Barbro bjorkman following: We do not live in a fair world, resources and opportunities are not evenly distributed, and, as a result, the vast majority of the worlds population lives in poverty. We should all do our best to lessen poverty and suffering and make the world a more equal place. This is not done, however, by denying them what might be their best option to improve their lives, which well could be to sell an organ. In the words of Janet Radcliffe -Richards et al.,"feelings of repugnance among the rich and healthy, no matter how strongly felt, cannot justify removing the only hope of the destitute and dying"(p. 1950). To do so, it is said, is to violate their rights, rob them of their autonomy, and, to make matters even worse, will do nothing to alleviate the real problem. Julian Savulescu takes the argument one step further and calls a ban on organ selling paternalism in its worst form"(p. 139). He advocates that people should be allowed to make this choice(on the condition that it is informed consent)if it provides them with the means to realize what they value in life. Although the arguments outlined above might seem reasonable on one level (i.e, that people should not have to die queuing for an organ if there are alternatives), they fail to correlate with most people's moral intuitions on this matter. It appears that we have strong intuitions, in the sense that they are stable and withstand the test of time, that the selling of organs is plain wrong and no reasonable consequence- or rights-based argument can make it more alatable Naturally this could just mean that we are wrong. It is unclear what the difference, if indeed there is any, between moral intuition and emotional aversion actually consists of and moreover if people's emotional aversion should carry moral weight. It is far from obvious that the fact that we(the rich and healthy, presumably) are repulsed by something truly means that it is also morally reprehensible. Perhaps this reveals an inconsistency in our views on the relationship to ones own body. However, given that the purpose of normative ethics is to help us to bring some order to and explain our stable moral intuitions, the above-mentioned theories do not seem to be adequate tools for doing just that. Few of us sincerely feel that creating a market for transplant organs would make the world a better place from a moral point of view, even if the consequences were favorable and important rights would be protected. 9 Some Common Arguments against Organ Commodification Before moving on to the virtue ethics analysis, three of the most frequently voiced arguments against selling organs are explored First, it is said that commodification of organs is wrong because it implies themselves. Such arguments draw on Kantian ideas of not using people iin that we use people as means to an end rather than allow for them to be ends means to an end and that selling even the smallest part of ourselves would open the door for slavery Or in Kants own words, "a man who sells himself makes himself a thing and as he has jettisoned his person it is open to deal with him as he pleases"(p. 124). Thus Kant effectively states that any form of selling dignity by introducing a new way of thinking both about others and ourselves that some humans would come to serve as toolboxes for othersfollowing: We do not live in a fair world, resources and opportunities are not evenly distributed, and, as a result, the vast majority of the world’s population lives in poverty. We should all do our best to lessen poverty and suffering and make the world a more equal place. This is not done, however, by denying them what might be their best option to improve their lives, which well could be to sell an organ. In the words of Janet Radcliffe-Richards et al., “feelings of repugnance among the rich and healthy, no matter how strongly felt, cannot justify removing the only hope of the destitute and dying” (p. 1950).7 To do so, it is said, is to violate their rights, rob them of their autonomy, and, to make matters even worse, will do nothing to alleviate the real problem. Julian Savulescu takes the argument one step further and calls a ban on organ selling “paternalism in its worst form” (p. 139). He advocates that people should be allowed to make this choice (on the condition that it is informed consent) if it provides them with the means to realize what they value in life.8 Although the arguments outlined above might seem reasonable on one level (i.e., that people should not have to die queuing for an organ if there are alternatives), they fail to correlate with most people’s moral intuitions on this matter. It appears that we have strong intuitions, in the sense that they are stable and withstand the test of time, that the selling of organs is plain wrong and no reasonable consequence- or rights-based argument can make it more palatable. Naturally this could just mean that we are wrong. It is unclear what the difference, if indeed there is any, between moral intuition and emotional aversion actually consists of and moreover if people’s emotional aversion should carry moral weight. It is far from obvious that the fact that we (the rich and healthy, presumably) are repulsed by something truly means that it is also morally reprehensible. Perhaps this reveals an inconsistency in our views on the relationship to one’s own body. However, given that the purpose of normative ethics is to help us to bring some order to and explain our stable moral intuitions, the above-mentioned theories do not seem to be adequate tools for doing just that. Few of us sincerely feel that creating a market for transplant organs would make the world a better place from a moral point of view, even if the consequences were favorable and important rights would be protected.9 Some Common Arguments against Organ Commodification Before moving on to the virtue ethics analysis, three of the most frequently voiced arguments against selling organs are explored. First, it is said that commodification of organs is wrong because it implies that we use people as means to an end rather than allow for them to be ends in themselves. Such arguments draw on Kantian ideas of not using people as means to an end and that selling even the smallest part of ourselves would open the door for slavery. Or in Kant’s own words, “a man who sells himself makes himself a thing and as he has jettisoned his person it is open to deal with him as he pleases” (p. 124). Thus Kant effectively states that any form of selling is degrading because it implies that a human being is property, a commodity like any other.10 It is also feared that such a practice might reduce human dignity by introducing a new way of thinking both about others and ourselves— that some humans would come to serve as toolboxes for others. Barbro Björkman 62