Threats,Assurances,and the Last Chance for Peace 123 United States would not respond with attacks on the mainland.The general accused the Truman administration of appeasement for not threatening China with retaliatory air strikes if Chinese troops attacked in force.2 De- fenders of the Truman administration charged that MacArthur's massive drive north in late November provoked China,by threatening the security of the Yalu River Valley and Manchuria.3 In hindsight,civilian and military officials in Washington suggested that the United States should have left a military buffer zone somewhere between the bulk of U.S.forces near Pyong- yang and Wonsan (the neck of Korea)and the Chinese border.4(See map, p.124) Both sides based their arguments on assumptions about Mao's risk analysis and strategy in Korea.But until now we have had little solid evidence of Mao's intentions and fears in entering the Korean War.This article presents 2.MacArthur wrote of the failure of American deterrence:"I will always believe that if the United States had issued a warning to the effect that any entry of the Chinese Communists in force into Korea would be considered an act of international war against the United States,then the Korean war would have terminated with our advance north.I feel that the reds would have stayed on their side of the Yalu....They knew they could swarm down across the Yalu River without having to worry about bombers hitting their Manchurian supply lines."Douglas MacArthur,Reminiscences (New York:McGraw-Hill,1964),pp.374-375.Also see Spanier,Tru- man-MacArthur Controversy,p.130. 3.For this accusation and MacArthur's response to it,see Spanier,The Truman-MacArthur Controversy,p.149 4.Buffer zones of varying widths were discussed during the early months of the Korean War. The buffers were designed to keep non-Korean troops away from the border areas so as not to provoke China.The largest proposed buffer would have run from the Yalu border to the Pyongyang-Wonsan line;the smallest would have straddled the Yalu with a ten-mile de-mili- tarized zone on both sides.(See map.)For Truman's recollections,see Peter N.Farrar,"A Pause for Negotiations:The British Buffer Plan of November,1950,"in James Cotton and Ian Neary, The Korean War in History (Atlantic Highlands,N.I.:Humanities Press International,1989),p.66. For criticisms of MacArthur's strategy,see Dean Acheson,Present at the Creation (New York: Norton,1969),pp.466-468.Acheson claims that the government's failure to prevent MacArthur from sending American forces toward the Chinese border squandered "the last chance to halt the march to disaster."Despite the reference to Washington's inaction,Acheson ultimately blamed the general for initiating the decision to drive north with American troops.He also claims that a British buffer plan was not attempted because he was sure that MacArthur "would frustrate any such efforts."The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that MacArthur could at least have halted on the high ground above the Yalu River Valley,where he could repel any Chinese offensive in the valley with artillery fire without threatening the Chinese border.See Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy,p.129;and Osgood,Limited War,p.172.It is important to note that while MacArthur may have disobeyed the "spirit"of his orders,neither military nor civilian leaders in Washington had placed clear restraints on the General's activities.Richard Ned Lebow challenges Acheson's claim that he had wanted to stop MacArthur,citing declassified State Department records showing that Acheson voiced no opposition to MacArthur's drive north.See Lebow,Between Peace and War:The Nature of International Crises (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press,1981),p.183. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsThreats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace | 123 United States would not respond with attacks on the mainland. The general accused the Truman administration of appeasement for not threatening China with retaliatory air strikes if Chinese troops attacked in force.2 De￾fenders of the Truman administration charged that MacArthur's massive drive north in late November provoked China, by threatening the security of the Yalu River Valley and Manchuria.3 In hindsight, civilian and military officials in Washington suggested that the United States should have left a military buffer zone somewhere between the bulk of U.S. forces near Pyong￾yang and Wonsan (the neck of Korea) and the Chinese border.4 (See map, p. 124.) Both sides based their arguments on assumptions about Mao's risk analysis and strategy in Korea. But until now we have had little solid evidence of Mao's intentions and fears in entering the Korean War. This article presents 2. MacArthur wrote of the failure of American deterrence: "I will always believe that if the United States had issued a warning to the effect that any entry of the Chinese Communists in force into Korea would be considered an act of international war against the United States, then the Korean war would have terminated with our advance north. Ifeel that the reds would have stayed on their side of the Yalu.... They knew they could swarm down across the Yalu River without having to worry about bombers hitting their Manchurian supply lines." Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp. 374-375. Also see Spanier, Tru￾man-MacArthur Controversy, p.130. 3. For this accusation and MacArthur's response to it, see Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy, p.149. 4. Buffer zones of varying widths were discussed during the early months of the Korean War. The buffers were designed to keep non-Korean troops away from the border areas so as not to provoke China. The largest proposed buffer would have run from the Yalu border to the Pyongyang-Wonsan line; the smallest would have straddled the Yalu with a ten-mile de-mili￾tarized zone on both sides. (See map.) For Truman's recollections, see Peter N. Farrar, "A Pause for Negotiations: The British Buffer Plan of November, 1950," in James Cotton and Ian Neary, The Korean War in History (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1989), p. 66. For criticisms of MacArthur's strategy, see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 466-468. Acheson claims that the government's failure to prevent MacArthur from sending American forces toward the Chinese border squandered "the last chance to halt the march to disaster." Despite the reference to Washington's inaction, Acheson ultimately blamed the general for initiating the decision to drive north with American troops. He also claims that a British buffer plan was not attempted because he was sure that MacArthur "would frustrate any such efforts." The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that MacArthur could at least have halted on the high ground above the Yalu River Valley, where he could repel any Chinese offensive in the valley with artillery fire without threatening the Chinese border. See Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy, p. 129; and Osgood, Limited War, p. 172. It is important to note that while MacArthur may have disobeyed the "spirit" of his orders, neither military nor civilian leaders in Washington had placed clear restraints on the General's activities. Richard Ned Lebow challenges Acheson's claim that he had wanted to stop MacArthur, citing declassified State Department records showing that Acheson voiced no opposition to MacArthur's drive north. See Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crises (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 183. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions