A Chinese Perspective 83 a general consensus:While the Soviet Union would remain the center of the international proletarian revolution,promoting revolution in the East would become primarily China's duty.Liu left Moscow in mid-August,accompa- nied by ninety-six Russian experts who were to assist China's military buildup and economic reconstruction.24 Mikoyan's mission to China and Liu's visit to Moscow greatly promoted Sino-Soviet cooperation.25 During this period,the CCP frequently exchanged opinions with Mos- cow on how to evaluate the "American threat"and how to deal with rela- tions with the United States.In November 1948,the CCP Northeast Bu- reau accepted Soviet advice to seize the radio transmitters of the American consulate in Shenyang.26 Early in January 1949,when Jiang Jieshi(Chiang Kai-shek)and the GMD started a "peace initiative"to end the civil war, Mao originally intended to rebuff it completely.But,Stalin advised the CCP leaders that the Americans were behind Jiang and that it would better serve the Party's interests if,instead of simply rebuffing Jiang's proposals,it proposed its own conditions for ending the war through non-military means.(Stalin emphasized that the CCP should make these conditions unac- ceptable to Jiang.)After a few exchanges.Mao Zedong"completely agreed with"Stalin's opinions and acted accordingly.27 In the spring of 1949,Stalin warned the CCP about possible American landing operations in the Peo- ple's Liberation Army's rear,convincing the CCP leadership to maintain a strategic reserve force in northern coastal China when the PLA's main force was engaged in the campaign of crossing the Yangzi (Yangtze)River.28 Dur- ing Liu Shaoqi's visit to the Soviet Union in June-August 1949,the CCP presented to Stalin a detailed memorandum,summarizing the Party's do- mestic and,particularly,international policies(including policy toward the United States).29 Particularly revealing are Mao's communications with Stalin on how the CCP should handle Huang Hua's contacts with Stuart.After receiving Chen Minshu's report about his secret meetings with Stuart in Shanghai, the CCP immediately informed Moscow of the contact.30 In a meeting with 24.For a detailed account of Liu's visit to Moscow see Shi She,"With Mao and Stalin:The Reminiscences of Mao's Interpreter,Part II:Liu Shaoqi in Moscow"(trans.Chen Jian).Chinese Historians 6,no.1 (Spring 1993):67-90. 25.For a more detailed analysis see Chen Jian,China's Road to the Korean War,69-78. 26.See Chen Jian,"The Ward Case and the Emergence of the Sino-American Confronta- tion,”153-54 27.The Russian originals of these telegrams between Stalin and Mao were published in the burnal of Modern and Contemporary History (Moscow),no.4-5 (1994):133-39.For an English translation see"Communications between Mao and Stalin,Seven Telegrams,January 1949"(trans.Song Datu).Chinese Historians 7,no.1-2 (1994):163-72. 28.Sergei N.Goncharov,John W Lewis,and Xue Litai,Uncertain Partners:Stalin,Mao. and the Korean War(Stanford,1994).43. 29.For the text of the memorandum see Zhang and Chen,eds.,Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and Cold War in Asia,doc.2.31. 30.Yang Kuisong."The Ward Case and the Shaping of New China's America Policy." Lishi yanjiu [Historical studies].no.5 (1994):113.A Chinese Perspective : 83 a general consensus: While the Soviet Union would remain the center of the international proletarian revolution, promoting revolution in the East would become primarily China’s duty. Liu left Moscow in mid-August, accompa￾nied by ninety-six Russian experts who were to assist China’s military buildup and economic reconstruction.24 Mikoyan’s mission to China and Liu’s visit to Moscow greatly promoted Sino-Soviet cooperation.25 During this period, the CCP frequently exchanged opinions with Mos￾cow on how to evaluate the “American threat” and how to deal with rela￾tions with the United States. In November 1948, the CCP Northeast Bu￾reau accepted Soviet advice to seize the radio transmitters of the American consulate in Shenyang.26 Early in January 1949, when Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and the GMD started a “peace initiative” to end the civil war, Mao originally intended to rebuff it completely. But, Stalin advised the CCP leaders that the Americans were behind Jiang and that it would better serve the Party’s interests if, instead of simply rebuffing Jiang’s proposals, it proposed its own conditions for ending the war through non-military means. (Stalin emphasized that the CCP should make these conditions unac￾ceptable to Jiang.) After a few exchanges, Mao Zedong “completely agreed with” Stalin’s opinions and acted accordingly.27 In the spring of 1949, Stalin warned the CCP about possible American landing operations in the Peo￾ple’s Liberation Army’s rear, convincing the CCP leadership to maintain a strategic reserve force in northern coastal China when the PLA’s main force was engaged in the campaign of crossing the Yangzi (Yangtze) River.28 Dur￾ing Liu Shaoqi’s visit to the Soviet Union in June–August 1949, the CCP presented to Stalin a detailed memorandum, summarizing the Party’s do￾mestic and, particularly, international policies (including policy toward the United States).29 Particularly revealing are Mao’s communications with Stalin on how the CCP should handle Huang Hua’s contacts with Stuart. After receiving Chen Minshu’s report about his secret meetings with Stuart in Shanghai, the CCP immediately informed Moscow of the contact.30 In a meeting with 24. For a detailed account of Liu’s visit to Moscow see Shi She, “With Mao and Stalin: The Reminiscences of Mao’s Interpreter, Part II: Liu Shaoqi in Moscow” (trans. Chen Jian), Chinese Historians 6, no.1 (Spring 1993): 67–90. 25. For a more detailed analysis see Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War, 69–78. 26. See Chen Jian, “The Ward Case and the Emergence of the Sino-American Confronta￾tion,” 153–54. 27. The Russian originals of these telegrams between Stalin and Mao were published in the Journal of Modern and Contemporary History (Moscow), no. 4–5 (1994): 133–39. For an English translation see “Communications between Mao and Stalin, Seven Telegrams, January 1949” (trans. Song Datu), Chinese Historians 7, no. 1–2 (1994): 163–72. 28. Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, 1994), 43. 29. For the text of the memorandum see Zhang and Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and Cold War in Asia, doc. 2.31. 30. Yang Kuisong, “The Ward Case and the Shaping of New China’s America Policy,” Lishi yanjiu [Historical studies], no.5 (1994): 113