Hitler's Speeches and the Rise of the Nazi Party neighboring areas from the pool of controls to account minds us that a leading candidate's campaign is not a for possible spillovers unitary entity but rather a set of efforts undertaken by various agents.For instance,Kelley (1961)found in his study of U.S.presidential campaigns that contenders THE TARGETING OF CANDIDATE used their running mates'schedules in either comple- APPEARANCES mentary or duplicative ways.Geographically or tem- porally complementary campaign schedules carry the In light of the potential confounding factors discussed risk of offsetting campaign effects(Finkel 1993),while above,the first step in assessing the impact of can- duplicative itineraries bring about potential misattri- didate appearances on election returns is to theorize bution of campaign effects.One way or the other,we how such visits are being targeted and in what way need to account for the activities of other Nazi speak- these factors relate to the outcome of interest (Althaus ers when assessing the effects of Hitler's public appear- Nardulli,and Shaw 2002).In doing so,we adopt an in- ances.The following section introduces measurements strumental view and assume that campaign activities for all relevant confounders serve to maximize votes while accounting for mobiliza- tion costs(Brams and Davis 1974:Colantoni.Levesque. and Ordeshook 1975;Cox 1999).Candidates should fo- DATA COLLECTION AND MEASUREMENT cus their scarce resources accordingly-that is,on lo- Period of observation.Our empirical analysis covers cations they expect personal appearances to favorably the period between the repeal of the speaking ban translate into additional votes,and specifically where on Hitler in Bavaria on March 6.1927 and the last additional votes would be decisive for winning man- (halfway)competitive Reichstag election on March 5, dates.The former suggests that rational campaigners 1933.5 Five national parliamentary elections (on May primarily target locales with large numbers of eligibles 20.1928:September 14,1930:July 31.1932:November 6 and a high expected share of supportive voters.The lat- 1932;and March 5,1933)and a two-round presidential 4号 ter expectation implies that candidates are more likely election (on March 13,1932 and April 10,1932)were to visit competitive districts in which small vote shifts held within this period.Our difference-in-differences could change the allocation of mandates in their favor approach focuses on changes between the four consec- or to their detriment.All these factors-the number utive parliamentary elections and both rounds of the of eligibles,expected electoral support,and a party's presidential election,respectively. expected competitiveness-are potential confounders Areal units.The availability of election statistics insomuch as they may also influence the outcome of in- dictates our choice of areal units.Thanks to a data terest.Applied to the present case,the size of the local collection effort of epic proportions by Jurgen Falter electorate may be negatively linked to Nazi vote shares and collaborators (Falter and Hanisch 1990),digital- since rural areas were less populous and,at the same ized community-level election statistics are available 是 time,on average more supportive of the NSDAP than for the 1928,1930,and 1933 elections;however,they urban areas for programmatic reasons(Heberle 1978; are not available for the elections in 1932,whose re- Thurner,Klima,and Kuchenhoff 2015).Likewise,the sults the Reich Statistical Office (Statistisches Reich- classical decision-theoretic model of voting suggests samt)reported only for the higher administrative levels 5795.801g that a party's expected competitiveness may directly of counties (Kreise)and county boroughs (kreisfreie affect the relative strength of parties through selective Stadte)(see Hanisch 1989,45).This leaves us with participation and strategic voting(Cox 1999). a single election pair (1928-1930)for a community- Local infrastructure is also relevant to mobilization level difference-in-differences analysis.We will use the costs.In the context of U.S.presidential campaigns, community-level data(N=3,864),among other things, Holbrook's(2002)study of Truman's 1948 whistle-stop to check the sensitivity of our empirical results for campaign and Althaus,Nardulli,and Shaw's (2002) potential violations of the non-interference assump- narratives of the boat trips down the Mississippi river tion discussed above.Other than this,our analytical by Al Gore in 2000 and by George H.W.Bush in 1988 focus will be on the counties and county boroughs(N provide good examples of campaigns in which ground =1.000).While election statistics are available at the transportation connectivity mattered.A remarkable county and,partly,the municipal level,neither level feature of Hitler's 1932 campaign was that,for the was relevant for the apportionment of parliamentary first time in history,he chartered a plane to transport seats.Mandates were allocated at the level of the 35 四 him to certain campaign events.Under the ambigu- primary districts (Wahlkreise)and 16 secondary dis- ous label "Hitler over Germany,"he made nearly 150 tricts (Wahlkreisverbande),which will serve as addi- appearances from April until November 1932.There. tional geographical layers to compute measures of the fore,distance to the nearest airfield should have mat NSDAP's competitiveness. tered for targeting event locations starting with the Areal units are key in generating and combining sub- 1932 elections.The strength of local party organiza- stantive variables.Unfortunately,the Falter data do not tions is often quoted as an important source of logistic support and secondary mobilization(Cox 1999;Rosen- stone and Hansen 1993).Some authors even consider 6 Gag orders in other regions were remitted successively:Saxony local organizational strength as another campaign tool on January 26,1927;Hamburg on March 23,1927;Baden on Apri 22,1927;Luibeck on May 18,1927;and both Anhalt and Prussia on subject to strategic allocation(Bartels 1985),which re- November 16,1928(Bruppacher 2012,181-198). 