202 n De During the Korean War henn Aprl1order to moblie the Shen Zhihua and Yafeng Xia 203 PV commanders pointed out that"this is the campaign that will mine the fate and length of the Korean War"(Shen and Meng Kim suggested launching an all-out offensive in June or July (APRF 93).But after more than two months of tough battles.the Chinese 1950.f.45.op.1.d.338.11.98-99;"Kim II-sung's letter to Peng De- hKorn forees failed to advance south of the thyee huai,"May 30.1951,in Wang 1998.500).Mao had to invite Kim to allel.On the contrary,the US-UN forces conquered Inchon travel to Beijing on June 3.1951.Mao and Zhou Enlai persuaded Kim Kimpo and marched north across the thirty-eighth parallel.The the barle ine xd to accept"the restoration of the thirty-eighth parallel [as a short-term rmlnheom objective]and phased withdrawal of all foreign troops [from Koreal o eyvemlerof the Rivrby une through negotiations and a political settlement of Korea's future by Shijie zhishi chubanshe 10 peaceful means [as long-term goals]"(Chai and Zhao 1992.115.125: Qi 1991.177:JYMZW 1987,355).Initially against armistice nego- 268.305-358). tiations,North Korea's dependence on the Chinese led Kim to agree The far of he fifthofenivemin demonstraed all the inablity of the tpus the well-quippedN to negotiations based on an armistice along the thirty-eighth parallel (Stueck2002,139).7 off the eninsu (Rees 14.)As Paul Pilla has It was much harder for the Chinese to persuade Stalin.After re- dhn the perceived possiblty of drect cheveme ceiving several cables from Mao and Peng regarding the difficulties ychanges n the rediness of goverments toe in pursuing the war,Stalin replied on June 5 and told the Chinese to (Pillar 6).Beijing evidently expected to settle theco "not rush to end the war."but rather continue"to inflict major blows fictalthouot necessarily to reach a cease-fire alone.Afterhe to the enemy,and annihilate three to four enemy divisions"(APRF CPVsecured a foothold around the thirty-eighth parallel,a peace 1950,f.45,op.1.d.339.11.4-6,10-16,24-25).Mao had to cable Stalin for the restoration of the status quo seemed advisable to again on June 5 and explain to him the extreme difficulties the Chinese Beijing.As Nie Rongzhen asserted."Now that we have accomplished and North Korean forces encountered.He asked Stalin to allow him thepoia objctive of driving the enemy out of North Korea [we] to send Gao Gang,the top leader in Northeast China,and Kim Il Sung houdthe thirty-eighth parallel,[because]restoration of the to Moscow to report on the situation.When Gao and Kim arrived in sttusatebellum would be acceptable to all [governments]that Moscow on June 10,Stalin kept asking them about the real intention areinoed[n the conflict]Most of the military strategists in Bei- and wishes of the Chinese and North Koreans.Only after he heard a jing.Nie recalled later,supported this idea.Mao also concurred.A definite answer that "We want to terminate the war"did Stalin con- policy of"keeping on fighting while negotiating a peace (biantan sent to the policy of armistice negotiations(Shi Zhe 1995.506-508). bianda)"was thus agreed upon by the CCP leadership (Nie 1984. After receiving Stalin's cable on June 13 regarding his consent 742).China's war aim and the method to end war swung back to their to an armistice,Mao asked Gao and Kim to consult with Stalin on initially defined positions. how to propose armistice negotiations.Since the Chinese-North Ko- But both Moscow and Pyongyang still cherished illusions of con- rean armies had lost their advantageous military position on the bat- tinuing the war.In his cable to Mao on May 29.Stalin stated,"It tlefield,it was inconvenient for them to propose an armistice.Mao seems that you are preparing a major offensive.Its purpose is to in- hoped that the Soviet Union would probe and mediate the conflict.As flict heavy loss to the British/American forces."Kim Il Sung wrote to conditions for an armistice,Mao voluntarily asked to drop the issue Peng Dehuai on May 30.stating."Please don't expect to peacefullyre of China's admission to the UN and to use the Taiwan issue only as a sove the Korean issue.We cannot end the war along the 38th parallel." bargaining chip (APRF 1950.f.45,op.1.d.339,11.31-32.57-60). Mao finally came to realize that China had lost its position of strength in negotiations