Between Power and principle that are party to the treaty respond to violations of a treaty in ways provided for in the treaty Collateral consequences, by contrast, arise when domestic and transnational actors premise their actions toward a state on the states decision to accept or not accept international legal rules. The reactions of these actors to the states actions can affect, among other things, foreign investment, aid donations, international trade, domestic political support, and political contributions, and hence create powerful incentives for states to commit to and com Viewing state decisions to commit and comply in with broader lens makes it possible to understand why countries behave in ways that standard theories miss--failing to join treaties, for instance, that they could easily comply with(because they have little to gain and much to lose), or joining treaties that they have little inclination to obey(because they have much to gain and little to lose). For example, it is often thought that countries with poor luman rights records will be reluctant to join treaties that embody higher standards. Yet in fact these countries often have stronger incentives(and weaker disincentives) to join human rights treaties than states with better records--first, because such countries usually have weak rule of law and thus create limited opportunities for domestic legal enforcement; second, because human rights treaties usually lack transnational legal enforcement mechanisms, such as supranational enforcement or credible threats of state-to-state retaliation; and finally, because such countries, by displaying their(sometimes commitment to human rights, increase their standing among other nations, international bodies, private investors, domestic actors, and others and thereby obtain significant collateral benefits. The integrated theory thus predicts that, holding other factors constant, countries with very poor human rights records can be as likely or even more likely to ratify treaties as countries with better records, but that unlike those with better records, they are unlikely to comply with those commitments--which is in fact the pattern found. In short, the theory not only provides a comprehensive vision of the potential and the limits of international law, it also gives rise to unique(and often counterintuitive) predictions that are consistent with the available evidence This Article focuses exclusively on international treaty law. For the purposes of this first effort to articulate the theory, I put customary international law to one side. The focus in this piece is on state decisions to commit to and comply with international treaty law. It is national frontiers. Both public and private international law are included, as are other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories. "Philip C.Jessup, Transnational Law 2 (Yale 1956). Hence "transnationaL"is used here in its literal sense: it means across nations, as opposed to "international, "which means between nations. The term "transnational herefore encompasses a larger universe of activity and interactions than does the term international. When applied to law, for example, transnational law includes any law that as cross-border effect, whereas international law refers only to treaties or other law that governs interactions between states io This Article is aimed only at explaining international treaty law. Hence references to"international law?are intended to include only international treaty law and not customary international law, jus cogens norms, private transnational legal interactions, or domestic law that extends across bordersBetween Power and Principle 5 that are party to the treaty respond to violations of a treaty in ways provided for in the treaty. Collateral consequences, by contrast, arise when domestic and transnational actors premise their actions toward a state on the state’s decision to accept or not accept international legal rules. The reactions of these actors to the state’s actions can affect, among other things, foreign investment, aid donations, international trade, domestic political support, and political contributions, and hence create powerful incentives for states to commit to and comply with treaties. Viewing state decisions to commit and comply in with broader lens makes it possible to understand why countries behave in ways that standard theories miss—failing to join treaties, for instance, that they could easily comply with (because they have little to gain and much to lose), or joining treaties that they have little inclination to obey (because they have much to gain and little to lose). For example, it is often thought that countries with poor human rights records will be reluctant to join treaties that embody higher standards. Yet in fact these countries often have stronger incentives (and weaker disincentives) to join human rights treaties than states with better records—first, because such countries usually have weak rule of law and thus create limited opportunities for domestic legal enforcement; second, because human rights treaties usually lack transnational legal enforcement mechanisms, such as supranational enforcement or credible threats of state-to-state retaliation; and finally, because such countries, by displaying their (sometimes insincere) commitment to human rights, increase their standing among other nations, international bodies, private investors, domestic actors, and others and thereby obtain significant collateral benefits. The integrated theory thus predicts that, holding other factors constant, countries with very poor human rights records can be as likely or even more likely to ratify treaties as countries with better records, but that unlike those with better records, they are unlikely to comply with those commitments—which is in fact the pattern found. In short, the theory not only provides a comprehensive vision of the potential and the limits of international law; it also gives rise to unique (and often counterintuitive) predictions that are consistent with the available evidence. This Article focuses exclusively on international treaty law. For the purposes of this first effort to articulate the theory, I put customary international law to one side.10 The focus in this piece is on state decisions to commit to and comply with international treaty law. It is national frontiers. Both public and private international law are included, as are other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories.” Philip C. Jessup, Transnational Law 2 (Yale 1956). Hence “transnational” is used here in its literal sense: it means across nations, as opposed to “international,” which means between nations. The term “transnational” therefore encompasses a larger universe of activity and interactions than does the term “international.” When applied to law, for example, transnational law includes any law that has cross-border effect, whereas international law refers only to treaties or other law that governs interactions between states. 10 This Article is aimed only at explaining international treaty law. Hence references to “international law” are intended to include only international treaty law and not customary international law, jus cogens norms, private transnational legal interactions, or domestic law that extends across borders