1053Hitler’s Speeches and the Rise of the Nazi Party neighboring areas from the pool of controls to account for possible spillovers. THE TARGETING OF CANDIDATE APPEARANCES In light of the potential confounding factors discussed above, the first step in assessing the impact of can￾didate appearances on election returns is to theorize how such visits are being targeted and in what way these factors relate to the outcome of interest (Althaus, Nardulli, and Shaw 2002). In doing so, we adopt an in￾strumental view and assume that campaign activities serve to maximize votes while accounting for mobiliza￾tion costs (Brams and Davis 1974; Colantoni,Levesque, and Ordeshook 1975; Cox 1999). Candidates should fo￾cus their scarce resources accordingly—that is, on lo￾cations they expect personal appearances to favorably translate into additional votes, and specifically where additional votes would be decisive for winning man￾dates. The former suggests that rational campaigners primarily target locales with large numbers of eligibles and a high expected share of supportive voters. The lat￾ter expectation implies that candidates are more likely to visit competitive districts in which small vote shifts could change the allocation of mandates in their favor or to their detriment. All these factors—the number of eligibles, expected electoral support, and a party’s expected competitiveness—are potential confounders insomuch as they may also influence the outcome of in￾terest. Applied to the present case, the size of the local electorate may be negatively linked to Nazi vote shares since rural areas were less populous and, at the same time, on average more supportive of the NSDAP than urban areas for programmatic reasons (Heberle 1978; Thurner, Klima, and Küchenhoff 2015). Likewise, the classical decision-theoretic model of voting suggests that a party’s expected competitiveness may directly affect the relative strength of parties through selective participation and strategic voting (Cox 1999). Local infrastructure is also relevant to mobilization costs. In the context of U.S. presidential campaigns, Holbrook’s (2002) study of Truman’s 1948 whistle-stop campaign and Althaus, Nardulli, and Shaw’s (2002) narratives of the boat trips down the Mississippi river by Al Gore in 2000 and by George H.W. Bush in 1988 provide good examples of campaigns in which ground transportation connectivity mattered. A remarkable feature of Hitler’s 1932 campaign was that, for the first time in history, he chartered a plane to transport him to certain campaign events. Under the ambigu￾ous label “Hitler over Germany,” he made nearly 150 appearances from April until November 1932. There￾fore, distance to the nearest airfield should have mat￾tered for targeting event locations starting with the 1932 elections. The strength of local party organiza￾tions is often quoted as an important source of logistic support and secondary mobilization (Cox 1999; Rosen￾stone and Hansen 1993). Some authors even consider local organizational strength as another campaign tool subject to strategic allocation (Bartels 1985), which re￾minds us that a leading candidate’s campaign is not a unitary entity but rather a set of efforts undertaken by various agents. For instance, Kelley (1961) found in his study of U.S. presidential campaigns that contenders used their running mates’ schedules in either comple￾mentary or duplicative ways. Geographically or tem￾porally complementary campaign schedules carry the risk of offsetting campaign effects (Finkel 1993), while duplicative itineraries bring about potential misattri￾bution of campaign effects. One way or the other, we need to account for the activities of other Nazi speak￾ers when assessing the effects of Hitler’s public appear￾ances. The following section introduces measurements for all relevant confounders. DATA COLLECTION AND MEASUREMENT Period of observation. Our empirical analysis covers the period between the repeal of the speaking ban on Hitler in Bavaria on March 6, 1927 and the last (halfway) competitive Reichstag election on March 5, 1933.6 Five national parliamentary elections (on May 20, 1928; September 14, 1930; July 31, 1932;November 6, 1932; and March 5, 1933) and a two-round presidential election (on March 13, 1932 and April 10, 1932) were held within this period. Our difference-in-differences approach focuses on changes between the four consec￾utive parliamentary elections and both rounds of the presidential election, respectively. Areal units. The availability of election statistics dictates our choice of areal units. Thanks to a data collection effort of epic proportions by Jürgen Falter and collaborators (Falter and Hänisch 1990), digital￾ized community-level election statistics are available for the 1928, 1930, and 1933 elections; however, they are not available for the elections in 1932, whose re￾sults the Reich Statistical Office (Statistisches Reich￾samt) reported only for the higher administrative levels of counties (Kreise) and county boroughs (kreisfreie Städte) (see Hänisch 1989, 45). This leaves us with a single election pair (1928–1930) for a community￾level difference-in-differences analysis. We will use the community-level data (N = 3, 864), among other things, to check the sensitivity of our empirical results for potential violations of the non-interference assump￾tion discussed above. Other than this, our analytical focus will be on the counties and county boroughs (N = 1,000). While election statistics are available at the county and, partly, the municipal level, neither level was relevant for the apportionment of parliamentary seats. Mandates were allocated at the level of the 35 primary districts (Wahlkreise) and 16 secondary dis￾tricts (Wahlkreisverbände), which will serve as addi￾tional geographical layers to compute measures of the NSDAP’s competitiveness. Areal units are key in generating and combining sub￾stantive variables.Unfortunately, the Falter data do not 6 Gag orders in other regions were remitted successively: Saxony on January 26, 1927; Hamburg on March 23, 1927; Baden on April 22, 1927; Lübeck on May 18, 1927; and both Anhalt and Prussia on November 16, 1928 (Bruppacher 2012, 181–198). 1053 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:56:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000424