the short'pioneer skirts of that time. From a feminist point of view, it is easy to see in the Ukase the revival of the patriarchal, male ideology that the man should not be responsible for his bastard children and all the consequences should be borne by the woman alone Although it is very well possible that the contra-reform was initiated by Stalin or his direct environment for no other reason than personal convictions, one can also imagine objective reasons for it. The advancing totalitarian state strived to penetrate all corners of society. The economy had already been brought completely under its control. The family, not being directly linked to the economy, was the next to be subjugated. The communist state did not want to tolerate a private place where men could find refuge from its pressure. 77 Family the stability of the family, but rather the desire to make totalitarianisation complete could be solidarity was perceived to be a threat to the devotion to communist ideals. 78 Not concern fo seen to underlie Stalin's Ukase. Rheinstein was partly right when writing that"[conservatism in matters of marriage was thus demonstrated to be not simply a survival of Christian trad ition but also a desideratum of purely secular statism. 79 To my mind, a survival of Christian trad ition was completely out of the question. Stalins policies were based on strictly secular ideas derived from Marxism and theories such as those of Leon Duguit, who was very popular in the 1920s, and Auguste Comte. The only thing that resembled the Christian trad ition was the attempt to re- institutionalise marriage Conclusion On the basis of this brief sketch of the historical development of family law in Europe I would like to make the following suggestions If we do not place the early Soviet and Portuguese reforms outside an explanatory framework as temporary excesses of a revolutionary period, it becomes clear that the first family law reforms did not take place in the countries with the most developed econd and the most democratic political regimes. The countries with the earliest and most far-reaching transformations of family law seem to have followed more or less the sa pattern: the consolidation of the whole spectre of the left political forces around the late- liberal ideas concerning the family and the position of women, a high level of secularisation and a radical break with the canonical concepts of marriage, divorce and illegitimacy Conservatism in family law does not primarily correlate with a less developed economy, but first and foremost with the measure of abandonment of the old canonical dogmas. This abandonment was slower in countries with a strong Church influence(such as Italy, Spain, Ireland and Greece).80 Even economically less developed East Europear a distinguished lawyer of that time wrote: "TT]he socialist State reserves for itself wide latitude for direct and active infringement into family relationships. .. The state denies the qualification of relations between sexes as individual, intimate, and of no interest for State and society ... It dictates, determines rules to guarantee the interests of the collective, to force individuals to fulfil their duties towards the collective, Sverdlov(1941),p 78The hero and martyrof that time was a young pioneer killed by his family because he betrayed his fatherasa ulak 9Rheinstein(1972), p. 236 The Netherlands serves as anotherexample this country with a modern economy had until recently in several respects a very outdated family law, which is generally attributed to the strong influence of the Christian political partiesthe ‘short’ pioneer skirts of that time. From a feminist point of view, it is easy to see in the Ukase the revival of the patriarchal, male ideology that the man should not be responsible for his bastard children and all the consequences should be borne by the woman alone. Although it is very well possible that the contra-reform was initiated by Stalin or his direct environment for no other reason than personal convictions, one can also imagine objective reasons for it. The advancing totalitarian state strived to penetrate all corners of society. The economy had already been brought completely under its control. The family, not being directly linked to the economy, was the next to be subjugated. The communist state did not want to tolerate a private place where men could find refuge from its pressure.77 Family solidarity was perceived to be a threat to the devotion to communist ideals.78 Not concern for the stability of the family, but rather the desire to make totalitarianisation complete could be seen to underlie Stalin’s Ukase. Rheinstein was partly right when writing that ‘[c]onservatism in matters of marriage was thus demonstrated to be not simply a survival of Christian tradition but also a desideratum of purely secular statism’.79 To my mind, ‘a survival of Christian tradition’ was completely out of the question. Stalin’s policies were based on strictly secular ideas derived from Marxism and theories such as those of Léon Duguit, who was very popular in the 1920s, and Auguste Comte. The only thing that resembled the Christian tradition was the attempt to re-institutionalise marriage. Conclusion On the basis of this brief sketch of the historical development of family law in Europe I would like to make the following suggestions: - If we do not place the early Soviet and Portuguese reforms outside an explanatory framework as temporary excesses of a revolutionary period, it becomes clear that the first family law reforms did not take place in the countries with the most developed economies and the most democratic political regimes. The countries with the earliest and most far-reaching transformations of family law seem to have followed more or less the same pattern: the consolidation of the whole spectre of the ‘left’ political forces around the late-liberal ideas concerning the family and the position of women, a high level of secularisation and a radical break with the canonical concepts of marriage, divorce and illegitimacy. - Conservatism in family law does not primarily correlate with a less developed economy, but first and foremost with the measure of abandonment of the old canonical dogmas. This abandonment was slower in countries with a strong Church influence (such as Italy, Spain, Ireland and Greece).80 Even economically less developed East European 77A distinguished lawyer of that time wrote: ‘[T]he socialist State reserves for itself wide latitude for direct and active infringement into family relationships. . . . The state denies the qualification of relations between sexes as individual, intimate, and of no interest for State and society. . . . It dictates, determines rules to guarantee the interests of the collective, to force individuals to fulfil their duties towards the collective’; Sverdlov (1941), p. 58. 78The hero and martyr of that time was a young pioneer killed by his family because he betrayed his father as a kulak. 79Rheinstein (1972), p. 236. 80The Netherlands serves as another example: this country with a modern economy had until recently in several respects a very outdated family law, which is generally attributed to the strong influence of the Christian political parties