about punitive damages and many other subjects within torts. Many Federalist Society members will be unsympathetic with Professor Bogus's claim that large punitive awards are desirable from a regulatory perspective. But he is right about one thing, and the Supreme Court agrees with him in this particular instance: corporations and individuals commit egregious wrongs against others that justify a certain kind of punitive response via the legal system. Where he goes astray, in my view, is in hinking about the justification -as does the Supreme Court -in terms of the states regulatory objectives. What is at stake in Campbell is not the State of Utah's interests in obtaining retribution on behalf of its citizens, or in deterring sharp business practices, but the Campbells interest in vindicating their rights not to be mistreated in the way that they were. Thus, to my mind, the question is not: How much money may be extracted from State Farm in order to vindicate the laws of Utah or to promote better insurance-company behavior in Utah? Instead, the question is: How much money will it take to make things right for the Campbells, not just in the sense of compensating them for their losses, but in the sense of providing them with satisfaction-- a remedy adequate to acknowledge and avenge State Farms predatory conduct towards them. 7 7 I realize that this characterization puts a compensatory cast on punitive damages. Still, I do not think it ollapses the distinction between compensatory and punitive damages -a charge that has from time to time been leveled against the sort of view articulated here. See, e. g, Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342(1872)(arguing that amages are just a form of emotional distress damages). All damage a tort context compensatory in the minimal or thin sense of being payments to which a tort victim has a right by virtue of having been victimized; they are payments that help make things right as between victim and tortfeasor. But they are not all compensatory in the sense of being paid to make up for harm caused to the victims body or psyche: they are not, in this sense, part of"make whole damages. Thus, I would argue that a tort plaintiff ca sometimes make out a valid claim for punitive damages even if the evidence shows that she was not physically injured and that she stoically withstood her mistreatment. 88 about punitive damages and many other subjects within torts. Many Federalist Society members will be unsympathetic with Professor Bogus’s claim that large punitive awards are desirable from a regulatory perspective. But he is right about one thing, and the Supreme Court agrees with him in this particular instance: corporations and individuals commit egregious wrongs against others that justify a certain kind of punitive response via the legal system. Where he goes astray, in my view, is in thinking about the justification -- as does the Supreme Court -- in terms of the state’s regulatory objectives. What is at stake in Campbell is not the State of Utah’s interests in obtaining retribution on behalf of its citizens, or in deterring sharp business practices, but the Campbells’ interest in vindicating their rights not to be mistreated in the way that they were. Thus, to my mind, the question is not: How much money may be extracted from State Farm in order to vindicate the laws of Utah or to promote better insurance-company behavior in Utah? Instead, the question is: How much money will it take to make things right for the Campbells, not just in the sense of compensating them for their losses, but in the sense of providing them with satisfaction -- a remedy adequate to acknowledge and avenge State Farm’s predatory conduct towards them.7 7 I realize that this characterization puts a compensatory cast on punitive damages. Still, I do not think it collapses the distinction between compensatory and punitive damages – a charge that has from time to time been leveled against the sort of view articulated here. See, e.g., Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1872) (arguing that punitive damages are just a form of emotional distress damages). All damage payments in a tort context are compensatory in the minimal or thin sense of being payments to which a tort victim has a right by virtue of having been victimized; they are payments that help make things right as between victim and tortfeasor. But they are not all compensatory in the sense of being paid to make up for harm caused to the victim’s body or psyche: they are not, in this sense, part of “make whole” damages. Thus, I would argue that a tort plaintiff can sometimes make out a valid claim for punitive damages even if the evidence shows that she was not physically injured and that she stoically withstood her mistreatment