Who Polices the Administrative State? seen by Congress.20 and is Congress fixed-effects,ac- and legislator in a given Congress.Legislator ideal 6 counting for exogenous shocks common across each points come from Carroll et al.(2015).Agency ideal Congress.21represents the effect of time-varying char- points were estimated by Chen and Johnson (2014). acteristics within districts and agencies I discuss later This provides a time-variant measure of disagreement in this section,and e;represents residuals clustered by on an interpretable and often-used scale.Chen and legislator. Johnson use campaign donations and staff composition This research design has a variety of appealing fea- to place legislators and executive agencies on a com- tures.First,all time-invariant characteristics of agen mon scale.That is,agency personnel make campaign cies and legislators will be accounted for by intercept contributions used to scale their preferences,and agen- shifts.Second.it allows me to isolate the over-time vari- cies encounter staff turnover across administrations ation in agency-ideology attributable to a change in the that change their overall ideological composition.The presidency.As I describe below,this will primarily be a key measurement assumption is that campaign con- function of staff turnover.Third,since Democrats tributions represent sincere endorsements of political maintained majorities in the House and Senate,all candidates.23 Alternative measures of agency ideology committee turnover will be unrelated to partisan based on surveys of scholars(Clinton and Lewis 2008) changes in the executive branch.This approach is most and bureaucrats(Richardson,Clinton,and Lewis 2018) similar to recent work by Berry and Fowler (2015) produce similar results.An additional concern is that Powell and Grimmer(2016),and Fouirnaies and Hall including the preferences of career bureaucrats may (2018),which employs similar designs to study district be inappropriate,since legislators are most focused on spending and campaign contributions,respectively. Senate-confirmed appointees.To address this concern, Nonetheless,restricting the analysis to 2007-2010 I also replicate the main results with mean appointee raises the concern that the results may be unique to scores from Bonica,Chen,and Johnson(2015)and leg- presidential transitions.To investigate this.I reesti- islator scores from Bonica(2013).24 The results are ro- mated the model above with an unbalanced panel of bust to this measure. 4号 additional agencies and congresses,which I report in Figure 3 plots the key variation for each agency: Table B7 of the SI.The results are robust to this spec- shifting ideal points following the transition from the ification.I also examine the volume and content of re 110th to the 111th Congress.Most agencies shift left, quests over time,to determine if transitions are asso- which is consistent with recent work by Bolton.de ciated with unique temporal trends.I plot several of Figueiredo,and Lewis(2017),which finds that the be- these time trends in Figure D1 of the SI.In general ginning of new presidential terms lead to the exit of presidential transitions do not appear to be unique in senior employees in agencies with views that diverge the content of informal oversight.but some agencies from those of the new president.This highlights the exhibit clear changes in the volume of oversight during two sources of variation:voluntary departure by ca- these periods.Thus,it is important to note that without reer officials,and political appointments.25 The expec- additional data,I cannot assess the relative uniqueness tation is that this shift left should result in conservative of the transition in question or presidential transitions members of Congress increasing their oversight of the more generally.22 administration-while we would expect liberal mem- The key independent variable is Distance,a continu- bers to do the opposite.26 ous measure of the ideological divergence between the legislator and the agency.This is the absolute Common- space DW-NOMINATE distance between the agency 2 23 Available evidence suggests that individual donors give sincerely (e.g.,Gimpel,Lee,and Pearson-Merkowitz 2008;Ensley 2009) 20 Agency mandates may dictate higher rates of comment and rec. Bonica (2013),for example,estimated dynamic measures of legis. ommendations on significant rules.Some agencies outlay billions in lator ideology based on individual donations that are both remark- competitive grants-which increases the probability of congressional ably stable and provide a worse model fit.Evidence suggests that support letters.Agencies vary meaningfully in size and scope,which corporations,legislators,and PACs give strategically (e.g.,Gordon. may promote congressional incentives to oversee their activity.A Hafer,and Landa 2007).But importantly,Bonica,Chen,and Johnson brief,descriptive look at oversight