there is of course the same basic scarcity of resources at the global level. Through globalization, people are increasingly competing for the same resources on a global scale in a shared territory: our planet. That they are non-altruistic and assert conflicting claims over these resources does not need to be argued Because of globalization, we also now have the capacity to help and to harm each other at the global level as well, to an unprecedented degree. Through globalization, we increasingly find that we have a capacity to effectively respond to the needs and concerns of others beyond our boundaries, through the transnational mobilization of information power, capital, or public opinion. Because of globalization, we also increasingly find that our states policies, and our own political and consumer choices, are influencing the life prospects of others in direct and dramatic ways. The globalization of markets means that in many cases we are directly profiting from the economic and social conditions in other parts of the world. Thus, completing Rawls basic conditions, we have the capacity to harm each other as wel Together, these global circumstances of justice offer one kind of argument for global society, making justice both possible and necessary at the global level. A second, more ambitious argument is that globalization is going farther than creating merely global society, and is creating global community, at least to a limited degree One basis for global community is the globalization of knowledge. Througl globalization, we know so much more, immediately and intimately, about the plight of people in other parts of the world. One specific type of shared knowledge important to CHARLES JONES, GLOBAL JUSTICE 9(1999). Even David Miller, a communitarian critic of global justice acknowledges that the"prosaic observation that the rich countries now have the technical capacity to transfer large quantities of resources to the poorer countries, "makes a prima facie case that such transfers have become morally obligatory. The Limits of Cosmopolitan Justice, " in INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 164 (MAPEL AND NARDIN EDS. 1998)there is of course the same basic scarcity of resources at the global level. Through globalization, people are increasingly competing for the same resources on a global scale in a shared territory: our planet. That they are non-altruistic and assert conflicting claims over these resources does not need to be argued. Because of globalization, we also now have the capacity to help and to harm each other at the global level as well, to an unprecedented degree. Through globalization, we increasingly find that we have a capacity to effectively respond to the needs and concerns of others beyond our boundaries, through the transnational mobilization of information, power, capital, or public opinion.14 Because of globalization, we also increasingly find that our state’s policies, and our own political and consumer choices, are influencing the life prospects of others in direct and dramatic ways. The globalization of markets means that in many cases we are directly profiting from the economic and social conditions in other parts of the world. Thus, completing Rawls’ basic conditions, we have the capacity to harm each other as well. Together, these global circumstances of justice offer one kind of argument for global society, making justice both possible and necessary at the global level. A second, more ambitious argument is that globalization is going farther than creating merely global society, and is creating global community, at least to a limited degree. One basis for global community is the globalization of knowledge. Through globalization, we know so much more, immediately and intimately, about the plight of people in other parts of the world. One specific type of shared knowledge important to 14 CHARLES JONES, GLOBAL JUSTICE 9 (1999). Even David Miller, a communitarian critic of global justice, acknowledges that the “prosaic observation that the rich countries now have the technical capacity to transfer large quantities of resources to the poorer countries,” makes a prima facie case that such transfers have become morally obligatory. “The Limits of Cosmopolitan Justice,” in INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 164 (MAPEL AND NARDIN EDS. 1998). 5