Corporate Criminal law and organization Incentives: A Managerial Perspective* Nuno garoupa Universitat Pompeu Fabra Spain November 2000 Abstract Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the eco- nomic theory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes? Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individ- uals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions 6? Should corporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two major contributions to the literature. First it provides a common analytical framework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field. In second place, by making use of the framework, we provide new insights into how corporations shoul be punished for the offenses committed by their employees Keywords: law enforcement, corporation Financial support by CICYT(grant SEC99-1191-C02-01)is gratefully acknowledged The usual disclaimers apply TDepartment d Economia i Empresa, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Ramon Trias Far gas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain. Email: nuno garoupa @econ. upf es: Phone: +34-93- 5422639;Fax:+34-93-5421746Corporate Criminal Law and Organization Incentives: A Managerial Perspective∗ Nuno GAROUPA† Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain November 2000 Abstract Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the eco￾nomic theory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes? Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individ￾uals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Should corporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two major contributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analytical framework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field. In second place, by making use of the framework, we provide new insights into how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed by their employees. Keywords: law enforcement, corporation JEL classification: K4. ∗Financial support by CICYT (grant SEC99-1191-C02-01) is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimers apply. †Department d’Economia i Empresa, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Ramon Trias Far￾gas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain. Email: nuno.garoupa@econ.upf.es; Phone: +34-93- 5422639; Fax: +34-93-5421746 1