patterns suggests this is the case (2015)find no evidence that failed and confirmed appointees system- 21 This includes differences between end-of-term and beginning-of- atically differ in their giving behavior-suggesting selection among term levels of oversight,or changes in macro-economic conditions these officials is unrelated to donations.Moreover,strategic giving that might influence legislative activity. by bureaucrats should result in the attenuation of over-time differ- 22 One additional concern of focusing on a transition is that members ences.In contrast,the shifts observed in Figure 3 are substantively could be shifting their more political inquiries directly to the White significant and in the expected direction. House (i.e..target-switching).Reassuringly,agencies do occasionally I report these estimates in Appendix B1. note that the White House was "cc'ed"in the correspondence.For 25 Agency scores based on Senate-confirmed appointees (Bonica, other inquiries,log descriptions seem to suggest the letter was ad- Chen,and Johnson 2015)exhibit the same leftward shift. dressed to the president.The fact that members take care to "cc' 26 The apparent outlier is the Federal Labor Relations Authority. relevant agencies suggests that members don't leave them out of the which,from 2009-2010,was still dealing with the consequences of loop.Also,notably,the unit of observation includes total contacts underfunding.Democratic board member resignations,and a mas- over a complete Congress-so the switching would have to occur sive case backlog from the Bush administration.It was named one of over a sufficiently long period to bias in favor of the null.Members the worst small agencies to work for from 2007 to 2009("Best Places would have to consciously exclude agencies from correspondence to Work in the Federal Government,"Partnership for Public Service, relevant to the duties they perform.And members would have to 2009.URL:http://www.feddesk.com/freehandbooks/060409-1.pdf). think that overseeing agencies indirectly by contacting the president This likely explains why liberal donors were not entering the agency would be more effective.That implies that copartisans would be more during the first Obama administration.Excluding it does not influ- likely to switch targets,which would bias against the null. ence the results (see Figure B1 in the SI). 881Who Polices the Administrative State? seen by Congress,20 and φt is Congress fixed-effects, ac￾counting for exogenous shocks common across each Congress.21 ζ represents the effect of time-varying char￾acteristics within districts and agencies I discuss later in this section, and i represents residuals clustered by legislator. This research design has a variety of appealing fea￾tures. First, all time-invariant characteristics of agen￾cies and legislators will be accounted for by intercept shifts. Second,it allows me to isolate the over-time vari￾ation in agency-ideology attributable to a change in the presidency. As I describe below, this will primarily be a function of staff turnover. Third, since Democrats maintained majorities in the House and Senate, all committee turnover will be unrelated to partisan changes in the executive branch. This approach is most similar to recent work by Berry and Fowler (2015), Powell and Grimmer (2016), and Fouirnaies and Hall (2018), which employs similar designs to study district spending and campaign contributions, respectively. Nonetheless, restricting the analysis to 2007-2010 raises the concern that the results may be unique to presidential transitions. To investigate this, I reesti￾mated the model above with an unbalanced panel of additional agencies and congresses, which I report in Table B7 of the SI. The results are robust to this spec￾ification. I also examine the volume and content of re￾quests over time, to determine if transitions are asso￾ciated with unique temporal trends. I plot several of these time trends in Figure D1 of the SI. In general, presidential transitions do not appear to be unique in the content of informal oversight, but some agencies exhibit clear changes in the volume of oversight during these periods. Thus, it is important to note that without additional data, I cannot assess the relative uniqueness of the transition in question or presidential transitions, more generally. 22 The key independent variable is Distance, a continu￾ous measure of the ideological divergence between the legislator and the agency.This is the absolute Common￾space DW-NOMINATE distance between the agency 20 Agency mandates may dictate higher rates of comment and rec￾ommendations on significant rules. Some agencies outlay billions in competitive grants—which increases the probability of congressional support letters. Agencies vary meaningfully in size and scope, which may promote congressional incentives to oversee their activity. A brief, descriptive look at oversight patterns suggests this is the case. 21 This includes differences between end-of-term and beginning-of￾term levels of oversight, or changes in macro-economic conditions that might influence legislative activity. 