New Political Economy,Vol.12,No.1,March 2007 s】Routledge Twior Francis Group 1sn6n Everyday Legitimacy and International N S6.20 Financial Orders:The Social Sources of Imperialism and Hegemony in Global Finance LEONARD SEABROOKE 益 How do states build financial power in the international political economy?The conventional focus is to examine changes at what we may consider the 'big end of town'-the stock exchange,the large banks,institutional investors and domi- nant corporations'-or historical shifts between principal financial centres over the longue duree.?While institutions at the big end of town',and actors who work within them,undoubtedly represent the 'sharp end'where financial strength is most concentrated,this article investigates the more everyday sources of finan- cial power. It does so on the basis of the following proposition:that states that enable the majority of their citizens to access credit and build wealth are more able to recycle capital through the domestic system and,in so doing,improve their inter- national financial capacity to export and attract capital,as well as to have a regu- latory and normative influence on the character of the international financial order. It is perhaps not so surprising that states that exercise financial power within the international political economy need to ground it in a stronger basis than only elites.Indeed,the history of international financial orders speaks not only to how elites build financial power,but also to how fragile their grasp upon it can become.This may especially be the case when there is a broad social perception that finance is unstable because it is concentrated in the hands of the few and requires state intervention. If a state's financial power is not autonomous from broader society but is instead drawn from society,then understanding its social sources requires us to ascribe some role to non-elite actors.One way to address this aim would be to take the rationalist tack and argue that over the centuries liberal democratic states can more easily build financial power because citizens can punish political representatives at the ballot box,but this explanation requires us to see the voter as having stable incentives over time (not to mention the issue of who can vote in different periods of time).Alternatively,one could take the Gramscian route and Leonard Seabrooke,International Center for Business and Politics,Copenhagen Business School, Steen Blichers Vej 22,2000 Frederiksberg,Denmark. ISSN 1356-3467 print:ISSN 1469-9923 online/07/010001-18 C 2007 Taylor Francis D0:10.1080/13563460601068453Downloaded By: [University of Sydney] At: 02:46 7 August 2007 Everyday Legitimacy and International Financial Orders: The Social Sources of Imperialism and Hegemony in Global Finance LEONARD SEABROOKE How do states build financial power in the international political economy? The conventional focus is to examine changes at what we may consider the ‘big end of town’ – the stock exchange, the large banks, institutional investors and domi￾nant corporations1 – or historical shifts between principal financial centres over the longue dure´e. 2 While institutions at the ‘big end of town’, and actors who work within them, undoubtedly represent the ‘sharp end’ where financial strength is most concentrated, this article investigates the more everyday sources of finan￾cial power.3 It does so on the basis of the following proposition: that states that enable the majority of their citizens to access credit and build wealth are more able to recycle capital through the domestic system and, in so doing, improve their inter￾national financial capacity to export and attract capital, as well as to have a regu￾latory and normative influence on the character of the international financial order. It is perhaps not so surprising that states that exercise financial power within the international political economy need to ground it in a stronger basis than only elites. Indeed, the history of international financial orders speaks not only to how elites build financial power, but also to how fragile their grasp upon it can become. This may especially be the case when there is a broad social perception that finance is unstable because it is concentrated in the hands of the few and requires state intervention. If a state’s financial power is not autonomous from broader society but is instead drawn from society, then understanding its social sources requires us to ascribe some role to non-elite actors. One way to address this aim would be to take the rationalist tack and argue that over the centuries liberal democratic states can more easily build financial power because citizens can punish political representatives at the ballot box,4 but this explanation requires us to see the voter as having stable incentives over time (not to mention the issue of who can vote in different periods of time). Alternatively, one could take the Gramscian route and New Political Economy, Vol. 12, No. 1, March 2007 Leonard Seabrooke, International Center for Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School, Steen Blichers Vej 22, 2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark. ISSN 1356-3467 print; ISSN 1469-9923 online=07=010001-18 # 2007 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080=13563460601068453