CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW rarely discussed in the international law literature but that are fundamental to understanding CIL. The first set of issues concerns the unarticulated and undefended assumptions that underlie the traditional conception of CIL. Despite the many disagreements within the traditional paradigm, the parties to this debate assume that Cil is unitary, universal and exogenous CIL is unitary in the sense that all the behaviors it describes have an identical logical form that is described in the standard definition cil is universal in the sense that its obligations bind all nations except those that "persistently object during the development of the CIL norm. 24 And CIL is an exogenous influence on national behavior in the sense that it guides, shapes, and influences national actions. When nations are law abiding they conform their behavior to CIL. When they violate Cil they act in defiance of it. Our theory of cil challenges each of these optic The second set of issues on which we focus concerns the traditional paradigm's inability to explain international behavior. For example, the traditional paradigm has no account for how CIL originates. 25 It does not explain how international behavioral regularities emerge from disorder. As we saw above, it also fails to explain how nations move from a"mere"behavioral regularity to a behavioral regularity that nations follow from a sense of legal obligation The traditional account cannot explain how CiL rules change over time. 26 To take one of scores of examples the ostensible CIL ale governing a nations jurisdiction over its coasts changed from a cannon-shot rule to a three-mile rule to a twelve mile rule with many qualifications. 27 On the traditional account, the process of change is necessarily illegal, since some states must initiate a departure from 24 On the persistent objector rule, see Restatement(Third), supra note_, at s 102, comment d; Ted L Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 Harv. Int'l L J. 457 (1985) 25 ee D'Amato, supra note, at 4. 26 f, supra note, at 97-105 27 This is a simplification. We explore this rule more fully infra.9 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW rarely discussed in the international law literature, but that are fundamental to understanding CIL. The first set of issues concerns the unarticulated and undefended assumptions that underlie the traditional conception of CIL. Despite the many disagreements within the traditional paradigm, the parties to this debate assume that CIL is unitary, universal, and exogenous. CIL is unitary in the sense that all the behaviors it describes have an identical logical form that is described in the standard definition. CIL is universal in the sense that its obligations bind all nations except those that “persistently object” during the development of the CIL norm.24 And CIL is an exogenous influence on national behavior in the sense that it guides, shapes, and influences national actions. When nations are law￾abiding they conform their behavior to CIL. When they violate CIL they act in defiance of it. Our theory of CIL challenges each of these assumptions. The second set of issues on which we focus concerns the traditional paradigm’s inability to explain international behavior. For example, the traditional paradigm has no account for how CIL originates.25 It does not explain how international behavioral regularities emerge from disorder. As we saw above, it also fails to explain how nations move from a “mere” behavioral regularity to a behavioral regularity that nations follow from a sense of legal obligation. The traditional account cannot explain how CIL rules change over time.26 To take one of scores of examples: the ostensible CIL rule governing a nation’s jurisdiction over its coasts changed from a cannon-shot rule to a three-mile rule to a twelve mile rule with many qualifications.27 On the traditional account, the process of change is necessarily illegal, since some states must initiate a departure from 24 On the persistent objector rule, see Restatement (Third), supra note __, at § 102, comment d; Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 Harv. Int’l L. J. 457 (1985). 25 See D’Amato, supra note __, at 4. 26 See id.; Hoof, supra note __, at 97-105. 27 This is a simplification. We explore this rule more fully infra