22 One additional concern of focusing on a transition is that members could be shifting their more political inquiries directly to the White House (i.e., target-switching). Reassuringly, agencies do occasionally note that the White House was “cc’ed” in the correspondence. For other inquiries, log descriptions seem to suggest the letter was ad￾dressed to the president. The fact that members take care to “cc” relevant agencies suggests that members don’t leave them out of the loop. Also, notably, the unit of observation includes total contacts over a complete Congress—so the switching would have to occur over a sufficiently long period to bias in favor of the null. Members would have to consciously exclude agencies from correspondence relevant to the duties they perform. And members would have to think that overseeing agencies indirectly by contacting the president would be more effective.That implies that copartisans would be more likely to switch targets, which would bias against the null. and legislator in a given Congress. Legislator ideal points come from Carroll et al. (2015). Agency ideal points were estimated by Chen and Johnson (2014). This provides a time-variant measure of disagreement on an interpretable and often-used scale. Chen and Johnson use campaign donations and staff composition to place legislators and executive agencies on a com￾mon scale. That is, agency personnel make campaign contributions used to scale their preferences, and agen￾cies encounter staff turnover across administrations that change their overall ideological composition. The key measurement assumption is that campaign con￾tributions represent sincere endorsements of political candidates.23 Alternative measures of agency ideology based on surveys of scholars (Clinton and Lewis 2008) and bureaucrats (Richardson, Clinton, and Lewis 2018) produce similar results. An additional concern is that including the preferences of career bureaucrats may be inappropriate, since legislators are most focused on Senate-confirmed appointees. To address this concern, I also replicate the main results with mean appointee scores from Bonica, Chen, and Johnson (2015) and leg￾islator scores from Bonica (2013).24 The results are ro￾bust to this measure. Figure 3 plots the key variation for each agency: shifting ideal points following the transition from the 110th to the 111th Congress. Most agencies shift left, which is consistent with recent work by Bolton, de Figueiredo, and Lewis (2017), which finds that the be￾ginning of new presidential terms lead to the exit of senior employees in agencies with views that diverge from those of the new president. This highlights the two sources of variation: voluntary departure by ca￾reer officials, and political appointments.25 The expec￾tation is that this shift left should result in conservative members of Congress increasing their oversight of the administration—while we would expect liberal mem￾bers to do the opposite.26 23 Available evidence suggests that individual donors give sincerely (e.g., Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-Merkowitz 2008; Ensley 2009). Bonica (2013), for example, estimated dynamic measures of legis￾lator ideology based on individual donations that are both remark￾ably stable and provide a worse model fit. Evidence suggests that corporations, legislators, and PACs give strategically (e.g., Gordon, Hafer, and Landa 2007). But importantly, Bonica, Chen, and Johnson (2015) find no evidence that failed and confirmed appointees system￾atically differ in their giving behavior—suggesting selection among these officials is unrelated to donations. Moreover, strategic giving by bureaucrats should result in the attenuation of over-time differ￾ences. In contrast, the shifts observed in Figure 3 are substantively significant and in the expected direction. 24 I report these estimates in Appendix B1. 25 Agency scores based on Senate-confirmed appointees (Bonica, Chen, and Johnson 2015) exhibit the same leftward shift. 26 The apparent outlier is the Federal Labor Relations Authority, which, from 2009-2010, was still dealing with the consequences of underfunding, Democratic board member resignations, and a mas￾sive case backlog from the Bush administration. It was named one of the worst small agencies to work for from 2007 to 2009 (“Best Places to Work in the Federal Government,” Partnership for Public Service, 2009. URL: http://www.feddesk.com/freehandbooks/060409-1.pdf). This likely explains why liberal donors were not entering the agency during the first Obama administration. Excluding it does not influ￾ence the results (see Figure B1 in the SI). 881 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000497