2003)argues that development reduces elite opposition to democratization as the bases for wealth become more mobile. Results are comparable to separate regressions of territorial and 3The original U.S.war plan was for Iraqi oil assets to be quickly nonterritorial MIDs (Gartzke 2006a).The contiguity interaction returned to local control (Woodward 2004,322-24).What com- term is convenient here(most territorial disputes involve contigu- merce cannot do-where force is still efficacious-is to supplant ous states).For further discussion of the relationship between ter- obstreperous leaders or to undermine inimical policies. ritory and contiguity,see Hensel(2000). 3As rentier activity becomes unprofitable with economic devel- 3Contrasting effects of development are spatially distinct and tem- opment,political units default to cultural variables.Ambivalence porally sequenced.Technology shocks beginning in the fifteenth about being British has been a near constant in Scotland and Wales, century propelled Europeans abroad in search of loot,land,and but official acceptance of autonomy is a novelty.Conversely,inde- labor.Imperialism first flowed and then ebbed as the cost of main- pendence in Northern Ireland is resisted more robustly as it con- tainingarmiesexceeded the value ofrents from occupation(Gartzke fronts Protestant identity. and Rohner 2006a).172 ERIK GARTZKE War costs are also endogenous; if fighting is prohibitive, countries will make themselves a “nice little war.”30 In￾creasing the cost of fighting, or alternately increasing the benefits of peace—even when possible—shape what each actor will accept in lieu of fighting, but do not tell us which bargains are forged before warfare, and which after. Even the prospect of nuclear annihilation did not deter disputes during the cold war (Schelling 1960). If, on the other hand, the value of resources in dis￾pute is small or varies with ownership, then states can be disinclined to fight. Nations have historically used force to acquire land and resources, and subdue foreign pop￾ulations. War or treaties that shifted control of territory changed the balance of resources, and power. Sovereigns, and to a lesser extent citizens, prospered as the state ex￾tended its domain. Development can alter these incen￾tives if modern production processes de-emphasize land, minerals, and rooted labor in favor of intellectual and financial capital (Brooks 1999, 2005; Rosecrance 1996). If the rents from conquest decline, even as occupation costs increase, then states can prefer to buy goods rather than steal them.31 As the U.S. invasion of Iraq illustrates, occupying a reluctant foreign power is extremely labor intensive. If soldiers are expensive, then nations can be better off “outsourcing occupation” to local leaders and obtaining needed goods through trade.32 At the same time that development leads states to prefer trade to theft, developed countries also retain pop￾ulations with common identities, cultural affinities, and political, social, and economic ties. These states may be reluctant to conquer their neighbors, but they are equally opposed to arbitrary contractions of their borders. Resi￾dents of Gibraltar, for example, prefer British rule, even while Spain, which has fought over this lump of rock for centuries, is today unwilling to provoke a war.33 The com￾bination of a lack of motive for territorial expansion and continued interest in serving and protecting a given pop￾ulation ensures a decline in conflict among states with 30In Gunga Din (1939), Sgt. Archibald Cutter (Cary Grant) asks, “How can we get a nice little war going?” 31Boix (2003) argues that development reduces elite opposition to democratization as the bases for wealth become more mobile. 32The original U.S. war plan was for Iraqi oil assets to be quickly returned to local control (Woodward 2004, 322–24). What com￾merce cannot do—where force is still efficacious—is to supplant obstreperous leaders or to undermine inimical policies. 33As rentier activity becomes unprofitable with economic devel￾opment, political units default to cultural variables. Ambivalence about being British has been a near constant in Scotland and Wales, but official acceptance of autonomy is a novelty. Conversely, inde￾pendence in Northern Ireland is resisted more robustly as it con￾fronts Protestant identity. developed economies, especially where developed coun￾tries are geographically clustered (Gleditsch 2003). Since most territorial disputes are between contiguous states (Vasquez 1993), I hypothesize that developed, contigu￾ous dyads are more powerful than either developing or noncontiguous dyads.34 H1: Development leads contiguous dyads to be less likely to experience conflict. While development decreases incentives for territo￾rial aggrandizement, it greatly enhances the technological ability of states to project power. Nations with ships and aircraft can engage in distant disputes inconceivable for poor countries. Development may also lead to increased willingness to pursue policy conflicts. If development is clustered and neighbors no longer covet territory, capabil￾ities can be devoted to pursuing the nation’s secondary or tertiary interests. Distributed production networks and greater economic, social, or political integration natu￾rally also create incentives to seek to influence the for￾eign policies of other countries, sometimes through force. In contrast to the blanket assertion of classical politi￾cal economists, I expect that development actually leads countries to be more likely to engage in conflicts far from home.35 Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait in August 1990, intent on securing its “nineteenth province” and wresting Kuwaiti oil wealth from local leaders. The United States and its Coalition allies also invaded Kuwait, not to conquer and keep, but to return the Emirate to its previous lead￾ers. While Coalition objectives were couched in moralistic rhetoric, the United States was clearly concerned about who governed Kuwait, while preferring not to govern the country itself. Similarly, European colonial powers have repeatedly intervened in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere to prop up or dethrone regimes, impose settlements, or oth￾erwise meddle in the affairs of developing countries. H2: Development leads noncontiguous dyads to be more likely to experience conflict. 34Results are comparable to separate regressions of territorial and nonterritorial MIDs (Gartzke 2006a). The contiguity interaction term is convenient here (most territorial disputes involve contigu￾ous states). For further discussion of the relationship between ter￾ritory and contiguity, see Hensel (2000). 35Contrasting effects of development are spatially distinct and tem￾porally sequenced. Technology shocks beginning in the fifteenth century propelled Europeans abroad in search of loot, land, and labor. Imperialism first flowed and then ebbed as the cost of main￾taining armies exceeded the value of rents from occupation (Gartzke and Rohner 2006a)