410 WORLD POLITICS ture of state power.While at one time states could be considered the monopoly producers of currency within their borders,they have now been reduced to(still powerful)oligopolists.They retain the capacity to shape the market but also find themselves constrained by competitors. With his foil,the one nation,one money myth,and his question,the political and economic consequences of increased interpenetration of international monetary spaces,Cohen proceeds with his argument sys- tematically and effectively.First,looking back,Geograpby explores the old-fashioned world of territorial money from a historical perspective. While there was always sovereign coinage,Cohen notes,the conceptu- alization of money in territorial terms did not come about until the nineteenth century.Before then foreign coins circulated with little con- cern for national boundaries.But leaders overseeing the consolidation of the nation-state in the nineteenth century used money as in instru- ment of state building,2 and the establishment of national money as “legal tender'”drove out foreign(currency）competition. In retrospect,then,the century from 1870 to 1970 was an atypical interlude in which states enjoyed a near monopoly in currency affairs. This monopoly gave states power vis-a-vis other societal actors in four ways.First,it provided a powerful political symbol,which is one reason why newly independent states today continue to establish distinct cur- rencies despite their reduced economic significance.Second is the op- portunity for seigniorage,which can be an important source of revenue for states and,importantly,the opportunity for which is inversely re- lated to the ability of subjects to substitute into another currency.States that control their money can also practice macroeconomic management by manipulating the money supply and the exchange rate-important policy tools,especially in the short run.Finally,by issuing their own currency,states gain power in a negative sense:they avoid dependence on some other source.For these reasons states continue to support the Westphalian conception of one nation,one money,even though today “it is no more than a myth”(p.46). Not only is the Westphalian conception of money a myth,but Cohen illustrates that it was an oversimplification even during its hey- day.While states had more control over their currencies from 1870 to 1970,they nevertheless routinely chose to abdicate some of that sover- eignty,in two ways-either by subordinating or by sharing their mon- etary sovereignty.States routinely subordinated their sovereignty, 2On this point,see Eric Helleiner,"Historicizing Territorial Currencies:Money Space and the Na- tion-State in North America,"Political Geograpby 18(March 1999).ture of state power. While at one time states could be considered the monopoly producers of currency within their borders, they have now been reduced to (still powerful) oligopolists. They retain the capacity to shape the market but also find themselves constrained by competitors. With his foil, the one nation, one money myth, and his question, the political and economic consequences of increased interpenetration of international monetary spaces, Cohen proceeds with his argument sys￾tematically and effectively. First, looking back, Geography explores the old-fashioned world of territorial money from a historical perspective. While there was always sovereign coinage, Cohen notes, the conceptu￾alization of money in territorial terms did not come about until the nineteenth century. Before then foreign coins circulated with little con￾cern for national boundaries. But leaders overseeing the consolidation of the nation-state in the nineteenth century used money as in instru￾ment of state building,2 and the establishment of national money as “legal tender” drove out foreign (currency) competition. In retrospect, then, the century from 1870 to 1970 was an atypical interlude in which states enjoyed a near monopoly in currency affairs. This monopoly gave states power vis-à-vis other societal actors in four ways. First, it provided a powerful political symbol, which is one reason why newly independent states today continue to establish distinct cur￾rencies despite their reduced economic significance. Second is the op￾portunity for seigniorage, which can be an important source of revenue for states and, importantly, the opportunity for which is inversely re￾lated to the ability of subjects to substitute into another currency. States that control their money can also practice macroeconomic management by manipulating the money supply and the exchange rate—important policy tools, especially in the short run. Finally, by issuing their own currency, states gain power in a negative sense: they avoid dependence on some other source. For these reasons states continue to support the Westphalian conception of one nation, one money, even though today “it is no more than a myth” (p. 46). Not only is the Westphalian conception of money a myth, but Cohen illustrates that it was an oversimplification even during its hey￾day. While states had more control over their currencies from 1870 to 1970, they nevertheless routinely chose to abdicate some of that sover￾eignty, in two ways—either by subordinating or by sharing their mon￾etary sovereignty. States routinely subordinated their sovereignty, 410 WORLD POLITICS 2 On this point, see Eric Helleiner, “Historicizing Territorial Currencies: Money Space and the Na￾tion-State in North America,” Political Geography 18 (March 1999)