that most appeals to their readers. For example, to the extent that personal finance publications appeal to ivestors who prefer to purchase direct-marketed funds rather than employ a broker and pay a load, these publications should be more likely to recommend no-load funds. Since families of no-load funds should then be more likely to advertise in the personal finance publications, Z includes a dummy variable indicating whether fund i charges a load; it also includes the level of fund is 12b-1(marketing and distribution) fee As additional measures of potential investor interest in fund i, we include log dollars under management within both fund i and the fund family to which it belongs, log net inflows into fund i over the prior twelve months, and the number of mentions in each of the other publications in our sample over the prior twelve months. Since mutual fund families that advertise may differ systematically from those that do not--either because advertisers have systematically higher expected future returns or because investors are more likely to value reviews of funds from families they learned about through advertising--z also includes total print and non-print advertising expenditures by fund is family over the prior 12 months B. Testing for Advertising Bias In Table III, we estimate equation(1)separately for each type of media mention. For example, the dependent ariable in the column titled"SmartMoney Positive"equals one if we coded fund i as receiving a positive mention in SmartMoney in month t and zero otherwise. Estimation is via logit and includes a separate fixed effect for each investment objective-by-month combination. The number of observations in this column reflects the number of mutual funds each month with the same investment objectives as those receiving a positive mention in SmartMoney. The explanatory variable of interest is advertising expenditures by fund i's family within SmartMoney over the prior 12 months, which we refer to as " own-publication advertising expenditures. Standard errors are reported below the coefficients and cluster on mutual fund family Moulto 1990 Looking across the columns in Table Ill, the coefficents on own-publication advertising are positive and re not mentioned in the n, our tests for advertising bias effectively condition on the investment objectives that publications choose to focus on each issue and ask, within these investment objectives, whether advertising expenditures influence which funds are mentioned Since we observe advertising expenditures at the mutual fund family level and many families offer funds that span the set of Ivestment objectives, we have insufficient statistical to test whether the choice of investment objectives favors advertisers 7that most appeals to their readers. For example, to the extent that personal finance publications appeal to investors who prefer to purchase direct-marketed funds rather than employ a broker and pay a load, these publications should be more likely to recommend no-load funds. Since families of no-load funds should then be more likely to advertise in the personal finance publications, Z includes a dummy variable indicating whether fund i charges a load; it also includes the level of fund i’s 12b-1 (marketing and distribution) fee. As additional measures of potential investor interest in fund i, we include log dollars under management within both fund i and the fund family to which it belongs, log net inflows into fund i over the prior twelve months, and the number of mentions in each of the other publications in our sample over the prior twelve months. Since mutual fund families that advertise may differ systematically from those that do not—either because advertisers have systematically higher expected future returns or because investors are more likely to value reviews of funds from families they learned about through advertising—Z also includes total print and non-print advertising expenditures by fund i’s family over the prior 12 months. B. Testing for Advertising Bias In Table III, we estimate equation (1) separately for each type of media mention. For example, the dependent variable in the column titled “SmartMoney Positive” equals one if we coded fund i as receiving a positive mention in SmartMoney in month t and zero otherwise. Estimation is via logit and includes a separate fixed effect for each investment objective-by-month combination. The number of observations in this column reflects the number of mutual funds each month with the same investment objectives as those receiving a positive mention in SmartMoney. 9 The explanatory variable of interest is advertising expenditures by fund i’s family within SmartMoney over the prior 12 months, which we refer to as “own-publication advertising” expenditures. Standard errors are reported below the coefficients and cluster on mutual fund family [Moulton 1990]. Looking across the columns in Table III, the coefficents on own-publication advertising are positive and 9Because funds with investment objectives that are not mentioned in the publication in month t are excluded from the estimation, our tests for advertising bias effectively condition on the investment objectives that publications choose to focus on each issue and ask, within these investment objectives, whether advertising expenditures influence which funds are mentioned. Since we observe advertising expenditures at the mutual fund family level and many families offer funds that span the set of investment objectives, we have insufficient statistical power to test whether the choice of investment objectives favors advertisers. 7