1 1.Introduction Determining whether international economic integration in advanced economies increases worker insecurity is critical to competing explanations of welfare-state policymaking and the politics of globalization.An influential argument in the welfare-state literature is that increases in economic insecurity from globalization generate demands for more generous social insurance that compensates workers for a riskier environment (e.g.,Cameron,1978;Rodrik 1997,1998; Garrett 1998;Burgoon 2001;Hays,Ehrlich,and Peinhardt 2002;Boix 2002).The connection between globalization and welfare spending in this argument depends on the causal mechanism that international economic integration increases worker insecurity.Claims that no such link exists undermine this explanation for variation in welfare-state spending. The link between economic integration and worker insecurity is also an essential element of explanations for patterns of public opposition to policies aimed at further liberalization of international trade,immigration,and foreign direct investment (FDI)in advanced economies. Economic insecurity may contribute to the backlash against globalization in at least two ways. First is a direct effect in which individuals that perceive globalization to be contributing to their own economic insecurity are much more likely to develop policy attitudes against economic integration.Second,if globalization limits the capacities of governments to provide social insurance,or is perceived to do so,then individuals may worry further about globalization and this effect is likely to be magnified if labor-market risks are heightened by global integration. Previous empirical research has focused on whether one particular component of globalization,international trade,generates economic volatility.This research has been inconclusive.Among others,Rodrik (1997,1998)argues in the affirmative and presents evidence that exposure to external risk from trade,measured by the interaction between trade1 1. Introduction Determining whether international economic integration in advanced economies increases worker insecurity is critical to competing explanations of welfare-state policymaking and the politics of globalization. An influential argument in the welfare-state literature is that increases in economic insecurity from globalization generate demands for more generous social insurance that compensates workers for a riskier environment (e.g., Cameron, 1978; Rodrik 1997, 1998; Garrett 1998; Burgoon 2001; Hays, Ehrlich, and Peinhardt 2002; Boix 2002). The connection between globalization and welfare spending in this argument depends on the causal mechanism that international economic integration increases worker insecurity. Claims that no such link exists undermine this explanation for variation in welfare-state spending. The link between economic integration and worker insecurity is also an essential element of explanations for patterns of public opposition to policies aimed at further liberalization of international trade, immigration, and foreign direct investment (FDI) in advanced economies. Economic insecurity may contribute to the backlash against globalization in at least two ways. First is a direct effect in which individuals that perceive globalization to be contributing to their own economic insecurity are much more likely to develop policy attitudes against economic integration. Second, if globalization limits the capacities of governments to provide social insurance, or is perceived to do so, then individuals may worry further about globalization and this effect is likely to be magnified if labor-market risks are heightened by global integration. Previous empirical research has focused on whether one particular component of globalization, international trade, generates economic volatility. This research has been inconclusive. Among others, Rodrik (1997, 1998) argues in the affirmative and presents evidence that exposure to external risk from trade, measured by the interaction between trade