State Constitutions and American Tort Law-Witt has rarely been questioned(Tiffany 1893, 28). There are therefore virtually no reported mid-nineteenth-century cases recording arguments by defendants that the wrongful death statutes impermissibly reallocated rights from defendants to plaintiffs; the one reported case indicating that such an argument had been made gave the argument such short shrift that defendants no doubt shrank from making it again. At least in part, this may have been because most state wrongful death legislation was general in its application, applying across the board to all tort defendants rather than singling out some class of defendants. But even legislation in the New England states in the 1850s that authorized wrongful death actions only against common carriers produced no reported mid-century cases on the question whether such statutes impermissibly singled out some class of Regular constitutional challenges to state tort legislation began to ppear only after the Civil War in the mid 1870s. In the wrongful death cases, for example, the Georgia Supreme Court in 1874 upheld the constitutionality of the wrongful death provisions of the states employers liability law against a challenge that it impermissibly singled out railroads by applying only to railroad employees. More typical of late nineteenth- century constitutional cases involving wrongful death were challenges to follows. The Georgia Supreme Court responded to the defendants constitutional argument as As to the constitutional competency of the legislature to pass the act, there cannot a shadow of doubt: neither a corporation nor a citizen can have a vested right to do wrong, to take human life intentionally or negligently. To prevent so erious an evil, the General Assembly may compel the wrong-doer, whether private or corporate, to make pecuniary compensation. The act is general; applicable alike to all, and making no odious discriminations against railroads. he legislature might make a reckless destruction of life like this a capital felony on the part of the employees of the road, if it be not one already. And for myself I believe it would, as a preventive, be better to do this than to South-Western R.R. v Paulk, 24 Ga 356(1858) 1853 Conn. Pub. Acts chap. 7488, at 135: 1855 Maine Acts, chap. 161$ 1, at 160: 1840 Mass. Acts, chap. 80, at 224: 1850 N H. Laws, chap 953,$7, at 928: 1855 R I. Acts 1388, at 15:se so An Act Concerning Passenger Carriers, 1840 Mass. Acts chap. 80, at 224(creating a quasi-criminal liability in cases of passengers killed by the negligence or carelessness of common carriers) orgia rr Banking Co. V. Oaks, 52 Ga. 410(1874); see also Ballard v. Mississippi Cotton Oil Co., 34 So. 533(Miss. 1903); Mobile, J. &K.C. RR, 46 So. 360(Miss. 1908): Pensacola Electric Co. v. Soderlind, 53 So. 722(Fla. 1910)8 State Constitutions and American Tort Law – Witt 5 The Georgia Supreme Court responded to the defendant’s constitutional argument as follows: As to the constitutional competency of the legislature to pass the act, there cannot be a shadow of doubt: neither a corporation nor a citizen can have a vested right to do wrong; to take human life intentionally or negligently. To prevent so serious an evil, the General Assembly may compel the wrong-doer, whether private or corporate, to make pecuniary compensation. The act is general; applicable alike to all, and making no odious discriminations against railroads. The legislature might make a reckless destruction of life like this a capital felony on the part of the employees of the road, if it be not one already. And for myself I believe it would, as a preventive, be better to do this than to treat human life as stock, to be paid for in money. South-Western R.R. v. Paulk, 24 Ga. 356 (1858). 6 1853 Conn. Pub. Acts chap. 74 § 8, at 135; 1855 Maine Acts, chap. 161 § 1, at 160; 1840 Mass. Acts, chap. 80, at 224; 1850 N.H. Laws, chap. 953, § 7, at 928; 1855 R.I. Acts 13 § 8, at 15; see also An Act Concerning Passenger Carriers, 1840 Mass. Acts chap. 80, at 224 (creating a quasi-criminal liability in cases of passengers killed by the negligence or carelessness of common carriers). 7 Georgia RR & Banking Co. V. Oaks, 52 Ga. 410 (1874); see also Ballard v. Mississippi Cotton Oil Co., 34 So. 533 (Miss. 1903); Mobile, J. & K. C. RR, 46 So. 360 (Miss. 1908): Pensacola Electric Co. v. Soderlind, 53 So. 722 (Fla. 1910). has rarely been questioned” (Tiffany 1893, 28). There are therefore virtually no reported mid-nineteenth-century cases recording arguments by defendants that the wrongful death statutes impermissibly reallocated rights from defendants to plaintiffs; the one reported case indicating that such an argument had been made gave the argument such short shrift that defendants no doubt shrank from making it again.5 At least in part, this may have been because most state wrongful death legislation was general in its application, applying across the board to all tort defendants rather than singling out some class of defendants. But even legislation in the New England states in the 1850s that authorized wrongful death actions only against common carriers produced no reported mid-century cases on the question whether such statutes impermissibly singled out some class of actors for special burdens.6 Regular constitutional challenges to state tort legislation began to appear only after the Civil War in the mid 1870s. In the wrongful death cases, for example, the Georgia Supreme Court in 1874 upheld the constitutionality of the wrongful death provisions of the state’s employers’ liability law against a challenge that it impermissibly singled out railroads by applying only to railroad employees.7 More typical of late nineteenth￾century constitutional cases involving wrongful death were challenges to