742 International Organization Japan-Alcoholic Beverages,which reasons that only adopted reports should carry weight because they are "endorsed"by all the members (which is not true of unadopted WTO reports,much less NAFTA reports),2 and the requirement in DSU 3.2 for WTO bodies to interpret the institution's agreements for themselves,33 the panel explained that "we see no reason at all why we should be bound by the rulings of non-WTO dispute settlement bodies."34 More generally,Pauwelyn points out that,even when hearing cases covering claims similar to those before NAFTA (that is,softwood lumber and sweeteners),WTO bodies have not even mentioned these regional proceedings,much less been guided by the decisions that result.35 In a few NAFTA disputes,on the other hand,GATT/WTO decisions have been referenced by panels,not least because the agreement incorporates certain WTO articles.Even here,however,these references have simply been of suggestive value to the panel,much like at the U.S.Supreme Court,where,as in Lawrence v.Texas, decisions by the European Court of Human Rights were cited,despite the fact that these have no bearing on the high court's de jure stare decisis.36 Also like at the U.S.Supreme Court,moreover,NAFTA's references to the WTO have been ad hoc and controversial,rather than setting expectations about the institution's de facto stare decisis.Indeed,even NAFTA's body of jurisprudence is far from porous: in broom corn broom,for example,the panel explained that,since the rule in ques- tion was similar across the two institutions,"the Panel chose to rest its decision entirely on NAFTA Annex 803.3(12),without relying on Article 3.1 of the WTO Safeguards Code"or its attending case law.37 The WTO panel in Mexico-Soft Drinks could not agree more that NAFTA should take this tack,reasoning that "any findings made by this Panel,as well as its conclusions and recommendations in the present case,only relate to Mexico's rights and obligations under the WTO covered agreements,and not to its rights and obligations under other international agreements,such as the NAFTA,or other rules of international law."38 In short,one can speak meaningfully about separate bodies of de facto stare decisis at the WTO and NAFTA.39 Other scholars also argue that precedent matters 32.WTO Doc.WT/DS8/AB/R.14. 33.See Mavroidis,Howse,and Bermann forthcoming,63. 34.WTO Doc.WT/DS241/R,para.7.41.Likewise,in EC-Biotech Products,the panel explains that both the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Biosafety Protocol are "not applicable"for this same reason.WTO Doc.WT/DS291/R,para.7.75. 35.Pauwelyn2006,202. 36.See Joan Biskupic,"Supreme Court Citing More Foreign Cases,"USA Today.7 July 2003,avail- able at (http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-07-07-foreign-usat_x.htm),accessed 18 April 2007;and Jeffrey Toobin,"Swing Shift:How Anthony Kennedy's Passion for Foreign Law Could Change the Supreme Court,"New Yorker,12 September 2005,available at (http://www.newyorker.com/ archive/2005/09/12/050912fa_fact),accessed 18 April 2007. 37.NAFTA Doc.USA-97-2008-01,para.50. 38.WTO Doc.WT/DS308/R,para.7.15. 39.In discussing the model,and Figure 1,in particular,I will show that,even if there were some unanticipated spillover of precedent from the WTO to NAFTA,the complainant would still engage in forum shopping to discriminate among memberships,and would be more inclined to file at NAFTA as a result.Japan—Alcoholic Beverages, which reasons that only adopted reports should carry weight because they are “endorsed” by all the members ~which is not true of unadopted WTO reports, much less NAFTA reports!, 32 and the requirement in DSU 3+2 for WTO bodies to interpret the institution’s agreements for themselves, 33 the panel explained that “we see no reason at all why we should be bound by the rulings of non-WTO dispute settlement bodies+”34 More generally, Pauwelyn points out that, even when hearing cases covering claims similar to those before NAFTA ~that is, softwood lumber and sweeteners!, WTO bodies have not even mentioned these regional proceedings, much less been guided by the decisions that result+ 35 In a few NAFTA disputes, on the other hand, GATT0WTO decisions have been referenced by panels, not least because the agreement incorporates certain WTO articles+ Even here, however, these references have simply been of suggestive value to the panel, much like at the U+S+ Supreme Court, where, as in Lawrence v. Texas, decisions by the European Court of Human Rights were cited, despite the fact that these have no bearing on the high court’s de jure stare decisis+ 36 Also like at the U+S+ Supreme Court, moreover, NAFTA’s references to the WTO have been ad hoc and controversial, rather than setting expectations about the institution’s de facto stare decisis+ Indeed, even NAFTA’s body of jurisprudence is far from porous: in broom corn broom, for example, the panel explained that, since the rule in ques￾tion was similar across the two institutions, “the Panel chose to rest its decision entirely on NAFTA Annex 803+3~12!, without relying on Article 3+1 of the WTO Safeguards Code” or its attending case law+ 37 The WTO panel in Mexico—Soft Drinks could not agree more that NAFTA should take this tack, reasoning that “any findings made by this Panel, as well as its conclusions and recommendations in the present case, only relate to Mexico’s rights and obligations under the WTO covered agreements, and not to its rights and obligations under other international agreements, such as the NAFTA, or other rules of international law+”38 In short, one can speak meaningfully about separate bodies of de facto stare decisis at the WTO and NAFTA+ 39 Other scholars also argue that precedent matters 32+ WTO Doc+ WT0DS80AB0R, 14+ 33+ See Mavroidis, Howse, and Bermann forthcoming, 63+ 34+ WTO Doc+ WT0DS2410R, para+ 7+41+ Likewise, in EC—Biotech Products, the panel explains that both the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Biosafety Protocol are “not applicable” for this same reason+ WTO Doc+ WT0DS2910R, para+ 7+75+ 35+ Pauwelyn 2006, 202+ 36+ See Joan Biskupic, “Supreme Court Citing More Foreign Cases,” USA Today+ 7 July 2003, avail￾able at ^http:00www+usatoday+com0news0washington02003-07-07-foreign-usat_x+htm&, accessed 18 April 2007; and Jeffrey Toobin, “Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy’s Passion for Foreign Law Could Change the Supreme Court,” New Yorker, 12 September 2005, available at ^http:00www+newyorker+com0 archive020050090120050912fa_fact&, accessed 18 April 2007+ 37+ NAFTA Doc+ USA-97-2008-01, para+ 50+ 38+ WTO Doc+ WT0DS3080R, para+ 7+15+ 39+ In discussing the model, and Figure 1, in particular, I will show that, even if there were some unanticipated spillover of precedent from the WTO to NAFTA, the complainant would still engage in forum shopping to discriminate among memberships, and would be more inclined to file at NAFTA as a result+ 742 International Organization