2 a-c O Solving the system of the two equations we get Q=Q2=-,Q (a a+2 36 In the case of monopoly, since n=/ 1 b0 Qi=Q, equation 7 becomes a-bo a-c M a+c a-2b0=c0= In the case of perfect competition, since p=coa-bo=c, and therefore a-bg=c→OCa-c Stackelberg’ s Mode Instead of simultaneity in the firms' action as in the Cournot model, here the follower (say, firm 2)moves second playing Cournot Q eL while the leader, (say, firm 1)will maximise its profits by taking into account the follower's reaction function as he knows that the latter will act as a Cournot firm, (correctly) treating the leader's output as fixed Hence equation 1 becomes ela-b(@ +02 ) a-c a-c Consequently,b a c Q Q b Q a c Q 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 − + = − + = Solving the system of the two equations we get: 3 2 , 3 2( ) , 3 * 2 * 1 a c p b a c Q b a c Q Q C C + = − = − = = In the case of monopoly, since n=1, a bQ bQ − =  1 , Qi=Q, equation 7 becomes: 2 , 2 2 a c p b a c a bQ c Q M M + = − − =  = In the case of perfect competition, since p=c a-bQ=c, and therefore: p c b a c a bQ c Q PC PC = − − =  = , Stackelberg’s Model Instead of simultaneity in the firms’ action as in the Cournot model, here the follower (say, firm 2) moves second playing Cournot: 2 2 1 2 Q b a c Q − − = while the leader, (say, firm 1) will maximise its profits by taking into account the follower’s reaction function as he knows that the latter will act as a Cournot firm, (correctly) treating the leader’s output as fixed. Hence equation 1 becomes: ( ( )) ( )        + − −  = − = − + − = − − 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 c Q Q b b a c pQ cQ Q a b Q Q cQ a bQ b 1 1 1 2 2 Q Q b a c       − −  = Consequently