imperialistic, parasitic, and scavenging. 30 Brian Leiter charged that"its most striking feature is its intellectual voyeurism: superficial and ill-informed treatment of serious ideas apparently done intellectual " titillation'or to advertise, in a pretentious way, the sophistication of the writer I Nor can English legal historians be charged with the high sins of presentism232 and anachronism. 3 They have not engaged"in the artful manipulation of historical sources to serve adversarial positions in contemporary disputes roaming through history looking for [their] friends. 3) Thus, they are not practitioners of"forensic history, which has led critics to challenge its current use in American constitutional and political theory, 3o labeling it" lawyers history"and"history-in-law"7 or more pejoratively, "law office history 38 and"history lite None of these criticisms seems relevant in appraising the nature or value of the scholarly contributions to 30. See white, Reflections on the" Republican Revival supra note 1, at 3 (quoting Daniel Rodgers) 31. See Brian Leiter, Intellectual Voyeurism in Legal Scholarship 4 Yale J. Law& Humanities 79, 79-80(1992) 2加mm上mB2m0m103 33. See e.g., Linda K. Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful, 97 Yale L.J. 1663, 1672(1988) 34. See id at 16 35. See Morton Horowitz, Republican Origins of Constitutionalism, in Toward a st l Under State Constitutions 148-49(Paul Finkelman Stephan Gottlieb eds, 1991). Many historians ed the history used by these best deeply problematic and at worst, howlers. "See Martin S. Flaherty, History"Lie- assertions that are at Constitutionalism, 95 CoL. L. Rev. 523, 525(1995). But perhaps such work should be judged by criteria different from those used for evaluating the practice of history. See Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case ofHistory-1n-Lamw, 71 Chicago-Kent L Rev. 917, 932-35(1996) a note 21, at 132-246: Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on and Forgetting: Kalman's ""Strange Career"and the Marketing of Civic Republicanism, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1025(1998); Tushnet, supra note 35, at 925-32: White, Reflections on the Republican Revival"sunra note 1, at 15-23 37. See Tushnet, supra note 35, at 917-34. Also English legal historians have not exhibited"past dependency, treating use it Is Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History in Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. Chi L.Rev.573(2000 38. See Flaherty, supra note 35, at 554; John P. Reid, Law and History, 27 Loyola L. Rev. 193, 197-203.(1993) 39. See Flaherty, supra note 35. As John Reid has pointed"forensic history" is not new and can be observed in the polemics of 17th century English ancient constitutio ngstanding English and American contractarian constitutional theories. See reid, supra note 38, at 205-1730. See White, Reflections on the “Republican Revival” supra note 1, at 3 (quoting Daniel Rodgers). 31. See Brian Leiter, Intellectual Voyeurism in Legal Scholarship, 4 Yale J. Law & Humanities 79, 79- 80 (1992). 32. . See Kalman, Strange Career, supra note 21, at 180-90; Stolzenberg, supra note 36, at 1033-39; White, Reflections on the “Republican Revival” supra note 1, at 19-20 & n.43. 33. See, e.g., Linda K. Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful, 97 Yale L.J. 1663, 1672 (1988). 34. See id. at 16. 35. See Morton Horowitz, Republican Origins of Constitutionalism, in Toward a Usable Past: Liberty Under State Constitutions 148-49 (Paul Finkelman & Stephan Gottlieb eds., 1991). Many historians claimed the history used by these lawyers was inaccurate and unrecognizable. “Constitutional discourse is replete with historical assertions that are at best deeply problematic and at worst, howlers.” See Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 Col. L. Rev. 523, 525 (1995). But perhaps such work should be judged by criteria different from those used for evaluating the practice of history. See Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case of History-In-Law, 71 Chicago- Kent L. Rev. 917, 932-35 (1996). 36. See Flaherty, supra note 35, at 525; Kalman, supra note 21, at 132-246; Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal Scholarship, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 87, 107 (1997); Nomi M. Stolzenberg, A Book of Laughter and Forgetting: Kalman’s “Strange Career” and the Marketing of Civic Republicanism, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1025 (1998); Tushnet, supra note 35, at 925-32; White, Reflections on the “Republican Revival” supra note 1, at 15-23. 37. See Tushnet, supra note 35, at 917-34. Also English legal historians have not exhibited “past dependency,” treating history as form of idolatry or vesting the past, simply because it is the past, with a normative quality. See Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Criticque of History in Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 573 (2000). 38. See Flaherty, supra note 35, at 554; John P. Reid, Law and History, 27 Loyola L. Rev. 193, 197-203.(1993). 39. See Flaherty, supra note 35. As John Reid has pointed “forensic history” is not new and can be observed in the polemics of 17th century English ancient constitutionalism and longstanding English and American contractarian constitutional theories. See Reid, supra note 38, at 205-17. 7 imperialistic, parasitic, and scavenging.30 Brian Leiter charged that “its most striking feature is its ‘intellectual voyeurism’: superficial and ill-informed treatment of serious ideas apparently done intellectual ‘titillation’ or to advertise, in a pretentious way, the sophistication of the writer.”31 Nor can English legal historians be charged with the high sins of “presentism”32 and anachronism.33 They have not engaged “in the artful manipulation of historical sources to serve adversarial positions in contemporary disputes,”34 “roaming through historylookingfor[their]friends.”35 Thus, theyare not practitioners of “forensic history,” which has led critics to challenge its current use in American constitutional and political theory, 36 labeling it “lawyers history” and “history-in-law”37 or more pejoratively, “law office history”38 and “history lite.”39 None of these criticisms seems relevant in appraising the nature or value of the scholarly contributions to