ognised as a legal category. In his own words: New property represents a relationship between an organization and the holder, the organization being the the source "of the interest, the holder being the beneficial owner. "15 Examples of this "new property, which he also describes as the development of economically valuable interests that are of vital importance to the holders of those interests, are job security and the right to be in a national rk or forest What can be the object of a right of ownership or other absolute right is a different problem area compared to the question whether only those rights can be recognised as absolute(i.e as rights against the world) which are mentioned in a mandatory catalogue or whether freedom exists to create new absolute rights. This latter question does not deal with the object of, e.g., ownership or security interests, but with the type and content of the right which is claimed to be absolute in regard to a particular object. Of course, the two questions interrelate. If-to give an example it would be accepted that a right for every citizen exists to walk in a national park, the question arises what the nature of this right is. Is it a public law an absolute right? If it is accepted as an absolute right accord ing to private law, what door or a private law right? Assuming that it could be a private law right, would it be a personal or this mean in the light of the existing numerus clausus? here we touch the immensely complicated borderline both between public law and private law and between the law of obligations and the law of property. Let me give another example, to show how difficult it already is to draw a clear line only between contract and property. Sometimes contractual rights can become commodities'and are treated as objects of property law. An illustration therswaps: contracts aimed at taking over-but only between the two parties among concluded with, e.g., a bank. As a result of the swap, interest rates, currencies or both can be exchanged: the two parties who conclude a swap will each behave as if he were the other party. If party a pays a fixed interest rate and party b a floating rate, after the swap a will futures and options. It derives its own value from the underlying value, in tn/s case the, like pay b the floating rate and B will pay a the fixed rate. A swap is, as such, a derivati existing loan contracts with the agreed interest rates and currencies. 9 It is generally assumed that swaps and derivatives are to be considered as contracts. However, once these contracts have been standardised and in this form are traded in an exchange, they may also be considered to be commod ities and, hence, goods. 20 If this qualification is correct, it would Property, 29 Buffalo Law Review(1980), 325 ff. C.A. Reich, The New Property after 25 Years, 24 University of san Francisco Law Review(1990), 223f,atp.225 Reich, New Property after 25 Years, p. 226 G. Samuel, " Property Notions in the Law of obligations, 53 Cambridge Law journal(1994), 524 ff. G.L. Gretton, Owning Rights and Things, Stellenbosse Regstydskrif/ Stellenbosh Law Review(1997),176 ff , K Reid, Obligations and Property: Exploring the border, Acta Juridica(1997), 225 ff. floatia. This implies, of course, an element of speculation. In the future, A hopes to be better offby payingthe rate(when the floating rate gets lower than the fixed rate)and b hopes the same by pay ing the fixed rate(when the floatingrate gets higher). Only one of them can be right See C F. Leeger, Swaps onder ISDA-documentatie, Serie Contracteren in de internationale praktijk Deventer: Kluwer, 2002), p. 1 20 Ph R. Wood, Title Finance, Derivatives, Securitisations, Set-offand Netting, Series Law and Practice of Intemational Finance(London: Sweet Maxwell, 1995), pp 215 ff, where he discusses derivatives markets,recognised as a legal category. In his own words: ‘New property represents a relationship between an organization and the holder, the organization being the “the source” of the interest, the holder being the beneficial owner.’15 Examples of this ‘new property’, which he also describes as ‘the development of economically valuable interests that are of vital importance to the holders of those interests’, are job security and the right to be in a national park or forest.16 What can be the object of a right of ownership or other absolute right is a different problem area compared to the question whether only those rights can be recognised as absolute (i.e. as rights against the world) which are mentioned in a mandatory catalogue or whether freedom exists to create ‘new’ absolute rights. This latter question does not deal with the object of, e.g., ownership or security interests, but with the type and content of the right which is claimed to be absolute in regard to a particular object. Of course, the two questions interrelate. If - to give an example - it would be accepted that a right for every citizen exists to walk in a national park, the question arises what the nature of this right is. Is it a public law or a private law right? Assuming that it could be a private law right, would it be a personal or an absolute right? If it is accepted as an absolute right according to private law, what does this mean in the light of the existing numerus clausus? Here we touch the immensely complicated borderline both between public law and private law and between the law of obligations and the law of property.17 Let me give another example, to show how difficult it already is to draw a clear line only between contract and property. Sometimes contractual rights can become ‘commodities’ and are treated as objects of property law. An illustration are swaps: contracts aimed at taking over - but only between the two parties among themselves - the other party’s position in regard to a loan agreement which that party concluded with, e.g., a bank. As a result of the swap, interest rates, currencies or both can be ‘exchanged’: the two parties who conclude a swap will each behave as if he were the other party. If party A pays a fixed interest rate and party B a floating rate, after the swap A will pay B the floating rate and B will pay A the fixed rate.18 A swap is, as such, a derivative, like futures and options. It derives its own value from the underlying value, in this case the existing loan contracts with the agreed interest rates and currencies.19 It is generally assumed that swaps and derivatives are to be considered as ‘contracts’. However, once these contracts have been standardised and in this form are traded in an exchange, they may also be considered to be commodities and, hence, goods.20 If this qualification is correct, it would Property’, 29 Buffalo Law Review (1980), 325 ff.. 15 C.A. Reich, ‘The New Property after 25 Years’, 24 University of San Francisco Law Review (1990), 223 ff., at p. 225. 16 Reich, ‘New Property after 25 Years’, p. 226. 17 G. Samuel, ‘Property Notions in the Law of Obligations’, 53 Cambridge Law Journal (1994), 524 ff.; G.L. Gretton, ‘Owning Rights and Things’, Stellenbosse Regstydskrif/Stellenbosh Law Review (1997), 176 ff.; K. Reid, ‘Obligations and Property: Exploring the Border’, Acta Juridica (1997), 225 ff. 18 This implies, of course, an element of speculation. In the future, A hopes to be better off by paying the floating rate (when the floating rate gets lower than the fixed rate) and B hopes the same by paying the fixed rate (when the floating rate gets higher). Only one of them can be right. 19 See C.F. Leeger, Swaps onder ISDA-documentatie, Serie Contracteren in de internationale praktijk (Deventer: Kluwer, 2002), p. 1. 20 Ph.R. Wood, Title Finance, Derivatives, Securitisations, Set-off and Netting, Series Law and Practice of International Finance (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1995), pp. 215 ff. , where he discusses derivatives markets