A“Segregated”Asia2:847 I.Racisu:the American white domination attitude. 2.Iuperialisi:the white man was the imperialist in Asia.We supported the French in Indochina and Chiang as a dummy against Mao.We are the all-powerful representative of the white West.'s As Christina Klein has contended,these accumulated anxieties,that a negative policy of containment was inadequate in the face of the insidious Communist threat in Asia,found cultural and aesthetic expression in an "imaginary of integration,"where differences between peoples could be bridged through the empathy,commitment,and engagement of ordinary Americans with a world emerging from colonialism.The compelling need to avoid any appearance of racism,to discard any association with the language and attitudes of im- perialism,and to bring about the political and economic integration of non-Communist Asia formed important strands in the policy and rhetorical approaches of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.6 Examining Washington's attempts to organize the collective defense of Southeast Asia during 1954,and the subsequent reactions induced by the gath- ering of twenty-nine Asian and African states at Bandung in 1955,help to show how these concerns,and the subject of race,lay beneath much official Ameri- can thinking in this period.*7 Throughout the early 1osos,U.S.policymakers referred repeatedly to the need to avoid any impression being given to Asian 25.Diary entry for 8 February 1955,C.L.Sulzberger,The Last of the Giants (New York, 1970),132.U.S.officials were also aware that the Soviet Union,due to its supposed part-Asian "racial"characteristics,possessed clear advantages in appealing to a non-European audience; in 1955,the CIA's assistant director of national estimates can be found arguing that "West- erners have too often acted in a tactless and overbearing manner.They don't forget the Kipling concept of 'lesser breeds.'The Communists are very astute in their approach.They have created the impression that they do not look upon these people as 'backward'or 'underdevel- oped,'phrases we have too often used.The struggle between the Soviets and U.S.and Western Europe,together with the racial and geographic background of the Soviets,have made it pos- sible for the Soviets to get themselves accepted as non-Europeans,as fellow Asians."See "Reasons for the Impact of the Soviet Orbit's Military,Economic and Cultural Drive in the Middle East,South and Southeast Asia,"Sherman Kent memorandum for Allen Dulles,29 November 1955,folder 9,box Ioo,Allen Dulles Papers,Seeley Mudd Library,Princeton University,Princeton,New Jersey. 26.Klein,Cold War Orientalism,37-49.Note also Andrew Rotter's view that"white Amer- ican policymakers...saw Indians and other dark-skinned people as racial Others,in funda- mental ways different from and inferior to whites.Because racial differences were felt so deeply by whites,race thinking conditioned foreign policy decisions.American policymakers after 1947 seldom said they were making policy for racial reasons.It would not have been fashion- able to do so....And yet,there is indirect but compelling evidence that American officials were thinking in racial terms when they made policy toward Latin America,Asia and Africa"; see Andrew J.Rotter,Comrades at Odds:The United States and India,1947-1964 (Ithaca,NY, 200o,154 27.American reactions to the Bandung Conference have also been traced by Cary Fraser. This article differs in the important links it draws with other contemporary developments, including the formation of SEATO,the conclusions it reaches regarding Bandung's signifi- cance for pan-Asianism,and the array of perspectives and sources it employs;see Cary Fraser, "An American Dilemma:Race and Realpolitik in the American Response to the Bandung Con- ference,1955,"in Plummer,Window on Freedom,115-40.1. Racism: the American white domination attitude. 2. Imperialism: the white man was the imperialist in Asia. We supported the French in Indochina and Chiang as a dummy against Mao. We are the all-powerful representative of the white West.25 As Christina Klein has contended, these accumulated anxieties, that a negative policy of containment was inadequate in the face of the insidious Communist threat in Asia, found cultural and aesthetic expression in an “imaginary of integration,” where differences between peoples could be bridged through the empathy, commitment, and engagement of ordinary Americans with a world emerging from colonialism. The compelling need to avoid any appearance of racism, to discard any association with the language and attitudes of im￾perialism, and to bring about the political and economic integration of non-Communist Asia formed important strands in the policy and rhetorical approaches of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.26 Examining Washington’s attempts to organize the collective defense of Southeast Asia during 1954, and the subsequent reactions induced by the gath￾ering of twenty-nine Asian and African states at Bandung in 1955, help to show how these concerns, and the subject of race, lay beneath much official Ameri￾can thinking in this period.27 Throughout the early 1950s, U.S. policymakers referred repeatedly to the need to avoid any impression being given to Asian A “Segregated” Asia? : 847 25. Diary entry for 8 February 1955, C. L. Sulzberger, The Last of the Giants (New York, 1970), 132. U.S. officials were also aware that the Soviet Union, due to its supposed part-Asian “racial” characteristics, possessed clear advantages in appealing to a non-European audience; in 1955, the CIA’s assistant director of national estimates can be found arguing that “West￾erners have too often acted in a tactless and overbearing manner. They don’t forget the Kipling concept of ‘lesser breeds.’ The Communists are very astute in their approach. They have created the impression that they do not look upon these people as ‘backward’ or ‘underdevel￾oped,’ phrases we have too often used. The struggle between the Soviets and U.S. and Western Europe, together with the racial and geographic background of the Soviets, have made it pos￾sible for the Soviets to get themselves accepted as non-Europeans, as fellow Asians.” See “Reasons for the Impact of the Soviet Orbit’s Military, Economic and Cultural Drive in the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia,” Sherman Kent memorandum for Allen Dulles, 29 November 1955, folder 9, box 100, Allen Dulles Papers, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey. 26. Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 37–49. Note also Andrew Rotter’s view that “white Amer￾ican policymakers . . . saw Indians and other dark-skinned people as racial Others, in funda￾mental ways different from and inferior to whites. Because racial differences were felt so deeply by whites, race thinking conditioned foreign policy decisions. American policymakers after 1947 seldom said they were making policy for racial reasons. It would not have been fashion￾able to do so. . . . And yet, there is indirect but compelling evidence that American officials were thinking in racial terms when they made policy toward Latin America, Asia and Africa”; see Andrew J. Rotter, Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964 (Ithaca, NY, 2000), 154. 27. American reactions to the Bandung Conference have also been traced by Cary Fraser. This article differs in the important links it draws with other contemporary developments, including the formation of SEATO, the conclusions it reaches regarding Bandung’s signifi- cance for pan-Asianism, and the array of perspectives and sources it employs; see Cary Fraser, “An American Dilemma: Race and Realpolitik in the American Response to the Bandung Con￾ference, 1955,” in Plummer, Window on Freedom, 115–40