ElectronicjournalofcomparaTiveLaw,vol.9.1(january2005),<http://www.ejcl.org System; 2003). 6 It is, moreover, to be expected that the various governmental agencies will not automatically adopt the line held by the ministry of Justice. If the implementation of regulation is a persistent problem, so is the implementation of legislative policy. If we compare the social logic implied in the two cultural frames with the social logic proposed under a conception of responsive law, however, we will find interesting connections. Like the production model of legislation, the model of responsive regulation assumes democratic self- governance, albeit not by supporting the idea of political primacy for government and parliament. But it is similarly pragmatist in orientation and geared to procedural values of deliberative democracy and the rule of law, promising-seen through the lens of the production frame-a different and superior, pragmatic kind of instrumentality based on multilateral exchanges and on a widened knowledge base and the inclusion of more stakeholders. Like the situational model of legislation, responsive regulation awards primacy to the social order, to practices people engage in and local knowledge utilized therein, and it shares Ehrlich's preference for normative legal pluralism. But for the situationalists it has the message that even very effective semi-autonomous social fields are connected to a supporting environment and that the people acting within these systems are primarily citizens of a wider community with important shared values(and a lot of controversy over their meaning).When we see this, we situate the social logic of responsive regulation in between the social logic espoused by the two cultural frames of the production model and the situational model Perhaps, then, the idea of responsive regulation can be a bridge between them Schon and Rein developed their notion of cultural frames in order to be able to help actors caught up in their implicit conceptual schemes reflect on how their perceptions obstructed the solutions of intractable policy dilemmas. These authors subsequently they would engage in frame-reflective policy discourse The evidence of various ot such g envisaged methods for bringing together framed' actors in conversational settings in whi reflective conversations suggested that under certain conditions it would indeed be possible to escape from restricting frames and construct new ones. Perhaps this would also be feasible in legislative conversations involving participants in the legislative process, designed in such a way as to stimulate them to look into their own schemes of conceptualization. Participant in such a conversation must be able to put themselves in the shoes of other actors in the environment, and they must have a complementary ability to consider how their own action frames may contribute to the problematic situations in which they find themselves. 17 And it is exactly this kind of perspectivism which fosters the pragmatic problem-solving attitude advocated by the social logic of responsive regulation De bruikbare rechtsorde Kamerstukken 1/2003/2004.29279 no 9 Schon and Rein, Frame Reflection, at p. 187Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 9.1 (January 2005), <http://www.ejcl.org/> 10 System; 2003).16 It is, moreover, to be expected that the various governmental agencies will not automatically adopt the line held by the Ministry of Justice. If the implementation of regulation is a persistent problem, so is the implementation of legislative policy. If we compare the social logic implied in the two cultural frames with the social logic proposed under a conception of responsive law, however, we will find interesting connections. Like the production model of legislation, the model of responsive regulation assumes democratic self￾governance, albeit not by supporting the idea of political primacy for government and parliament. But it is similarly pragmatist in orientation and geared to procedural values of deliberative democracy and the rule of law, promising - seen through the lens of the production frame - a different and superior, pragmatic kind of instrumentality based on multilateral exchanges and on a widened knowledge base and the inclusion of more stakeholders. Like the situational model of legislation, responsive regulation awards primacy to the social order, to practices people engage in and local knowledge utilized therein, and it shares Ehrlich’s preference for normative legal pluralism. But for the situationalists it has the message that even very effective semi-autonomous social fields are connected to a supporting environment and that the people acting within these systems are primarily citizens of a wider community with important shared values (and a lot of controversy over their meaning). When we see this, we situate the social logic of responsive regulation in between the social logic espoused by the two cultural frames of the production model and the situational model. Perhaps, then, the idea of responsive regulation can be a bridge between them. Schön and Rein developed their notion of cultural frames in order to be able to help actors caught up in their implicit conceptual schemes reflect on how their perceptions obstructed the solutions of intractable policy dilemmas. These authors subsequently envisaged methods for bringing together ‘framed’ actors in conversational settings in which they would engage in ‘frame-reflective policy discourse’. The evidence of various of such reflective conversations suggested that under certain conditions it would indeed be possible to escape from restricting frames and construct new ones. Perhaps this would also be feasible in legislative conversations involving participants in the legislative process, designed in such a way as to stimulate them to look into their own schemes of conceptualization. ‘Participants in such a conversation must be able to put themselves in the shoes of other actors in the environment, and they must have a complementary ability to consider how their own action frames may contribute to the problematic situations in which they find themselves.’17 And it is exactly this kind of perspectivism which fosters the pragmatic problem-solving attitude advocated by the social logic of responsive regulation. 16 De bruikbare rechtsorde, Kamerstukken II 2003/2004, 29 279, no. 9. 17 Schön and Rein, Frame Reflection, at p. 187