468 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol.120:460 been destroyed-are more promising roads than legal origin for re- search seeking to explain financial outcomes. For example,nations fighting communism internally and externally and recall that this was the central agenda in Western Europe and East Asia in the dec- ades after World War II-had reason to protect labor markets tightly and to did so often regardles h governmen of-ce nter or right of-center ideology.A political economy approach is both simple be- cause politics is more vital than legal origin,and complex because tracing which political theory works best overall will not be easy. I then conclude,summarizing the four new issues I here bring to the table.First,a sustained analysis of the law-based literat ure gal origir comm n and civil law nations increa ngly us ing regulatory tools during the twentieth century. Second.the avail ability of the classical tools associated with each legal origin is less important than whether a nation wants to build up capital markets Third,political theories explain the differences in willingness to build up capital markets,with th olitical the ng to variat ion experienced the rs of the twentieth century.And the development agencies'reliance on common law's core tools may thus be misguided. L CONSIDERING LEGAL ORIGINS That an important intellectual movement attributes much to legal origin is not in doubt Even the titles of articles assert legal origins centrality:Why Does Legal Origin Matter?s Or just:Legal Origins. But could origin,which to many legal academics seems just to be a technical aspect of judicial style,determine the strength of securities markets? With so many authors contributing to this literature,it's hard and potentially unfair to summarize it. Early movers'views have evolved,emphasizing different institutional features than they did originally.Not all players sign onto every idea others espouse. But the idea that legal origin hardwires a national system in ways that are hard to overcome is out there and influential.Here I sur marize its major eleme 5 Thorsten Beck et al.,Law and Finance:Why Does Legal Origin Matter?,31 J.COMP. This is c f the 7 As said in an excellent r N.1193200 and Property Rights 3(Nat'l Bureau of Ecor orki "La Po de-Siper No rg/papers/.pdHARVARD LAW REVIEW been destroyed - are more promising roads than legal origin for re￾search seeking to explain financial outcomes. For example, nations fighting communism internally and externally - and recall that this was the central agenda in Western Europe and East Asia in the dec￾ades after World War II - had reason to protect labor markets tightly and to ignore their capital markets. They did so, often regardless of whether the government in power had a locally left-of-center or right￾of-center ideology. A political economy approach is both simple be￾cause politics is more vital than legal origin, and complex because tracing which political theory works best overall will not be easy. I then conclude, summarizing the four new issues I here bring to the table. First, a sustained analysis of the law-based literature on le￾gal origin shows both common and civil law nations' increasingly us￾ing regulatory tools during the twentieth century. Second, the avail￾ability of the classical tools associated with each legal origin is less important than whether a nation wants to build up capital markets. Third, political theories explain the differences in willingness to build up capital markets, with the political theories tying to variation in how nations experienced the first half of the twentieth century. And finally, the development agencies' reliance on common law's core tools may thus be misguided. I. CONSIDERING LEGAL ORIGINS That an important intellectual movement attributes much to legal origin is not in doubt. Even the titles of articles assert legal origins' centrality: Why Does Legal Origin Matter?5 Or just: Legal Origins.6 But could origin, which to many legal academics seems just to be a technical aspect of judicial style, determine the strength of securities markets? With so many authors contributing to this literature, it's hard - and potentially unfair - to summarize it. Early movers' views have evolved, emphasizing different institutional features than they did originally. Not all players sign onto every idea others espouse. But the idea that legal origin hardwires a national system in ways that are hard to overcome is out there and influential. Here I summarize its major elements.7 5 Thorsten Beck et al., Law and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin Matter?, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 653 (2003). This is one of the important articles associated with the World Bank. 6 Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1193 (2002). 7 As said in an excellent recapitulation: "[D]ifferences in legal tradition cause differences in property rights." Ross Levine, Law, Endowments, and Property Rights 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. T1502, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wII5o2.pdf. "La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny... argue that. . . legal origin ... explains cross￾country differences in financial development." Menzie D. Chinn & Hiro Ito, What Matters for [Vol. 120:46o