Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies outgroup and toward PCI suggests that hostility does attitudes,on the other hand.is less clear.While there not necessarily result in exclusionary attitudes and that are prominent theories of ideology that posit that it is exclusionary attitudes are an independent and conse- a deeply rooted dispositional (Jost et al.2003)or even quential attitude,separate from other types of affect. physiological (Oxley et al.2008)trait,other prominent scholarship sees issue positions as more malleable and Exclusionary Preferences as Symbolic subject to elite influence (Zaller 1992).As such,we Attitudes treat the relationship between ideology and exclusion- We speculated that social distance,as an indicator of ary attitudes as weaker evidence for the symbolic na exclusionary attitudes,is a symbolic attitude.Given the ture of these attitudes centrality of the PCI in Israeli political discourse,this In Table 1,we present the results of OLS regres- might mean that attitudes toward PCI influences public sions,with social distance regressed on ideology,edu- opinion over a range of topics.A common quantitative cation,religiosity,and other demographic variables.3 test of whether an attitude is symbolic is to see if it is Political ideology,education,and religiosity all appear to be strongly related to social distance,with more 4 a significant predictor of attitudes and behaviors when included in multiple regression analysis with other con- right-wing,more religious,and less-educated subjects siderations(Sears et al.1997;Sears and Henry 2003). expressing more exclusionary preferences. We take this up below. In Model 2,we also include a measurement of self- 4 First,we test for another marker of symbolic at- reported social interactions with PCI.This variable titudes:whether social distance attitudes are related takes values of“daily,.”“weekly,”“monthly,”“yearly,” to slow-moving variables that tend to be socialized or"never."The results in this model suggest that those early in life.In an ideal study,we would test the sta- who interact with PCI more frequently are also likely to bility of these attitudes using longitudinal panel data report lower exclusionary attitudes.4 Of course,there over the course of a lifetime,starting with early adult is a question of endogeneity:it might be that those who are more accepting of PCI are more willing to inter- 4号 socialization-however.such data is unavailable.As such,we use a method common in the literature and act with them,rather than the other way around.Nev- turn to whether these preferences are predicted by ertheless,note that with the inclusion of this variable. 'asn traits that were likely established early in life.The liter- ideology and religion remain strong predictors of so- ature on attitudes toward outgroup minorities in gen- cial distance,suggesting that social distance is rooted, eral and in Israel in particular points to several such at least to some degree,in slow-moving individual-level factors: features.While exclusionary attitudes do appear to be influenced by social interactions,such variables do not explain all of the variation. Religiosity:Stronger religiosity may strengthen and The results in Table 1 are also consistent with the- reinforce ingroup identity and outgroup exclusion- ories that prejudice can spring from threats to status. ary preferences,especially when national dividing Ultra-Orthodox Jews,who share with the PCI several lines follow religious cleavages,as in Israel.Con- characteristics of low status,express strong social dis- versely,religious beliefs may generate a sense of tance from PCI. solidarity toward the less well-off,which under cer- We display predicted values of exclusionary prefer- tain circumstances may also encompass minority ences from Model 1 in Table 1 in Figure 2.In these outgroups(Ben-Nun Bloom,Arikan,and Courte- figures,we predict values for a secular,38-year-old manche 2015:Johnson.Rowatt.and LaBouff 2010: Sephardi male with average income,high-school edu- Knoll 2009) cation,and center-right political identity(5 on the 1-7 Political ideology:Right-wing ideological self- scale).Religiosity,ideology,and education vary in sub- identification.which is likely to be linked with figures a,b,and c,respectively.Note that in all these strong national sentiments,may be associated with figures,predicted values range only between coworker stronger exclusionary preferences (Golder 2003; and visitor,reflecting the high levels of exclusionary Semyonov,Raijman,and Gorodzeisky 2006) preferences in our sample of Israeli Jews. Education:Higher education is associated with Having established that social distance is predicted greater cultural openness(Stubager 2008,2009), by slow-moving and stable characteristics of a person, which may lead to greater openness toward out- groups.Indeed,Pedahzur,Halperin,and Canetti (2007)find that in Israel,higher education-more 13Ordered logit regression provides substantively similar results We measure levels of education on a four-level scale:primary educa- than other measures of socioeconomic status such tion (the lowest),high school education,undergraduate degree,and as employment-is associated with lower social graduate degree (highest level of education,which also serves as the distance from minority groups. reference category).Political ideology is measured on a continuous seven-point scale,ranging from 1(far left)to 7(far right),using the following question:"Many talk about left and right in politics.Use Education is,for most people,stable after adoles- the slider to show where you are on the left to right of politics.You cence or early adulthood.Religiosity also tends to be can put yourself all the way to the left,all the way to right,in the stable in the Israeli context(Coopermanm,Sahgal,and center,or somewhere else in-between."The other variables in the Schiller 2016).so it is reasonable to assume these vari- model are age,foreign born(0/1).income(categorically asisstandard ables are established prior to attitudes about exclusion om poteroto decreswrb rej The relationship between ideology and exclusionary dice,see Schroeder and Risen (2015). 749Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies outgroup and toward PCI suggests that hostility does not necessarily result in exclusionary attitudes and that exclusionary attitudes are an independent and conse￾quential attitude, separate from other types of affect. Exclusionary Preferences as Symbolic Attitudes We speculated that social distance, as an indicator of exclusionary attitudes, is a symbolic attitude. Given the centrality of the PCI in Israeli political discourse, this might mean that attitudes toward PCI influences public opinion over a range of topics. A common quantitative test of whether an attitude is symbolic is to see if it is a significant predictor of attitudes and behaviors when included in multiple regression analysis with other con￾siderations (Sears et al. 1997; Sears and Henry 2003). We take this up below. First, we test for another marker of symbolic at￾titudes: whether social distance attitudes are related to slow-moving variables that tend to be socialized early in life. In an ideal study, we would test the sta￾bility of these attitudes using longitudinal panel data over the course of a lifetime, starting with early adult socialization—however, such data is unavailable. As such, we use a method common in the literature and turn to whether these preferences are predicted by traits that were likely established early in life. The liter￾ature on attitudes toward outgroup minorities in gen￾eral and in Israel in particular points to several such factors: Religiosity: Stronger religiosity may strengthen and reinforce ingroup identity and outgroup exclusion￾ary preferences, especially when national dividing lines follow religious cleavages, as in Israel. Con￾versely, religious beliefs may generate a sense of solidarity toward the less well-off, which under cer￾tain circumstances may also encompass minority outgroups (Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, and Courte￾manche 2015; Johnson, Rowatt, and LaBouff 2010; Knoll 2009). Political ideology: Right-wing ideological self￾identification, which is likely to be linked with strong national sentiments, may be associated with stronger exclusionary preferences (Golder 2003; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006). Education: Higher education is associated with greater cultural openness (Stubager 2008, 2009), which may lead to greater openness toward out￾groups. Indeed, Pedahzur, Halperin, and Canetti (2007) find that in Israel, higher education—more than other measures of socioeconomic status such as employment—is associated with lower social distance from minority groups. Education is, for most people, stable after adoles￾cence or early adulthood. Religiosity also tends to be stable in the Israeli context (Coopermanm, Sahgal, and Schiller 2016), so it is reasonable to assume these vari￾ables are established prior to attitudes about exclusion. The relationship between ideology and exclusionary attitudes, on the other hand, is less clear. While there are prominent theories of ideology that posit that it is a deeply rooted dispositional (Jost et al. 2003) or even physiological (Oxley et al. 2008) trait, other prominent scholarship sees issue positions as more malleable and subject to elite influence (Zaller 1992). As such, we treat the relationship between ideology and exclusion￾ary attitudes as weaker evidence for the symbolic na￾ture of these attitudes. In Table 1, we present the results of OLS regres￾sions, with social distance regressed on ideology, edu￾cation, religiosity, and other demographic variables.13 Political ideology, education, and religiosity all appear to be strongly related to social distance, with more right-wing, more religious, and less-educated subjects expressing more exclusionary preferences. In Model 2, we also include a measurement of self￾reported social interactions with PCI. This variable takes values of “daily,” “weekly,” “monthly,” “yearly,” or “never.” The results in this model suggest that those who interact with PCI more frequently are also likely to report lower exclusionary attitudes.14 Of course, there is a question of endogeneity: it might be that those who are more accepting of PCI are more willing to inter￾act with them, rather than the other way around. Nev￾ertheless, note that with the inclusion of this variable, ideology and religion remain strong predictors of so￾cial distance, suggesting that social distance is rooted, at least to some degree,in slow-moving individual-level features. While exclusionary attitudes do appear to be influenced by social interactions, such variables do not explain all of the variation. The results in Table 1 are also consistent with the￾ories that prejudice can spring from threats to status. Ultra-Orthodox Jews, who share with the PCI several characteristics of low status, express strong social dis￾tance from PCI. We display predicted values of exclusionary prefer￾ences from Model 1 in Table 1 in Figure 2. In these figures, we predict values for a secular, 38-year-old Sephardi male with average income, high-school edu￾cation, and center-right political identity (5 on the 1–7 scale). Religiosity, ideology, and education vary in sub￾figures a, b, and c, respectively. Note that in all these figures, predicted values range only between coworker and visitor, reflecting the high levels of exclusionary preferences in our sample of Israeli Jews. Having established that social distance is predicted by slow-moving and stable characteristics of a person, 13 Ordered logit regression provides substantively similar results.We measure levels of education on a four-level scale: primary educa￾tion (the lowest), high school education, undergraduate degree, and graduate degree (highest level of education, which also serves as the reference category). Political ideology is measured on a continuous seven-point scale, ranging from 1 (far left) to 7 (far right), using the following question: “Many talk about left and right in politics. Use the slider to show where you are on the left to right of politics. You can put yourself all the way to the left, all the way to right, in the center, or somewhere else in-between.” The other variables in the model are age, foreign born (0/1),income (categorically as is standard in Israeli surveys), and ethnicity. 14 On the potential of interactions to decrease Jewish-Arab preju￾dice, see Schroeder and Risen (2015). 749 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000266