196 TU AND FISHBACH Results and Discussion The choic categories (a)hange s.(b)drinking glasses.(c)b (d) .(des ating that the options were simi (bookends.(h) 1)chair We ed only low-co that wer pair.the d tw onditions.which we attribute to the exteral featu e of the 7-2 ( the ta for futur choose differently to help"the choice an action versusa preference digm,all partici ants ind ted their choices,which we framed ir p one version of the Study 2:I Will Get What You Like ad Upon completion. Ve find that conform less over'sresp ction) In addition moving bevond actual us prefer. mity.weo the umber of time the cond respo ders led with d s ike) action (cho ubtle ng mar eople to co utur score ranged from 0to 6. their own future consump ius et al. 2009.for Results and Discussion conformity compared to preference ony fram a friend.with whom on s.will already have the 1 vs.2)ANOVA led the product in the future.We further predicted no effect for second Method bles ( Participants.We predetermined a sample size of 50 natural dyadic groups per condition (i.eundergraduate students who sat hu when we framed second responders'choices as actions (i.e. ed a smaller effect com- nga total of 190 dyads(1 males.194 females).Participants framed second res nders'choices as preferences Gie "Which 2 (other's action)2 =3.85,SD=1 .57 (see Figure 1) Results and Discussion The choice share of both flavors was similar among the first movers (32 chose the Wintermint and 34 chose the Sweetmint), indicating that the options were similarly attractive. In support of our hypothesis, second movers were less likely to conform (i.e., choose similarly to their study partner) when their study partner tasted the gum (24%; 8/34) than when he or she merely indicated preference for a flavor (53%; 17/32), 2 (1) 6.14, p .013. Using action (i.e., tasting the chewing gum) versus preference (i.e., indicating a preference for the chewing gum), Study 1 con￾firmed our basic hypothesis that people conform less to an ac￾quaintance’s actions than preferences. Interestingly, in this study (unlike the following ones), we find an overall low conformity across conditions, which we attribute to the external feature of the task. Because the task involved two people experiencing two flavors, it may have induced a perceived experimental demand to choose differently to “help” the experimenter cover all options in the experiment. We next test whether the difference in conformity level further depends on the second mover’s response, and whether merely framing the choice as an action versus a preference is sufficient to induce different levels of conformity. Study 2: I Will Get What You Like We find that people conform less to information on others’ actions versus preferences. A related question is whether people also conform less when they themselves act versus state their preferences in response to others. To test this possibility, Study 2 fully crossed the second mover’s response (preference vs. action) with the information on the first mover (preference vs. action). In addition, moving beyond actual consumption versus prefer￾ence information as sources of social influence, Study 2 manipu￾lated the framing of product choice as preference (choose what you like) versus action (choose what you want to have). This subtle framing manipulation encourages people to consider others’ future consumption (in addition to existing preference) when deciding on their own future consumption (see Griskevicius et al., 2009, for a similar subtle manipulation). We predicted that an action framing of others’ choice, in terms of future purchase intentions, would generate lower conformity compared to preference-only framing of others’ choice because it activates the consideration that one’s friend, with whom one mentally shares, will already have the product in the future. We further predicted no effect for second movers’ responses. Method Participants. We predetermined a sample size of 50 natural dyadic groups per condition (i.e., undergraduate students who sat with another person in a common university area; 100 people). Because we ran the study in a field setting and used a subtle manipulation, we suspected it could yield a smaller effect com￾pared with Study 1. We ran this study throughout 1 week, return￾ing a total of 190 dyads (186 males, 194 females). Participants completed the study for candy prizes. Procedure. The study employed a 2 (other’s response: pref￾erence vs. action)  2 (participant’s response: preference vs. action) between-subjects design. Dyadic groups completed a study on products. The experimental survey presented 12 pairs of household items for each of the following categories: (a) hangers, (b) drinking glasses, (c) book￾shelves, (d) laptop sleeves, (e) clocks, (f) desks, (g) bookends, (h) side tables, (i) office lamps, (j) water bottles, (k) photo frames, and (l) chairs. We used only low-cost, affordable items that were within reach of our participants’ budgets. A stated interest in high-cost products can imply wishful thinking rather than actual purchase intention (e.g., “I’d like to have a Lexus if I could afford it”). Thus, using products our participants could presumably afford to purchase was important. For each product pair, the survey displayed photos of the two products. We created two versions of surveys, one for products 1– 6 (Version 1) and one for products 7–12 (Version 2). Each survey had space for two responders under each product (Responder 1 and Responder 2). We manipulated the question for Responder 1: “Which one do you like?” (i.e., prefer￾ence) or “Which one do you want to have?” (i.e., desire for future action). We independently manipulated the question for Responder 2 (again, based on either preference or action). Using this para￾digm, all participants indicated their choices, which we framed in the survey as preference or desire for action. We gave one person in each dyadic group one version of the survey with product sets 1– 6; the other person received a survey with product sets 7–12. Both participants completed their part of the survey as Responder 1. Upon completion, participants switched their surveys. At that point, each participant could see the first responder’s responses under Responder 1, and completed the second part of the survey as Responder 2. We did not allow any verbal interaction within the dyad. Using this paradigm, we were interested in each participant’s responses when they went second, which we coded as either “the same as” or “different from” Responder 1’s choices. As a measure of confor￾mity, we counted the number of times the second responders’ answers coincided with the first responders’. Because we used six pairs of products on each version of the survey, the conformity score ranged from 0 to 6. Results and Discussion A 2 (other’s response framing: preference vs. action)  2 (target participant’s response framing: preference vs. action)  2 (survey version: 1 vs. 2) ANOVA yielded the predicted main effect of others’ response framing, F(1, 182) 11.77, p .001, indicating greater conformity to others’ choices when they were framed as preferences versus actions. We found no effect for participants’ responses, the survey version, or interactions involving these vari￾ables (Fs  1.02). Specifically, regardless of their own response mode, participants followed the first responders’ preferences more than their actions. Thus, when we framed second responders’ choices as actions (i.e., “Which one do you want to have?”), second responders followed first responders’ choices more when these choices were framed as preferences (M 3.76, SD .77) versus actions (M 3.32, SD 1.24), t(94) 2.08, p .04, Cohen’s d .43. Similarly, when we framed second responders’ choices as preferences (i.e., “Which one do you like better?”), second responders followed first re￾sponders’ choices more when we framed these choices as prefer￾ences (M 3.85, SD 1.10) versus actions (M 3.19, SD 1.20), t(92) 2.79, p .006, Cohen’s d .57 (see Figure 1). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. 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