American Political Science Review (2018)112.4.742-757 doi:10.1017/S0003055418000266 American Political Science Association 2018 Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies:Experimental Evidence from Israel RYAN D.ENOS Harvard University NOAM GIDRON Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Princeton University t is well-established that in diverse societies,certain groups prefer to exclude other groups from power and often from society entirely.Yet as many societies are diversifying at an increasingly rapid pace,the need for cross-group cooperation to solve collective action problems has intensified.Do preferences for exclusion inhibit the ability of individuals to cooperate and,therefore,diminish the ability for societies to collectively provide public goods?Turning to Israel,a society with multiple overlapping and politically salient cleavages,we use a large-scale lab-in-the-field design to investigate how preferences for exclusion among the Jewish majority predict discriminatory behavior toward Palestinian Citizens of Israel.We establish that preferences for exclusion are likely symbolic attitudes,and therefore stable and dominating of other attitudes;are held especially strongly by low-status majority group members;and powerfully predict costly non-cooperation.This preferences/behavior relationship appears unaffected by mitigating factors proposed in the intergroup relations literature.The demonstrated influence of symbolic attitudes on behavior calls for further examination of the social roots of exclusionary preferences. t is well-understood that across groups and soci- regation in the United States,white citizens had to de- eties,people hold discriminatory attitudes toward cide whether to cooperate with African Americans cit- social outgroups.One of the most politically conse- izens or to retreat into enclaves of non-cooperation, quential ways these attitudes can manifest is in prefer- thus hindering the provision of public goods such as ences for exclusion,including exclusion from political schools.In South Africa,a similar challenge was faced institutions and power(Sidanius and Pratto 2001),the with the end of apartheid and the increase in inter- "imagined community"of a nation (Anderson 1983), actions across racial groups.Currently,anti-immigrant or the country itself via restrictive immigration poli- political parties and candidates in the United States cies(Citrin and Sides 2008).Yet,despite such barriers and Western Europe have gained support,yet immigra- and opposition,the ethnic and religious composition tion to these places continues;to what degree are sup- of many Western democracies continue to diversify porters of anti-immigrant policies willing to cooperate and,in recent decades,at an accelerating pace (Putnam with immigrants in their communities?And in Israel. 2007).Within this context of growing diversity,cooper- are Jewish citizens willing to cooperate with Palestinian 是 ation across social groups is necessary for building and Citizens of Israel(PCI)-despite the prevalence of ex- maintaining successful and well-functioning societies clusionary preferences toward this large and growing (Habyarimana et al.2009;Singh 2011).A crucial ques- national minority？ tion then emerges:Can individuals with a strong pref- Put in more general terms,the issue at stake is erence for outgroup exclusion nevertheless put these whether and to what degree exclusionary attitudes hin- preferences aside to cooperate and solve challenges of der cooperation.This question has implications for collective action? both the success of outgroup members in making po- There are many examples of the relevance of this litical and economic gains and the ability of society as question.Following the decline of de jure racial seg- a whole to work together for the greater good.Are ex- clusionary attitudes separable from behaviors?Even if members of the hegemonic group express a preference Ryan D.Enos is a Professor of Government,Department of Govern- for the exclusion of outgroup members,will they still ment,Harvard University,1737 Cambridge Street,Cambridge,MA work with outgroup members for their mutual benefit 02138 (renos@gov.harvard.edu). Noam Gidron is a Research Fellow at the Niehaus Center for in the creation and allocation of public goods? Globalization and Governance at Princeton University and an As- On the one hand,there is reason to believe that at- sistant Professor of Political Science,Hebrew University,Mount Sco- titudes are separable from behaviors.Cooperation is pus,Jerusalem (Noam.Gidron@mail.huji.ac.il). often treated as a strategic choice that can be updated Both authors contributed equally.Support for this research was with repeated interactions with outgroup members and provided by the Harvard Center for Jewish Studies,the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies,and the Multidisci. other learning processes (Axelrod 2006).There is also plinary Program in Inequality and Social Policy at Harvard Uni- evidence that private attitudes toward outgroups may versity.A previous version of this article was presented at the 2017 not predict certain behaviors because the behaviors are Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting and the 2017 guided by social norms(Paluck 2009)or because atti- Toronto Political Behaviour Workshop.We thank Stanley Feld- tudes,as reported in surveys,are unstable and do not man and Eric Arias for comments and Riley Carney and Alexan- der Sahn for additional assistance.Replication files are available at reflect the more careful deliberation that may proceed the American Political Science Review Dataverse:https://doi.org/10. behavior (Zaller 1992).Yet,on the other hand,atti- 7910/DVN/DAR560 tudes may strongly predict non-cooperative behaviors Received:June 14,2017;revised:February 26,2018;accepted:May in light of evidence that exclusionary preferences are a 14,2018.First published online:July 13,2018. matter of deeply held prejudicial distaste(Hainmueller 742American Political Science Review (2018) 112, 4, 742–757 doi:10.1017/S0003055418000266 © American Political Science Association 2018 Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies: Experimental Evidence from Israel RYAN D. ENOS Harvard University NOAM GIDRON Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Princeton University I t is well-established that in diverse societies, certain groups prefer to exclude other groups from power and often from society entirely. Yet as many societies are diversifying at an increasingly rapid pace,the need for cross-group cooperation to solve collective action problems has intensified. Do preferences for exclusion inhibit the ability of individuals to cooperate and, therefore, diminish the ability for societies to collectively provide public goods? Turning to Israel, a society with multiple overlapping and politically salient cleavages, we use a large-scale lab-in-the-field design to investigate how preferences for exclusion among the Jewish majority predict discriminatory behavior toward Palestinian Citizens of Israel. We establish that preferences for exclusion are likely symbolic attitudes, and therefore stable and dominating of other attitudes; are held especially strongly by low-status majority group members; and powerfully predict costly non-cooperation. This preferences/behavior relationship appears unaffected by mitigating factors proposed in the intergroup relations literature. The demonstrated influence of symbolic attitudes on behavior calls for further examination of the social roots of exclusionary preferences. I t is well-understood that across groups and soci￾eties, people hold discriminatory attitudes toward social outgroups. One of the most politically conse￾quential ways these attitudes can manifest is in prefer￾ences for exclusion, including exclusion from political institutions and power (Sidanius and Pratto 2001), the “imagined community” of a nation (Anderson 1983), or the country itself via restrictive immigration poli￾cies (Citrin and Sides 2008). Yet, despite such barriers and opposition, the ethnic and religious composition of many Western democracies continue to diversify and, in recent decades, at an accelerating pace (Putnam 2007).Within this context of growing diversity, cooper￾ation across social groups is necessary for building and maintaining successful and well-functioning societies (Habyarimana et al. 2009; Singh 2011). A crucial ques￾tion then emerges: Can individuals with a strong pref￾erence for outgroup exclusion nevertheless put these preferences aside to cooperate and solve challenges of collective action? There are many examples of the relevance of this question. Following the decline of de jure racial seg￾Ryan D. Enos is a Professor of Government, Department of Govern￾ment, Harvard University, 1737 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 (renos@gov.harvard.edu). Noam Gidron is a Research Fellow at the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance at Princeton University and an As￾sistant Professor of Political Science, Hebrew University,Mount Sco￾pus, Jerusalem (Noam.Gidron@mail.huji.ac.il). Both authors contributed equally. Support for this research was provided by the Harvard Center for Jewish Studies, the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, and the Multidisci￾plinary Program in Inequality and Social Policy at Harvard Uni￾versity. A previous version of this article was presented at the 2017 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting and the 2017 Toronto Political Behaviour Workshop. We thank Stanley Feld￾man and Eric Arias for comments and Riley Carney and Alexan￾der Sahn for additional assistance. Replication files are available at the American Political Science Review Dataverse: https://doi.org/10. 7910/DVN/DAR56O. Received: June 14, 2017; revised: February 26, 2018; accepted: May 14, 2018. First published online: July 13, 2018. regation in the United States, white citizens had to de￾cide whether to cooperate with African Americans cit￾izens or to retreat into enclaves of non-cooperation, thus hindering the provision of public goods such as schools. In South Africa, a similar challenge was faced with the end of apartheid and the increase in inter￾actions across racial groups. Currently, anti-immigrant political parties and candidates in the United States and Western Europe have gained support, yet immigra￾tion to these places continues; to what degree are sup￾porters of anti-immigrant policies willing to cooperate with immigrants in their communities? And in Israel, are Jewish citizens willing to cooperate with Palestinian Citizens of Israel (PCI)—despite the prevalence of ex￾clusionary preferences toward this large and growing national minority? Put in more general terms, the issue at stake is whether and to what degree exclusionary attitudes hin￾der cooperation. This question has implications for both the success of outgroup members in making po￾litical and economic gains and the ability of society as a whole to work together for the greater good. Are ex￾clusionary attitudes separable from behaviors? Even if members of the hegemonic group express a preference for the exclusion of outgroup members, will they still work with outgroup members for their mutual benefit in the creation and allocation of public goods? On the one hand, there is reason to believe that at￾titudes are separable from behaviors. Cooperation is often treated as a strategic choice that can be updated with repeated interactions with outgroup members and other learning processes (Axelrod 2006). There is also evidence that private attitudes toward outgroups may not predict certain behaviors because the behaviors are guided by social norms (Paluck 2009) or because atti￾tudes, as reported in surveys, are unstable and do not reflect the more careful deliberation that may proceed behavior (Zaller 1992). Yet, on the other hand, atti￾tudes may strongly predict non-cooperative behaviors in light of evidence that exclusionary preferences are a matter of deeply held prejudicial distaste (Hainmueller 742 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000266