Political Geography of Immigration Control 689 ity"to attitudes in the"traditional settler nations,"such as Australia,Canada,and the United States,"where nation building through immigration led to ideas of member- ship based on civic participation and a generally shared commitment to democratic values."8 From this perspective,"settler"states are those where nationalidentity and citizenship are based on civic values of participation;immigrants are viewed as po- tential citizens,and the state is relatively open to immigration.In contrast,"nonim- migrant"nations are those where citizenship and national identity are based on ethnicity; where these cultural values hold,immigrants are viewed as aliens or foreigners,and low levels of immigration are anticipated.Because national identity is fixed,in order to account for the variation over time the analyses introduce additional exogenous variables. From the "identity"perspective,elites,institutional structures,or extremist groups, for example,can damp down or kindle pressures to control alien entry.10 Economic interests of domestic political actors are a second major explanatory scheme.One group of analysts favors employer interests in explaining levels of openness.According to Marxian analyses,employer interests are dominant because of their privileged access to the capitalist state;for public choice analysts,it is because employers face fewer collective action problems than do employees or the public at large:12 for labor market analysts,employer interests are a reasonable proxy for other societal interests because migrant labor is concentrated in the secondary labor market and therefore complements and enhances the returns to the native labor force deployed in the primary labor market.3 Alternatively,domestic political actors are believed to have competing economic interests,forcing them to vie in the politi- cal arena for different policy outcomes.That is,"different social classes within the national territory will have conflicting interests which can result in opposing posi- tions on immigration."14 In other words,employers are one important class of politi- cal actors in favor of immigration,but now unions(or other interest groups)enter the political equation as actors who"might be opposed on the ground that this will harm workers'wages and working conditions."From the "economic"perspective,varia- tion is explained either in terms of employer demand for labor and hence for mi- grants or in terms of power balances among societal actors,some who support immi- gration,others who oppose it. Finally,many analysts point to the tension between economic benefits that accrue from immigration and the cultural costs that openness entails.One method of model- ing the relationship between economic and cultural variables and political outcomes focuses on the competition for scarce resources.5 National-ethnic identity is defined 8.Meissner 1992,70. 9.Altematively,"this view assumes that ethnic and racial strife is inevitable and invariant"and cannot account for variation over time;see Olzak 1992. 10.See,for example,Roeder 1994. 11.See Castells 1975;Castles and Kosack 1973;and Petras 1981. 12.Freeman 1995. 13.Piore1979. 14.Leitner1995,262. 15.For alternative ways of modeling the relationship between the economic and cultural variables,see Hollifield 1992;Freeman 1995;Zolberg 1983;and Leitner 1995.ity’’to attitudesin the ‘‘traditionalsettler nations,’’such asAustralia, Canada, and the United States, ‘‘where nation building through immigration led to ideas of member￾ship based on civic participation and a generally shared commitment to democratic values.’’ 8 From this perspective,‘‘settler’’states are those where national identity and citizenship are based on civic values of participation; immigrants are viewed as po￾tential citizens, and the state is relatively open to immigration. In contrast, ‘‘nonim￾migrant’’ nations are those where citizenship and national identity are based on ethnicity; where these cultural values hold, immigrants are viewed as aliens or foreigners, and low levels of immigration are anticipated.Because nationalidentityisŽ xed,in order to account for the variation over time the analyses introduce additional exogenous variables.9 From the ‘‘identity’’ perspective, elites, institutionalstructures, or extremist groups, for example, can damp down or kindle pressures to control alien entry.10 Economic interests of domestic political actors are a second major explanatory scheme. One group of analysts favors employer interests in explaining levels of openness. According to Marxian analyses, employer interests are dominant because of their privileged access to the capitalist state;11 for public choice analysts, it is because employers face fewer collective action problems than do employees or the public at large;12 for labor market analysts, employer interests are a reasonable proxy for other societal interests because migrant labor is concentrated in the secondary labor market and therefore complements and enhancesthe returns to the native labor force deployed in the primary labor market.13 Alternatively, domestic political actors are believed to have competing economic interests, forcing them to vie in the politi￾cal arena for different policy outcomes. That is, ‘‘different social classes within the national territory will have con icting interests which can result in opposing posi￾tions on immigration.’’ 14 In other words, employers are one important class of politi￾cal actorsin favor of immigration, but now unions(or other interest groups) enter the political equation as actors who ‘‘might be opposed on the ground that this will harm workers’ wages and working conditions.’’ From the ‘‘economic’’ perspective, varia￾tion is explained either in terms of employer demand for labor and hence for mi￾grants or in terms of power balances among societal actors,some who support immi￾gration, others who oppose it. Finally, many analysts point to the tension between economic beneŽ ts that accrue from immigration and the cultural coststhat openness entails. One method of model￾ing the relationship between economic and cultural variables and political outcomes focuses on the competition for scarce resources.15 National–ethnic identity is deŽ ned 8. Meissner 1992, 70. 9. Alternatively, ‘‘this view assumes that ethnic and racial strife is inevitable and invariant’’ and cannot account for variation over time; see Olzak 1992. 10. See, for example, Roeder 1994. 11. See Castells 1975; Castles and Kosack 1973; and Petras 1981. 12. Freeman 1995. 13. Piore 1979. 14. Leitner 1995, 262. 15. For alternative ways of modeling the relationship between the economic and cultural variables, see HolliŽ eld 1992; Freeman 1995; Zolberg 1983; and Leitner 1995. Political Geography of Immigration Control 689