who were interested in public choice Don Gordon, Hal Hochman and Paul Rubin. What I remember especially is that for the entire time I was there, we talked almost exclusively about Mancur's book. The question, of course, was why some countries were able to grow faster than others The conventional wisdom was that countries grew fast when they had high saving and investment rates. Mancur changed the debate to focus on politics and political structure, particularly the structure of interest groups. As I remember it, all of us disagreed with the central argument, but we were excited by the way Mancur framed the question, we felt that here was a new way of thinking about macroeconomic policy, and we debated his logic constantly This time he has an even bigger subject-the economics of autocracy, and how it compares to democracy and anarchy. For good measure, he throws in a brief history of the forms of government- how autocracy arose out of anarchy and how democracy can arise out of autocracy -and a theory of the logic of power itself. Of course, with his tragic passing, we do not know how close to a finished product the book we have actually represents -and there are some obvious minor but blatant errors that ought to be corrected -but the book is certainly well organized and it reads well Is the story as compelling this time round? The central concept is Olsons familiar idea of the"stationary bandit, which explains why even autocratic rulers use their power to at least some extent in the public interest. In the book, this concept is approached through a metaphor about ordinary crime a thief contemplates the optimal level of his activity. Each theft reduces the wealth of society and therefore the amount available for the thief to steal Does this lead the thief to curtail his activity, in order to preserve the wealth of his prey? For the typical criminal, the answer is"no"because his interest is too narrow. The wealth of the society on which he preys is like a public good to the typical small scale criminal, his effort to preserve it would have only a minuscule effect, and so he is better off free riding rather than attempting to conserve it. On the other hand, the mafia and other criminal organizations which have a monopoly on crime in their area do have a sufficiently encom- passing interest in preserving the wealth of the society on which they prey. Thus, Olson asserts, they typically do not steal at all but engage in protection instead, charging the citizens a fee to ensure the safety of their victims both from others and from the protectors themselves This criminal metaphor then becomes the foundation for Olsons logic of government. Taxes are likened to theft. The difference between government by a roving"versus that by a stationary"bandit is that the stationary bandit, unlike the roving one, has an interest in preserving the wealth of the society from which she steals. She therefore limits her theft(taxation)and even391 who were interested in public choice – Don Gordon, Hal Hochman and Paul Rubin. What I remember especially is that for the entire time I was there, we talked almost exclusively about Mancur’s book. The question, of course, was why some countries were able to grow faster than others. The conventional wisdom was that countries grew fast when they had high saving and investment rates. Mancur changed the debate to focus on politics and political structure, particularly the structure of interest groups. As I remember it, all of us disagreed with the central argument, but we were excited by the way Mancur framed the question, we felt that here was a new way of thinking about macroeconomic policy, and we debated his logic constantly. This time he has an even bigger subject – the economics of autocracy, and how it compares to democracy and anarchy. For good measure, he throws in a brief history of the forms of government – how autocracy arose out of anarchy and how democracy can arise out of autocracy – and a theory of the logic of power itself. Of course, with his tragic passing, we do not know how close to a finished product the book we have actually represents – and there are some obvious minor but blatant errors that ought to be corrected – but the book is certainly well organized and it reads well. Is the story as compelling this time round? The central concept is Olson’s familiar idea of the “stationary bandit”, which explains why even autocratic rulers use their power to at least some extent in the public interest. In the book, this concept is approached through a metaphor about ordinary crime. A thief contemplates the optimal level of his activity. Each theft reduces the wealth of society and therefore the amount available for the thief to steal. Does this lead the thief to curtail his activity, in order to preserve the wealth of his prey? For the typical criminal, the answer is “no” because his interest is too narrow. The wealth of the society on which he preys is like a public good to the typical small scale criminal, his effort to preserve it would have only a minuscule effect, and so he is better off free riding rather than attempting to conserve it. On the other hand, the Mafia and other criminal organizations which have a monopoly on crime in their area do have a sufficiently encom￾passing interest in preserving the wealth of the society on which they prey. Thus, Olson asserts, they typically do not steal at all but engage in protection instead, charging the citizens a fee to ensure the safety of their victims both from others and from the protectors themselves. This criminal metaphor then becomes the foundation for Olson’s logic of government. Taxes are likened to theft. The difference between government by a “roving” versus that by a “stationary” bandit is that the stationary bandit, unlike the roving one, has an interest in preserving the wealth of the society from which she steals. She therefore limits her “theft” (taxation) and even