Virtue ethics and social Work 1021 virtues. Thus the goodness of the act is not a result of the(intended) outcome or of he indexing of ones moral actions by their universalizability and the duty entailed always to act similarly in similar cases. The connection between the actor and the acted upon whether in terms of respect or advantage given to the latter by the former is not of primary concern. It is not that the ends do not matter but that the(intended) result does not make the actor moral. It is rather peculiar to want to suggest that an action or its result, in and of itself, can be good. The goodness of an action lies in persons in a context of moral appraisal and their motivations and dispositions in the execution and aims of their actions. To account for the structure of this process is effect to do a phenomenology of moral action, and this requires scrutiny of the making of the inner self not merely through a psychology, but through the identi- fication of social and cultural factors which shape how the components of the inner life are intricated in the project of being human in the world. And this question exploring the meaning of the good life-the question of the best way to bewas central to plato and aristotle and the hellenic world view Aristotle's notion of the good life placed greater importance upon the collective of the city-state than it did upon the good of the individual. For even if the good of the community coincides with that of the individual. it is clearly a greater and more perfect thing to achieve and preserve that of a ommunity: for while it is desirable to secure what is good in the case of an individual, to do so in the case of a people or a state is something finer and more sublime(Aristotle, 1976, p. 64) Ultimately the interests of the state coincide with the interests of the individual- the well-being of the state is the summum bonum because it promotes the good of all individuals and is the entity which the individual thus aspires to promote and for which he does his best. The reciprocal nature of the relation between the state and e individual requires that good as happiness is a function of the disposition towards certain ways of individual conduct that is the virtues acquired through training and example. To be happy is to act not only in accordance with virtue--to live virtu- ously--but also to have material goods 'throughout a complete life(Aristotle, 1976, p. 84). Human kind is therefore primarily active and practical, and secondarily con- templative. The good life, which all want in their various ways, can only be achieved through participation in the political culture which individuals develop by debating well and acting justly. These are precisely the means by which to improve the structural conditions which in turn improve the conditions of the individual. So the conception of a good life is bound to the practices of the virtuous citizen and the state. At root then, is the good will-the totality of virtuous dispositions the indi- vidual brings into his social and political activity. As we have seen these are matured by forms of education. Here we may quickly note that a good will-the impetus to act well towards an object or goalis the concept Kant appealed to as irreducibly ood when he opened the Groundwork (1785/1948). Identifying the good with a disposition to be good not surprisingly has led many to see that there is more than a whiff of virtue ethics about Kant despite it being widely held that he provided a form of ethical reasoning opposed to that of Aristotle(Sherman, 1997, p. 1; Baron, 1997,§3)Virtue Ethics and Social Work 1021 virtues. Thus the goodness of the act is not a result of the (intended) outcome or of the indexing of ones moral actions by their universalizability and the duty entailed always to act similarly in similar cases. The connection between the actor and the acted upon whether in terms of respect or advantage given to the latter by the former is not of primary concern. It is not that the ends do not matter but that the (intended) result does not make the actor moral. It is rather peculiar to want to suggest that an action or its result, in and of itself, can be good. The goodness of an action lies in persons in a context of moral appraisal and their motivations and dispositions in the execution and aims of their actions. To account for the structure of this process is in effect to do a phenomenology of moral action, and this requires scrutiny of the making of the inner self not merely through a psychology, but through the identi- fication of social and cultural factors which shape how the components of the inner life are intricated in the project of being human in the world. And this question exploring the meaning of the good life—the question of the best way to be—was central to Plato and Aristotle and the Hellenic world view. Aristotle’s notion of the good life placed greater importance upon the collective of the city-state than it did upon the good of the individual. For even if the good of the community coincides with that of the individual, it is clearly a greater and more perfect thing to achieve and preserve that of a community; for while it is desirable to secure what is good in the case of an individual, to do so in the case of a people or a state is something finer and more sublime (Aristotle, 1976, p. 64). Ultimately the interests of the state coincide with the interests of the individual— the well-being of the state is the summum bonum because it promotes the good of all individuals and is the entity which the individual thus aspires to promote and for which he does his best. The reciprocal nature of the relation between the state and the individual requires that good as happiness is a function of the disposition towards certain ways of individual conduct that is the virtues acquired through training and example. To be happy is to act not only in accordance with virtue—to live virtu￾ously—but also to have material goods ‘throughout a complete life’ (Aristotle, 1976, p. 84). Human kind is therefore primarily active and practical, and secondarily con￾templative. The good life, which all want in their various ways, can only be achieved through participation in the political culture which individuals develop by debating well and acting justly. These are precisely the means by which to improve the structural conditions which in turn improve the conditions of the individual. So the conception of a good life is bound to the practices of the virtuous citizen and the state. At root then, is the good will—the totality of virtuous dispositions the indi￾vidual brings into his social and political activity. As we have seen these are matured by forms of education. Here we may quickly note that a good will—the impetus to act well towards an object or goal—is the concept Kant appealed to as irreducibly good when he opened the Groundwork (1785/1948). Identifying the good with a disposition to be good not surprisingly has led many to see that there is more than a whiff of virtue ethics about Kant despite it being widely held that he provided a formof ethical reasoning opposed to that of Aristotle (Sherman, 1997, p. 1; Baron, 1997, § 3)