Imperialism and Hegemony in Global Finance rentier shift that is transforming the character of its influence in the international financial order from hegemonic to imperialist. 1sn6m Everyday legitimacy and mechanisms for institutional change S6.20 We can move away from elite-driven analyses of how change occurs in the world economy by viewing legitimacy as contestation between claims by those who seek to govern,and the conferral or rejection of such claims in everyday practice by those being governed.In doing so we may learn from the literature on 'everyday politicsA crucial aspect of this literature is the notion that defiance and resistance need not be organised in advocacy groups to be effective.Rather,it may also occur incrementally and provide impulses for those governing to reform institutions to be in line with economic and social conventions.Everyday practices range widely but may include non-compliance with regulations as well as new practices that reflect a change in attitudes about how the economy should work(from songs,to cheating,to 益 a reordering of life priorities).For Benedict Kerkvliet,such everyday politics provides a'way for the relatively powerless to venture claims and put some pressure on more powerful people to take them into account?o Everyday practices may be informed by what I refer to as 'axiorational'beha- utrou np o ermr Importantly,this rescues us from the view that non-elite actors will simply conform to a 'logic of consequences'or a 'logic of appropriateness',and permits us to see non-elite actors as viewing the capacity to crossover between conventions as more fluid or liquid'.?2 Such a view of reason allows us to place greater stress on intentions and expectations that inform interests and,in doing so,permits a better understanding of how non-elites'intersubjective under- standings can change and,through everyday practices,influence institutional change. To see all this in action,I argue that there are three linked social mechanisms at play in the two cases discussed in this article.23 The first is public or private con- testation from LIGs over the legitimacy of the financial reform nexus.Such con- testation may be expressed through protest by advocacy groups or,more subtly, through changing economic and social conventions related to taxation,credit and property.Either way,changes from LIGs provide impulses to the state that are either taken aboard or rejected and lead to a redistribution of political and economic assets and access.This redistribution either goes some way towards meeting LIGs'expectations about how the economy should work or violates them by favouring rentier interests and,in extreme cases,enables a rentier shift that reorders political and economic relations in a socially regressive manner.Either way,the state will engage in a propagation of economic social norms that seeks to persuade LIGs about how the economy should work.Such proclamations -legitimacy claims-provide feedback for the process to start again.The three mechanisms are anchored by focal points related to the financial reform nexus,namely credit and property access and relative tax burdens.How these mechanisms play out then informs the character of the state's influence on the international financial order. 3Downloaded By: [University of Sydney] At: 02:46 7 August 2007 rentier shift that is transforming the character of its influence in the international financial order from hegemonic to imperialist. Everyday legitimacy and mechanisms for institutional change We can move away from elite-driven analyses of how change occurs in the world economy by viewing legitimacy as contestation between claims by those who seek to govern, and the conferral or rejection of such claims in everyday practice by those being governed. In doing so we may learn from the literature on ‘everyday politics’.17 A crucial aspect of this literature is the notion that defiance and resistance need not be organised in advocacy groups to be effective. Rather, it may also occur incrementally and provide impulses for those governing to reform institutions to be in line with economic and social conventions.18 Everyday practices range widely but may include non-compliance with regulations as well as new practices that reflect a change in attitudes about how the economy should work (from songs, to cheating, to a reordering of life priorities).19 For Benedict Kerkvliet, such everyday politics provides a ‘way for the relatively powerless to venture claims and put some pressure on more powerful people to take them into account’.20 Everyday practices may be informed by what I refer to as ‘axiorational’ beha￾viour – that is, action that is neither purely instrumental nor purely value-oriented, but grounded in reasons that one’s peers will most likely confer legitimacy upon.21 Importantly, this rescues us from the view that non-elite actors will simply conform to a ‘logic of consequences’ or a ‘logic of appropriateness’, and permits us to see non-elite actors as viewing the capacity to crossover between conventions as more fluid or ‘liquid’.22 Such a view of reason allows us to place greater stress on intentions and expectations that inform interests and, in doing so, permits a better understanding of how non-elites’ intersubjective under￾standings can change and, through everyday practices, influence institutional change. To see all this in action, I argue that there are three linked social mechanisms at play in the two cases discussed in this article.23 The first is public or private con￾testation from LIGs over the legitimacy of the financial reform nexus. Such con￾testation may be expressed through protest by advocacy groups or, more subtly, through changing economic and social conventions related to taxation, credit and property. Either way, changes from LIGs provide impulses to the state that are either taken aboard or rejected and lead to a redistribution of political and economic assets and access. This redistribution either goes some way towards meeting LIGs’ expectations about how the economy should work or violates them by favouring rentier interests and, in extreme cases, enables a rentier shift that reorders political and economic relations in a socially regressive manner. Either way, the state will engage in a propagation of economic social norms that seeks to persuade LIGs about how the economy should work. Such proclamations – legitimacy claims – provide feedback for the process to start again.24 The three mechanisms are anchored by focal points related to the financial reform nexus, namely credit and property access and relative tax burdens. How these mechanisms play out then informs the character of the state’s influence on the international financial order. Imperialism and Hegemony in Global Finance 3