Compliance-Based Theory the governance of the international system, and often ignore "international law altogether To date, neither conventional international law scholars, nor those adopting an international relations approach, has presented a satisfactory model that is capable of explaining why states comply with international law in some circumstances and violate it in others. International law scholarship assumes a high level of compliance and provides little theoretical framework within which to examine the compliance decision while international relations scholars largely ignore the role of international law in national decision making. The failure to understand the compliance decision is troubling because compliance is one of the most central questions in international law Without a theory of compliance, we cannot examine the role of treaties, customary international law, of other agreements. Nor can we consider how to improve the functioning of the international legal system, or develop a workable theory of international legal and regulatory cooperation This Article uses the insights of international relations scholarship to address the question of compliance. Unlike traditional international law scholarship, the Article adopts a comprehensive theory in which compliance with international law comes about in a model of rational, self-interested states. Compliance exists because states are concerned with the reputational implications and the direct sanctions of violating the law. The model explains not only why nations comply, but also why and when they violate international law. Using the tools of international relations theory and See Beth A. Simmons, Money and the Law: Why Comply with the Public International Law of Money?, 25 YALE J. NT'L L. 323, 323-24(2000)("ILlegal scholars and practitioners believe that the rules at the center of their analysis do indeed matter Scholars of international relation have been far more skeptical. ") George W. Downs, et. al, Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT'L ORG. 379(199 6 See MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM. POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 8(1999)(International Relations scholars have traditionally had little time for such questions. Instead, they have regarded international law as something of an epiphenomena, with rules of international law being dependent on power, subject to short-term alteration by power-applying states, and therefore of little elevance to how states actually behave.”) 7 See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and Intemational Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT'L L J. 487, 491( 1997)("We do not yet have a well d or empirically teste instrumentalist theory of compliance with international commitments. ") Beth A. Simmons, Compliance with Intenational Agreements, 1 Al V. POL. SCI. 75, 76( 1998)("far less attention has been devoted to understanding why governments actually comply with such agreements. ); Koh, supra note 2, at 2599 (Why do nations obey international law? This remains among the most perplexing questions in international relations. " ) Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705, 705(1988)(" The surprising thing about international law is that nations bey its strictures our its mandates. ");Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. NT'L L 345, 345( 1998)("Compliance'is one of the central concepts in current and proposed research projects using social science methods to study the effect and significan international law. " 2Compliance-Based Theory 2 the governance of the international system,5 and often ignore “international law” altogether.6 To date, neither conventional international law scholars, nor those adopting an international relations approach, has presented a satisfactory model that is capable of explaining why states comply with international law in some circumstances and violate it in others.7 International law scholarship assumes a high level of compliance and provides little theoretical framework within which to examine the compliance decision while international relations scholars largely ignore the role of international law in national decision making. The failure to understand the compliance decision is troubling because compliance is one of the most central questions in international law. Without a theory of compliance, we cannot examine the role of treaties, customary international law, of other agreements. Nor can we consider how to improve the functioning of the international legal system, or develop a workable theory of international legal and regulatory cooperation. This Article uses the insights of international relations scholarship to address the question of compliance. Unlike traditional international law scholarship, the Article adopts a comprehensive theory in which compliance with international law comes about in a model of rational, self-interested states. Compliance exists because states are concerned with the reputational implications and the direct sanctions of violating the law. The model explains not only why nations comply, but also why and when they violate international law. Using the tools of international relations theory and 5 See Beth A. Simmons, Money and the Law: Why Comply with the Public International Law of Money?, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 323, 323-24 (2000) (“[L]egal scholars and practitioners believe that the rules at the center of their analysis do indeed matter . . . . Scholars of international relations . . . have been far more skeptical.”); George W. Downs, et. al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379 (1996). 6 See MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (1999) (“International Relations scholars have traditionally had little time for such questions. Instead, they have regarded international law as something of an epiphenomena, with rules of international law being dependent on power, subject to short-term alteration by power-applying states, and therefore of little relevance to how states actually behave.” ) 7 See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT’L L. J. 487, 491 (1997) (“We do not yet have a well-specified or empirically tested instrumentalist theory of compliance with international commitments.”); Beth A. Simmons, Compliance with International Agreements, 1 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 75, 76 (1998) (“far less attention has been devoted to understanding why governments actually comply with such agreements.”); Koh, supra note 2, at 2599 (“Why do nations obey international law? This remains among the most perplexing questions in international relations.”); Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 705, 705 (1988) (“The surprising thing about international law is that nations ever obey its strictures or carry our its mandates.”); Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 345, 345 (1998) (“‘Compliance’ is one of the central concepts in current and proposed research projects using social science methods to study the effect and significance of international law.”)